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ABSTRACT
The US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the
marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise -- UW is the military’s
doctrinal term for support to resistance activities and movements. This marginalization
results in inadequate consideration for applying UW as a strategic option for the nation.
Through a qualitative methods case study analysis utilizing macro- and microlevel process-tracing with a conceptual framework based on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems
Theory, the author shows that viable and acceptable resistance elements existed in
Syria in March 2011 to June 2014 and that the conventional US military failed to
recognize this development, adequately analyze its implications, and craft a strategic
UW option for the national security decision-makers to consider.
This finding is significant in that it exposes a deficiency in the US military’s
culture, structure and process that results in an incomplete and insufficient menu of
military options for the president. If these cultural, structural, and procedural flaws are
left unaddressed, the US is likely to repeat this strategic error in the future.
The author identifies specific recommendations for national security practitioners;
however, the overarching theme is the need to change the institutional culture and the
old structures of the conventional military to be able to provide the president a more
complete, comprehensive, and creative menu of options to consider when assessing
and responding to violent political crises short of conventional war.

viii

INTRODUCTION

“What often appears to be a personality-driven
or political debate between the commander-inchief and his strong-minded military advisors
actually has deeper institutional and cultural
roots. The ‘professional’ military officer has
certain expectations about how to craft ‘best
military advice’ for the president that are deeply
embedded into the organizational culture and
in fact hard-wired into the institutionalized and
incredibly detailed military planning process….
Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning
process fails to deliver the type of nuanced
advice in the form of creative options that the
president needs.”
--Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Plans from 200920121

The Syrian rebellion in the period of March 2011 to June 2014 can be viewed on
three distinct levels with one unifying theme that penetrates and links all three.
The first level is geostrategic. During this period, an opportunity existed to
disrupt the strategic partnership of Iran, Syria, and Lebanese Hizballah by supporting
non-terrorist resistance elements within Syria that sought to overthrow the Bashar alAssad regime and, by implication, break the weapons supply routes between Iran and
Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and
Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue”, Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 43 no.1, March 2013, 129.
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Lebanese Hizballah.2 Moreover, as the rebellion evolved into a civil war, the existence
of significant chemical weapons – and their use by the Assad regime – compounded the
geostrategic and realism view to this crisis.
The second level is counterterrorism. During this same period, what began as a
grassroots, non-terrorist, resistance movement quickly became violent. During the latter
portions of this time frame, the terrorist groups of al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) grew in strength and capabilities at the expense of the non-terrorist
resistance elements. With the fall of Mosul in June 2014, ISIS had established their
caliphate in western and northern Iraq plus eastern Syria.
The third level is humanitarian. The rebellion morphed into a civil war with
foreign intervention by Iran, Iranian-sponsored Shia militias from Iraq, Lebanese
Hizballah, and Russia. By 2016 several hundred thousand people had died and ten
million others were refugees or internally displaced.3
One unifying theme penetrates and links all three of these levels: the lack of an
effective strategic response from the United States.
What was the US response? This dissertation will show a very activity engaged
and committed US State Department. The dissertation will also show feckless US
military planning and options. Within the National Security Council and interagency
process, this divergence became apparent to the key participants.

For a more thorough examination of this strategic partnership between Iran, Syria, and
Hizballah, see Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism),” The
Washington Quarterly 36:4 (Fall 2013): 79-93.
3 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Deconstructing Syria: A Confederal Approach,” published
September 16, 2016, accessed November 4, 2016,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/deconstructing-syria-a-confederal-approach/
2

2

The president recognized that the situation in Syria was not a problem that the
US military could solve by itself. He also did not want to involve the US in another
conventional military invasion of another country; Afghanistan and Iraq were enough.
The president knew that working with the local Sunni population was the best way to
both fight the Islamic State and unseat the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – or to at
least coerce the regime to transition the government and hold free elections.4 Yet no
such option for providing military support to the Syrian resistance was provided by the
US military through the National Security Council to the president. With a conventional
military invasion off the table, the US military could muster no sufficient options to
satisfy the president. Limited airstrikes, maritime interdiction, refugee safe zones, and
secured humanitarian corridors would not be effective in driving Assad from office,
defeating ISIS, or in resolving the humanitarian crisis. Yet those were the only military
options provided to the president.5
As Janine Davidson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans from
2009-2012 wrote, “Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning process fails to deliver
the type of nuanced advice in the form of creative options that the president needs.”6
Senior leaders of the US military – a very conventional force -- complained that
no one could satisfactorily identify the various disjointed elements of the Syrian

Interview with President Barack Obama by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired
October 11, 2015 and was accessed February 5, 2016,
http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutes-syria-isis-2016-presidentialrace.
5 The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23,
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG112shrg7621.htm.
6 Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency”, 129.
4
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resistance, that is, the resistance did not present itself in an organized form from which
a central military leadership could be recognized and partnered with to receive US
weapons, ammunition, and training. Yet at the very same time, the US ambassador in
Damascus was training, advising, assisting, and equipping 1,500 Syrian political
activists – inside Syria, not expatriates in Europe – to build a network of activism that
consisted of strengthening local councils, civil society groups, free media, lawyers’
union, and private radio stations.7
As this dissertation will show, viable and acceptable resistance elements did
exist. The State Department was actively working with them – the leaders were known.
Moreover, using data and analysis published contemporary to this March 2011 to June
2014 period, even civilian research institutes and academics knew that a viable and
acceptable Syrian opposition existed. Indeed, some research institutions and nongovernmental organizations were communicating with these resistance force leaders.
This dissertation will show that the US military did not provide any viable options
to directly support this resistance movement during this critical period of March 2011 to
June 2014.
I do not argue that supporting the resistance would have “won the war” in Syria.
Rather, this dissertation is about strategic negligence; the negligence to provide a full
menu of military options to the National Security Council (NSC) principals, the president
included.
The questions become: Why and how does the best military in the history of the
world get to the point were it can provide only conventional military options, and when
US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United
States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 11.
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the conventional options do not fit, the US military is unable to provide any useful and
creative options, despite the subject of “unconventional warfare” or “military support to
resistance activities” being part of the US Army’s doctrinal mission set for decades?8
How and why does this happen? Answering these questions is the thrust of this
dissertation.
The US military is obligated by law to provide the president its “best military
advice”. That should include a complete menu of options, not just those constrained to
only conventional options like a modern day Maginot Line.9
To more formally introduce this dissertation, I will preview the research question,
hypothesis, conceptual or theoretical framework, key questions, and show how this
dissertation adds to the existing body of knowledge. I conclude this introduction with a
brief preview of the chapters.
The research question asks: Why and how did the US military miss the
opportunity to provide military support to a viable and acceptable Syrian resistance in
the March 2011 to June 2014 period?
My hypothesis is that the US military’s culture, structure, and process for
providing advice to the president and his national security decision-making team are
flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise. By
The terms “unconventional warfare” (UW) and “military support to resistance activities”
will be fully defined in chapter one. For now, suffice it to say that UW is the military’s
doctrinal term for “military support to resistance activities” and that the terms are
essentially synonymous.
9 The Maginot Line was an extensive and fortified defensive belt built by the French
after World War I to deter, defend, and defeat another German invasion. However,
when the Germans invaded again in World War II, they simply bypassed this extensive
and expensive defensive system with a flanking attack through Belgium. Since then the
term Maginot Line has referred to strategies or investments based on the experience of
the previous war that are not be applicable to the next conflict.
8

5

organizational structure and function – rooted in organizational culture – the UW experts
are literally assigned to organizations that exercise little to no role in major operational
decision-making; hence, the marginalization. The result is inadequate consideration for
applying UW as a strategic option for the nation.
The conceptual framework for this dissertation is based on Niklas Luhmann’s
Systems Theory that addresses complexity and a system or organization’s response to
such challenges. This will be reviewed in much more detail in chapters one and two,
but for now suffice it to say that the organizational or institutional biases within the
conventional US military precluded or at least obstructed any serious considerations for
strategic options to support the Syrian resistance movement.
To be sure, there are plausible rival hypotheses, and these are addressed within
this dissertation. The first rival hypothesis is the president provided guidance that preempted any consideration of military support to the resistance, or unconventional
warfare using the military’s doctrinal term. A variant to this first rival hypothesis
specifically highlights the then-secret negotiations with the Iranians over their nuclear
development program as the rationale for the president to direct his defense and military
leaders to not consider any such military option for Syria that could arguably derail
these negotiations with Iran. The second rival hypothesis states that the Department of
Defense (DoD) leaders themselves deliberately suppressed some US options, perhaps
due to either a desire to gather and preserve military resources in anticipation of a
possible war with Iran or out of a more general war-weariness after years of fighting in
Afghanistan and Iraq. This dissertation shows where the evidence supports or counters
these competing hypotheses.

6

I show in this dissertation that the primary hypothesis is correct – this is indeed
where, on balance, the preponderance of the evidence exists. However, there are still,
classified papers, briefings, and studies that could provide more evidence to any of
these hypotheses. Over time, these materials will be declassified and future
researchers can review this dissertation’s findings in that new light. Moreover, the new
evidence may show that although the rival hypotheses were not valid, they contained
elements of fact and analysis that would add to a richer understanding of the actual
causal mechanisms inherent in the original hypothesis. To this end, I anxiously await
the future researchers’ works.
The three key questions inherent in the investigation that links the research
question to the hypothesis and conclusions are:
•

Was there a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria in the period
March 2011 to June 2014?

•

If so, why and how did the US miss the opportunity to train, advise, and equip
them?

•

What are the resulting recommendations for national security practitioners?

This dissertation adds to the existing body of knowledge by exposing a deficiency
in the military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the president and
his national security decision-making team. This deficiency is a cultural, structural, and
process flaw that marginalizes the military’s expertise associated with supporting
resistance movements. As the early years of the Syrian rebellion demonstrated, there
are crises, contingencies, and events in the world that are not conducive to being solved

7

by conventional military operations. At the same time, doing nothing is often not a good
option either. More to the point, however, the US military has a niche capability within
its small Special Forces ranks that is trained, equipped, and professionalized with a
career path to plan, coordinate, and execute such options. But by structure, process,
and institutional culture of the conventional military, this expertise is marginalized. Thus,
this dissertation provides policy-relevant research that illuminates this deficiency and, by
implication, argues for its remedy.
Chapter one provides the research design for the dissertation. At its core, this is
a qualitative methods single case study with macro- and micro-level process-tracing.
The conceptual framework is based on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory that
addresses complexity and an organization’s responses to such challenges. Primary
source evidence included Congressional testimonies and memoirs from the key
participants in the decision-making, public statements from the White House and State
Department, plus interviews with senior leaders who participated in the decision-making
or were intimately familiar with the military’s culture, structure, and process concerning
unconventional warfare.
Chapter two provides the literature review that examines the previous academic
research that underpins the theoretical and conceptual framework of the dissertation.
Chapter three addresses the first of the three key questions: Was there a viable
and acceptable non-terrorist resistance force in Syria during the period March 2011 to
June 2014? Using source material contemporary to that period, including photos,
videos, and social media coupled with analysis graphically displayed on maps, the
reader can clearly see that such a resistance force existed. More significantly, any

8

military staff officer or intelligence analyst could and should have seen this same
information during this period.
Chapter four addresses the second of the three key questions: Why and how did
the US miss the opportunity to train, advise, and equip this resistance? I first review the
evolving US policy and strategy at the time, and then process-trace the key national
security decision-making concerning the military options. I then more directly address
the questions of how and why the US made its decisions. This analysis is based on
Luhmann’s Systems Theory. To answer the “how” portion I used a systems theory
approach to examine the military decision-making process for providing inputs to the
National Security Council (NSC). This approach revealed the inherent flaws for
developing military support to resistance activities – also known as “unconventional
warfare” options by marginalizing such experts from the key operational positions in the
decision-making. To answer the “why” portion, I showed that the conventional senior
military leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are prone to see and react to
developments in their environments that make sense only from their autopoiesis-based
frame of reference. In other words, they are biased towards providing conventional
warfare solutions.
The third of the three key questions concerns the resulting recommendations for
national security practitioners, but before I address that final question I consider the
counter-arguments, plausible rival hypotheses, and synthesize those results. For if the
analysis that answers the first two questions is faulty, the third question becomes
spurious. So in chapter five I present the counter-arguments, an analysis of the
plausible rival hypotheses (showing where and how well the evidence supports each),
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and then synthesize the results. The synthesis reveals and highlights a unique factor
concerning the role of “contact teams” to assess the resistance force. The significance
of this factor becomes a driving force in analyzing the recommendations of this study for
national security practitioners.
Chapter six addresses these recommendations, which focus on cultural,
structural, and process changes to address the deficiencies highlighted in chapter four.
The recommendations extend beyond this linear thinking, however, to more holistically
address the strategic nature of this issue; for example, what considerations should be
given to expanding the strategic partnership between the State Department, CIA, the
US Special Operations Command, and the private sector concerning joint planning,
coordination, and execution of support to resistance activities?
In summary, the US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice
to the president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the
marginalization of its own unconventional warfare -- or military support to resistance
activities -- expertise. This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for
applying unconventional warfare as a strategic option for the nation. If these cultural,
structural, and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, the US is likely to repeat this
strategic error in the future.
The research design that provides the basis for this dissertation is the subject of
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER ONE:
RESEARCH DESIGN10

--“What these studies show is a decline in …’old
war’ – that is to say, war involving states in which
battle is the decisive encounter…. New wars
involve networks of state and non-state actors and
most violence is directed against civilians….New
wars…are wars in which the difference between
internal and external is blurred; they are both
global and local and they are different both from
classic inter-state wars and classic civil wars.
--“In the context of spending cuts, there is a
tendency for governments to cut the very
capabilities most suitable for addressing new wars
and to protect their capabilities for fighting old
wars.
--“It turned out to be very difficult to change the
culture of the (US) military.”
-----Mary Kaldor, New War Theory11

At its core, this dissertation concerns the US military’s decision-making process
and its inability to effectively generate strategic options for the national security
decision-makers that involve support to resistance movements. The early years of the
Syrian rebellion provide the venue or the case for this analysis. Given the unit of

Portions of this chapter appeared in earlier papers submitted during coursework at the
University of South Florida. Specifically, POS 6933 PhD Capstone in the Spring
Semester of 2017 and POS 6707 Qualitative Methods in the Fall Semester 2016.
11 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd ed.,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), vi-vii.
10
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analysis as the US military’s decision-making process concerning supporting to
resistance elements, with Syria as the case, this dissertation illuminates how exactly
this decision-making structure, process, and culture failed to work effectively by
marginalizing expertise in supporting resistance activities. This can best be described
as a “pathway case” (Gerring, 2007) where causal effects can be isolated from other
potentially confounding factors indicating its uniquely penetrating insight into causal
mechanisms.12
Acknowledging this focus, I utilize the qualitative methods technique of a single
case study with macro- and micro-level process-tracing. Primary source evidence
included Congressional testimonies and memoirs from the key participants in the
decision-making, public statements from the White House and State Department, plus
interviews with senior leaders participating in the decision-making or who were
intimately familiar with the military’s structure, process, and culture concerning support
to resistance movements.
The major sections of this chapter are:
•

Research question and unit of analysis

•

Scope and frame

•

Hypothesis

•

Conceptual framework

•

Substantive focus

•

Concepts, definitions, and variables

•

Plausible rival hypotheses

John Gerring, “Is there a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?” Comparative Political
Studies Vol 40 Number 3, March 2007, Sage Publications, 238-239.
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•

The three key questions

•

Methodology

•

Data collection plan

•

The contribution of the dissertation

Research Question and Unit of Analysis
The research question is: Why and how did the US military miss the opportunity
to provide military support to viable and acceptable Syrian resistance elements in the
March 2011 – June 2014 period?
The unit of analysis concerns the US military’s decision-making structure,
process, culture, and recommendations to the National Security Council (NSC)
concerning support to resistance activities.

Scope and Frame
This dissertation is scoped and framed both temporally and functionally. The
time period of March 2011 to June 2014 corresponds to the outbreak of the rebellion in
Daraa in March 2011 and concludes when the US administration finally decided to
provide military support to the resistance in June 2014. The fall of Mosul to the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also occurred in June 2014, which finally triggered the US
decision to become more militarily active in the region.
Functionally, this dissertation is limited to the US military’s support to the
resistance. The dissertation will not review or discuss any Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) involvement with resistance elements that may or may not have been occurring,
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with the exception of the September 2012 NSC meeting where President Obama
rejected a recommendation for the CIA to arm the resistance, only to reverse his
decision the following year, as documented in the memoirs of Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.

Hypothesis:
The US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the
marginalization of unconventional warfare expertise. This marginalization results in
inadequate consideration for applying unconventional warfare as a strategic option for
the nation.

Conceptual Framework
This dissertation concerns the US military’s culture, structure, and decisionmaking process and its inability to generate strategic options for the national security
decision-makers that involve support to resistance movements. Consequently, the
theoretical or conceptual framework of this dissertation concerns national security
decision-making -- not resistance movements and not revolutions. More broadly, this
concerns systems theory. The core theoretical basis for this study is Niklas Luhmann’s
Systems Theory (Luhmann, 2002) that recognizes and addresses complexity and a
system’s or organization’s tendency to reproduce or reinforce its own structure and
activities rather than to more openly or holistically address the challenge of change.
This focus from Luhmann on complexity and an organization’s processing of complexity
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is significantly more advanced than earlier systems theorists’ work that tended to focus
on structural-functionalism and relatively simple input and output designs. Moreover,
Luhmann suggests that when an organization has established a mechanism to reduce
uncertainty, other alternative options are likely to be discarded. As such, Luhmann’s
approach to system theory and its work with complexity is more applicable to today’s
national security environment than the earlier simplistic theories.
There are several main components to Luhmann’s theory that I highlight in
relation to this dissertation: autopoiesis, complexity, rationality, communications, and
decisions.
Autopoiesis, literally meaning self-production or creation, refers to a system or
organization that reproduces or maintains itself or its boundaries like a biological cell.
Luhmann stripped away the biological depiction and instead emphasized the reflective
and self-reproductive nature of this action for systems or organizations.13 Luhmann
further argued that the environment is a distinct element that exists outside or beyond
the boundaries of the autopoiesis system. How well the system or organization could
recognize and respond to developments in the environment, especially with the
organization’s desire to continue to reproduce itself in its current image, bears a strong
resemblance to how the US military would respond – or not respond – to resistance
activities in Syria.
Likewise, Luhmann’s writings on complexity provide an interesting lens to view
the Syria case. Luhmann argues that a system or organization “bundles” complex
developments in the environment and then undertakes indifference or other
Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, trans. Peter Gilgen (Malden, MA:
Polity Press, 2013), viii-xiv.
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arrangements to deal with this complexity. The system engages in a “reduction of
complexity” by ignoring or treating the new developments with a template or design that
it previously experienced under different conditions.14 Consequently, the organization is
not fully seeing, understanding, and then developing appropriate responses to the new
development – exactly the same three verbs I will use in the formulation of the variables
for this dissertation. Instead, the system or organization has a “tendency to limit the
problem to the question of the arrangements that a system has at its disposal.”15
In his discussion on rationality, Luhmann posits that systems or organizations will
avoid or exclude developments that are deemed risky before they then rationally
evaluate possible response options. In Luhmann’s words, there is “always a nonrational zone outside the marked space” for rational consideration.16 This comment
provides a strong segue for a subsequent discussion on Alex Mintz’ theory of decisionmaking in upcoming paragraphs.
Luhmann advocated that one should treat communications and not actions as
the elements of a social system.17 Within the concept of autopoiesis, Luhmann
considered communications as essential for the system or organization to reproduce or
reinforce itself.18 The flow of information, from recognition, to understanding, and to
crafting responses, all underscore the significance of communications, or the
transmission and reception of information, to shaping decision-making for an

Ibid., 121.
Ibid., 124.
16 Ibid., 136.
17 David Seidl, Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Social Systems (Munich: University of
Munich School of Management, 2004), 11.
18 Ibid.
14
15
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organization or system. This flow of information will be the focus of the process-tracing
methodology used to examine the decision-making associated with the Syrian rebellion.
Luhmann considered organizations as social systems that would reproduce
themselves on the basis of their internal decisions.19 Based upon the organization’s
processing of information, the organization would decide what actions to take and these
decisions would shape the conditions for future decisions or adaptation. Thus, decision
would form a precedent for shaping future decisions and adaptations.
Together, Luhmann’s systems theory with the inherent concepts of autopoiesis,
complexity, rationality, communications, and decisions provide a strong conceptual
framework for this dissertation
Luhmann acknowledges that his theory is highly abstract.20 To provide a bridge,
pathway, or connective tissue between Luhmann’s theory and the very pragmatic
(perhaps dogmatic) military decision-making process, I use Alex Mintz’ theory of foreign
policy decision-making in a supporting role to Luhmann. Mintz’ theory of foreign policy
decision-making sequentially integrates cognitive and rational theories.21 As Mintz
describes it, there are two general schools of thought for foreign policy decision-making:
rationale choice and cognitive psychology. Mintz integrates both of these approaches
by stating that decision-makers actually use a two-stage process that first eliminates
alternatives with unacceptable returns (the cognitive psychology approach) and then
analyzes the remaining options with the clear risk-gain lens (rational decision-making).
This first stage process that eliminates options or ideas from a subsequent round of
Ibid., 15.
Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, 7.
21 Alex Mintz, ed., Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories of Foreign Policy
Decision Making (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).
19
20
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“rationale” decision-making strongly supports and is illustrative of Luhmann’s systems
theory. I review this in more detail in the literature review chapter.
In the case of the early years of the Syrian rebellion, these structural, process,
and organizational cultural factors formed a “glaucoma” that precluded a full vision,
understanding, and response from the US military to the National Security Council.22

Substantive Focus:
Figure 1 is an overly simplistic view of national security decision-making
concerning military support to resistance activities. Acknowledging Luhmann’s Systems
Theory, which better captures the complexities of systems and decision-making, this
sketch does concisely convey a simplistic structure of decision-making. As Luhmann
would immediately inject, however, this simplistic view of the Intelligence Community,
State Department, and Defense Department inputs on the left side of this chart are, in
fact, each separate systems and environments that provide their inputs to the NSC.
Nevertheless, Figure 1 is a simple way to quickly orient the reader to the NSC decisionmaking process.

This concept of a “theoretical glaucoma” is taken from Mohsen M. Milani’s The
Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, 2nd ed.
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 10. As Dr. Milani used the term, he highlighted
that there was no lack of information that foretold the ulama’s ultimate victory; rather,
there was a “theoretical glaucoma” that precluded a proper view and understanding of
the situation. Likewise, in the case of the early years of the Syrian rebellion, the
information on the resistance was abundantly available, but failed to be understood and
processed into feasible options by the US military.

22
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Backdrop of Other National Security Factors

Backdrop of Domestic Political

-Allies’ and adversaries’ views, intentions,

Considerations

capabilities, and probable actions

-Congressional Support

-Regional actors’ views, intentions,

-Popular Support

capabilities, and probable actions
-Other competing crises

Output To:

Inputs From:
Intelligence Community
Department of State
Department of Defense

National Security Council
Deliberations
State

President’s
Decision

Defense
Vice President
Intelligence

Figure 1: National Security Decision-Making on Military Support to
Resistance Activities (MSRA) Post-9/11
The Broad Aperture View

The substantive focus is on the unit of analysis (the US military’s decisionmaking structure, process, culture, and recommendations to the NSC concerning
support to resistance activities) and the environment and culture in the national security
enterprise that are relevant to limiting or marginalizing UW inputs. At the macro-level,
depicted in Figure 1, the output is the President’s decision to provide the military
support to the resistance or not, or some variant of limited support in between. As the
figure shows, the President’s decision-making is influenced by many actors and events,
including inputs from the Intelligence Community, Department of State, and Department
of Defense against the backdrop of many international factors. There is also a
backdrop of domestic political considerations, again depicted in the figure, but with the
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important understanding that the National Security Council (NSC) is the entity that
reviews, analyzes, and synthesizes all of the information and various options and then
presents a consolidated recommendation to the President for his decision. To this end,
this case study on Syria provides limited generalizations that will be useful to inform this
broader framework and process for national security decision-making.
Next, when the aperture is then narrowed to examine only the military’s inputs
into this larger process, we can isolate useful variables and steps that allow a more
focused case study examination of the military’s decision-making process for supporting
resistance movements, and in this specific case concerning the early years of the
Syrian rebellion. Figure 2 depicts this more narrow and focused view on the military’s
decision making. As shown, the independent variable, for the specific case of Syrian
resistance, is the ability to See and Understand the Resistance Activity and Potential.
The intervening variable is Develop Military Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA)
Options. The Dependent Variable is then Gain Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(C/JCS) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Approval and Submit the Options to the
National Security Council (NSC).
Figure 2 then is a key part of the research design and operationalization. This is
how exactly and concretely I assess the problem of marginalization of unconventional
warfare (UW) knowledge, expertise, and input into national security decision-making.
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See and Understand
The Resistance
Activities and
Potential

Develop MSRA
Options

Independent Variable

Intervening Variable

Gain Chairman and
Secretary of Defense
Approval and Submit
Options
to the NSC
Dependent Variable

Figure 2: National Security Decision-Making on
Military Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA) Post-9/11
The Narrow Aperture View

Concepts, Definitions, and Variables:
There are two parts to this section. The first section will define terms whose
definitions are essential to understanding the dissertation, like the nuanced but critical
difference between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Special Forces (SF). The
second section focuses on defining the independent, intervening, and dependent
variables in both nominal and operational terms.
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Key Terms Defined
Unconventional Warfare and Military Support to Resistance Activities
The following terms are essential to fully comprehend the various elements of the
dissertation. The term Unconventional Warfare (UW) is essentially synonymous with
Military Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA). UW is a military term defined by the
Department of Defense (DoD) as, “Activities conducted to enable a resistance
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying
power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a
denied area.”23 In simpler terms, UW is political, economic, and military support to
resistance activities or a resistance movement. Resistance movements could include
insurgents, militants, and other irregular armed political groups. There are also nonviolent resistance movements, like the resistance movement within Serbia that
unseated Milosevic from power in 2000.
With regards to the issue of which resistance groups the US should support, a
key determinant would be sufficient overlap or commonality of the goals and objectives
of the resistance group with the US national security interests. Other factors to consider
include analyzing if the resistance group has the capability of achieving the objectives
and if it will operate within the expected norms of warfare, i.e. the group will not engage
in terrorist tactics.
In this dissertation I use both terms: UW when the discussion is focused on the
internal US military deliberations, MSRA when the discussion emphasizes the broader
US interagency (e.g., State Department, CIA, others). Those distinctions make for
23

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, July
16, 2014, GL-12.
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nuanced differences; however, the two terms are essentially synonymous. To avoid
confusion, I often use the combined acronym of MSRA/UW in this dissertation.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Special Forces (SF)
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are forces from the Army, Navy, Marines, and
Air Force specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special
operations, which include UW, direct action kill/capture raids, and special
reconnaissance.24 However, not all SOF are trained, organized, and focused on UW.
The primacy for UW resides with the Army’s Special Operations Forces, and more
specifically, its sub-set of the Special Forces community, more commonly known as the
nation’s Green Berets.
Special Forces (SF) are Army special operations personnel who are “organized,
trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on UW
capabilities.”25 This is the only element within the US military uniquely focused on UW.

Viable and Acceptable Resistance
This phrase “viable and acceptable resistance” holds a prominent role in the
research question and helps to frame the resulting analysis. I will parse, define, and
carefully describe each of these words
Viable means feasible or capable of working successfully; in this case, capable of
successfully executing unconventional warfare. I have already provided the definition of
unconventional warfare as activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or
24
25

Ibid., GL-11.
Ibid., GL-10.
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with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. So, in the Syrian
context, viable refers to having that capability to successfully disrupt, coerce, or
overthrow the Assad regime. Keeping in mind that the words “disrupt, coerce, or
overthrown” are on a spectrum of their own, a resistance force that is not yet able to
overthrow the Assad regime, but one that can still disrupt it, is still, by definition, a viable
resistance force. Moreover, once US support, like weapons, ammunition, and training,
is provided to such a resistance force, one would expect to see the capabilities of the
resistance force expand from simple disruption to coercion and then overthrow.
Acceptable means suitable or allowed. In this case, an “acceptable” resistance
force would need to meet three criteria. First, the interests and objectives of the
resistance force must align with interests and objectives of the US. This does not
necessarily mean that the resistance force likes or supports the US, only that the
interests and objectives align. So, to the extent that the US sought to seek the removal
of the Assad regime and the resistance force did as well, then this first criteria is met
regardless of whether the rebels were pro-US or not. Second, the political end state of
the resistance could not contradict US values; i.e., the resistance force could not strive
to establish a dictatorship while receiving US support. Third, the resistance force could
not use terrorist tactics, i.e. deliberately targeting civilians for political affects on a
different entity, normally the governing or occupying power. (The definition and
description of terrorism is discussed in the next section.)
While the term resistance has many variants, most support the idea of an
organized political opposition to a governing or occupying power. Often this political
opposition, or at least core elements of it, must remain clandestine or underground to
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avoid arrest from the governing or occupying power. This organized political opposition
– and the term “organized” spans a spectrum of various degrees from incipient to highly
organized – could espouse violent and/or nonviolent measures in its resistance
activities. Violent political struggles are not uncommon in the history of the world or in
the development of freedom or liberty for oppressed groups.
Within the context of violent resistance, however, one must draw a distinction
between terrorism and non-terrorism tactics.

Terrorism
There is no one universally agreed upon definition of terrorism. Section 2656f(d)
of Title 22 of the United States Code defines terrorism as premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents.26 The definition of terrorism from the US military is, “The unlawful
use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other
ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals
that are usually political.”27
Given this variance, I accept and use both the State and Defense Department
definitions since this dissertation concerns the US interagency decision-making
process. The synthesis that I will emphasize, however, is the deliberate targeting of
innocent men, women, and children for political effects on a different entity, normally the

United States Department of State, Legislative Requirements and Key Terms,
accessed May 21, 2017 at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf
27
US Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, March 2017), accessed April 1, 2017 at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf
26
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governing or occupying power. Of significance -- and this must be underscored -- a
terrorist deliberately targets innocent people. Thus, detonating a car bomb in a crowded
market place to deliberately target innocent civilians is a terrorist act. However,
detonating a car bomb that deliberately targets a military checkpoint or soldiers is not a
terrorist act. This latter act is undoubtedly unlawful and criminal from the perspective of
the affected country, but this is not an act of terrorism. Likewise, a bombing that
intentionally and deliberately targets a military position but unintentionally harms
innocents is not a terrorist act – there was no deliberate attempt to target civilians. This
distinction is significant and must be understood before progressing in the analysis
presented in this dissertation.
Two non-Syrian examples illustrate this important point. Both Lebanese
Hizballah and Hamas, although portraying and conducting themselves as resistance
forces to Israeli occupation and activities, are also terrorist groups because at times
they deliberately target civilians. Their attacks deliberately targeting civilians are not
conducted by rogue commanders or units; rather, they are authorized and directed by
senior leaders of these organizations.
For purposes of this dissertation, I draw a sharp line between the terrorist and
non-terrorist resistance elements that operated in Syria in the March 2012 to June 2014
period. These will be clearly delineated and described in chapter three.

Defining the Variables in Nominal and Operational Terms
This second section focuses on defining the independent, intervening, and
dependent variables in both nominal and operational terms.
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See and Understand
The Resistance
Activities and
Potential
Independent Variable

Develop MSRA
Options

Intervening Variable

Gain Chairman and
Secretary of Defense
Approval and Submit
Options
to the NSC
Dependent Variable

Definition: The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective J-2 sections
directs, collects, analyzes, and reports assessments of the Syrian
resistance to their J-3s, J-5s, and Commander/Chairman.
Operationalize:
1. Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff intel assessment inputs
provided to the planners. (Due to classification this will be unavailable.)
2. In the absence of the classified assessments, show assessments from
others, to include those from the State Department and private organizations.
In other words, show what was available to any entity (military or private)
that was looking for it.)
3. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.
Figure 3: Defining and Operationalizing the Independent Variable

The independent variable, as depicted in the above figure, is the ability to “See
and Understand the Resistance Activity and Potential”. The nominal definition of this
variable is “The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective intelligence (J-2)
sections direct, collect, analyze, and report assessments of the Syrian resistance to
their operations officer (J-3), plans officer (J-5), and Commander/Chairman”. There are
three critical elements or measurements to operationalize this definition:
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1. Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff intelligence assessment inputs
provided to the planners. (Due to its security classification this assessment will be
unavailable.)
2. In the absence of the classified assessments, show assessments from others, to
include those from the State Department and private organizations. In other words,
show what was available to any entity (military or private) that was looking for it.
3. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.

See and Understand
The Resistance
Activities and
Potential

Independent Variable

Develop MSRA
Options

Intervening Variable

Gain Chairman and
Secretary of Defense
Approval and Submit
Options
to the NSC

Dependent Variable

Definition: The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective
J-5 sections conduct planning, which includes UW options, and
presents recommendations to the Commander/Chairman.
Operationalize:
1. Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff planning products
(i.e. staff estimates) provided to the Commander/Chairman.
(Due to classification this will be unavailable.)
2. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.
Figure 4: Defining and Operationalizing the Intervening Variable
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The intervening variable, as depicted in the above figure, is “Develop Military
Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA) Options”. The nominal definition of this
variable is “The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective plans (J-5) section
conducts planning, which includes UW options, and presents recommendations to the
Commander/Chairman”. There are two critical elements or measurements to
operationalize this definition:
1. Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff planning products (i.e., staff
estimates) provided to the Commander/Chairman. (Due to its security classification this
estimate will be unavailable.)
2. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.
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See and Understand
The Resistance
Activities and
Potential

Independent Variable

Develop MSRA
Options

Intervening Variable

Gain Chairman and
Secretary of Defense
Approval and Submit
Options
to the NSC
Dependent Variable

Definition: The Secretary of Defense, with advice from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approves the
planning and forwards it to the NSC for staff review and
presidential approval
Operationalize:
1. Show the plans submission from DoD to the NSC.
(Due to classification this will be unavailable.)
2. Show testimony from those who observed this event and had access to the
information (e.g. the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
Director of the CIA) and show how they described and assessed it.
Figure 5: Defining and Operationalizing the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is then “Gain Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(C/JCS) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Approval and Submit the Options to the
National Security Council (NSC)”. The nominal definition of this variable is “The
Secretary of Defense, with advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
approves the planning and forwards it to the NSC for staff review and presidential
approval”. There are two critical elements or measurements to operationalize this
definition:
1. Show the plans submission from DoD to the NSC. (Due to its security classification
this plan will be unavailable.)
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2. Show testimony from those who observed this event and had access to the
information (e.g. the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA) and
show how they described and assessed it.

Plausible Rival Hypotheses
As identified earlier in this chapter, my hypothesis is that the US military structure
and process for providing advice to the president and his national security decisionmaking team are flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare expertise.
This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying unconventional
warfare as a strategic option for the nation.
However, there are two plausible rival hypotheses that need to be considered:
•

Presidential guidance preempted any consideration of MSRA.

•

DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the MSRA/UW option and did not
present it to the NSC.

In chapter five I apply the evidence against each of these hypotheses.

Rival Hypothesis #1: Presidential Guidance Preempted any Consideration
of MSRA.
Under this rival hypothesis, the president would have provided guidance to the
NSC principals or military senior leaders to not consider any serious options or
recommendations for military operations in Syria. I found no evidence to support this
hypothesis, although it is true that the President was reluctant to get involved in Syria.
The President disapproved the CIA Director’s proposal to provide limited arms to the
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resistance in September 2012, although the Secretaries of State and Defense endorsed
the plan.28 However, after the Assad regime used chemical weapons against his own
people, the President changed his position and approved the CIA plan to arm the
resistance in June 2013.29 Despite the President’s initial reluctance and subsequent
approval to provide limited CIA arms to the resistance, there are no indications that he
provided guidance to the military to not initiate any recommendation for a larger military
support option. Given Clinton’s and Panetta’s disclosure and discussion of these
debates in their memoirs, it seems unlikely they would avoid commenting on this
presidential guidance to the military, if it occurred.

Variant to Rival Hypothesis One: The Iranian Negotiations Factor
A variant to this rival hypothesis concerns the initiation of the then confidential
negotiations between the US, Iran, and others to limit Iran’s development of nuclear
capabilities in exchange for the relaxation of the economic sanctions. Under this
scenario, the President would not want other areas of conflict to emerge between the
US and Iran lest they disturb or otherwise adversely affect the ongoing negotiations. In
this case too, however, I found no evidence supporting this option. That said, since
absence-of-evidence is not evidence-of-absence, this remains an open question for
future researchers. As the years pass, it is reasonable to expect at least some
classified documents concerning this topic will be declassified and available to
researchers.
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Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 463.
Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 450.
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Rival Hypothesis #2: DoD Leaders Deliberately Suppressed the UW Option
Under this rival hypothesis, there are two independent reasons why this would
have been plausible. First, concern over a looming possible war with Iran, it could be
speculated, would have caused the military leaders in the US Central Command and
the Joint Staff to deliberately suppress the UW option so that they could husband the
necessary military resources in advance of that possible conflict. Second, a more
general war-weariness within the senior military ranks from years of fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan could have led the military leaders to suppress any consideration to
become involved in the Syrian conflict to include UW.

The Three Key Questions
Linking the research question to the hypothesis and conclusions are three key
supporting questions that provide the framework for the main sections of this
dissertation.
•

Was there a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria in the period
March 2011 to June 2014?

•

If so, why and how did the US miss the opportunity to train, advise, and
equip them?

•

What are the resulting recommendations for national security
practitioners?

Methodology:
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (building on Arend Lijphart and Harry
Eckstein’s works) described six theory building approaches or objectives for qualitative
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methods case studies.30 Of those, the disciplined configurative case studies that use
established theories to explain a case is the best frame for this dissertation. That said,
if this single case study was expanded to include the other MSRM events, then the
resulting larger research effort would fit the model of the “building block” study of
phenomenon used to identify patterns for a broader set of conclusions, and this case
and dissertation could be considered one of those building blocks. However, for
purposes of this dissertation, the disciplined configurative case study approach is the
proper frame, although I discuss this broader topic in the conclusion.
More specifically this dissertation is a single case study with macro- and microprocess-tracing to capture the complexity of the military inputs to the National Security
Council decision-making. Primary source evidence included Congressional testimonies
and memoirs from the key participants in the decision-making, plus public statements
from the White House and State Department. Other primary source evidence included
elite interviews with senior leaders participating in this decision-making or those who are
subject matter experts in the cultural-institutional biases of the military.
To answer the “how” portion of the research question, I used a systems theory
approach to examine the military decision-making process for providing inputs to the
National Security Council (NSC). This approach revealed the inherent flaws for
developing military support to resistance activities – also known as “unconventional
warfare” options by marginalizing such experts from the key operational positions in the
decision-making. To answer the “why” portion of the research question, I showed that

30

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 74-76.
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the conventional senior military leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are
prone to see and react to developments in their environments that make sense only
from their autopoiesis-based frame of reference. In other words, they are biased
towards providing conventional warfare solutions.

Data Collection Plan:
There were four elements to the data collection plan: background research,
detailed review of key decision-maker comments from their Congressional testimonies
and memoirs, interviews of senior leaders involved in the decision-making, and the
construction of process-trace charts that reveal the interconnectedness (or lack thereof)
of the decision-making. These four parts are not purely sequential steps; rather, there
is a necessary and advantageous overlap between these four elements.
First, the background research detail the existence of the moderate Syrian
resistance movements during March 2011 to June 2014 exclusively using data
contemporary to that period – in other words, showing the existence of the resistance
movement with data that the US military and intelligence communities could and should
have seen independent from any classified sources and methods. In addition, during
this research phase I document the structural-functionalism and systems theory
approaches of the military decision-making process.
Second, I researched and extracted comments from the key senior leaders
involved in this decision-making. These leaders included the President, the Secretaries
of State (Clinton and Kerry) and Defense (Gates, Panetta, and Hagel), the Chairman of
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Mullen and Dempsey), and the US Ambassador to Syria
(Ford).
Third, only after researching exactly what they said and when they said it, did I
arrange and conduct interviews with some of the senior leaders that would have
participated or at least observed this decision-making. This involved interviews with the
US Ambassador to Syria at that time, Robert S. Ford, and retired Lieutenant General
Charles Cleveland, who commanded the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
during much of this period.
Fourth, given the data above, I constructed process-trace charts at two levels,
macro and micro. First, I listed and categorized all major political and military events
associated with the Syrian rebellion of March 2011 to June 2014, arranging them not
just temporally but by categories of actions taken by Syrian actors (Assad regime,
resistance elements) plus ISIS, actions by other states (minus the US) and international
organizations, and actions by the US government to include internal decision-making
events. These more than one hundred events, which are displayed in over thirty pages
of charts found in Appendix A, constitute the macro-level process-tracing of this case
study. Second, the analysis shows that seven of these events were particularly critical
in terms of the US decision-making. I isolated each of these seven events and framed
them as micro-level process-tracing which provided a timeline, identified the actors
involved in the particular event, and analyzed their inputs to that decision-making event
– in other words, who said what, where, when, why, and how.
An example chart is shown below – one that will be discussed in more detail in
chapter four. In the below example of the micro-level process-trace, I highlight two
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significant Congressional testimonies that occurred within one week of each other. In
the first event, Ambassador Ford testifies that he was training and equipping 1500 local
activists within Syria in how to organize and conduct their political resistance activities.
Then, within a week of this event, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testifies that
he cannot “clearly identify the right people” in the resistance.31 Such a diverging
assessment within the US government illuminates the deficiencies in the military’s
inputs to the National Security Council.
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Amb Ford testifies April 11th to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the State Department has trained
and equipped (non-lethal) over 1,500 local leaders and activists within Syria; the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff testifies April 17th that he cannot identify the resistance. “If we could clearly
identify the right people, I would support it.”

Figure 6: (Example of Process-Tracing Chart) Significant Divergence
Apparent Between DoD Senior Leaders and the US Ambassador in Syria
on Assessing the Resistance (April 2013)
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 113th Congress, 1st Session,
April 17, 2013. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, accessed
September 23, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
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This process-trace of the decision-making – of which the above chart is only a
sample event -- is key to the analysis, findings, and conclusions of this dissertation
research.

The Contribution of this Dissertation:
This dissertation makes one major and two secondary but important
contributions. The major contribution of this dissertation is the provision of a detailed
case study that demonstrates the role of organizational culture within the US military
between the conventional military, including the kill/capture SOF elements, versus the
unconventional forces (support to resistance elements) and ties this cleavage to policy
outcomes in the early years of the Syrian rebellion. In other words, a case study in US
interagency and military decision-making process that shows the marginalization of
MSRA/UW expertise in the formulation of strategic options provided to the president.
The secondary but important contributions are to theory testing and towards
bridging the gap from theory to policy development.
First, the conceptual framework for this dissertation is based on Niklas
Luhmann’s Systems Theory that addresses complexity and a system or organization’s
responses to such challenges. This dissertation tests and supports important elements
of Luhmann’s theory: autopoiesis, complexity, rationality, communications, and
decisions. The case study of the US military’s decision-making concerning the Syrian
rebellion becomes a useful example of a system dealing with complexity by aggregating
information and foreclosing options that do not fit with the autopoiesis nature of the
organization.
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Second, this dissertation contributes to the body of knowledge by beginning to
illuminate the causal conditions between the structure, function, bureaucracy culture,
assignment pattern of key military leaders, and the resulting uneven application of UW
as a national security option. In so doing, this dissertation provides policy-relevant
research for national security practitioners on the UW option.
Future research should examine this pattern of uneven application of UW in the
post-9/11 period by researching other cases or attempting to discern other factors that
may have affected these outcomes. Additionally, as more information concerning the
early years of the Syrian rebellion becomes declassified, future researchers should
reexamine this dissertation and challenge its assessments with the new information.
Chapter Summary
This chapter provided the research design for this dissertation. In the
subsequent chapters I show that the US military structure and process for providing
advice to the president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due
to the marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise. This marginalization
results in inadequate consideration to applying UW as a strategic option for the nation.
This inadequate planning and decision-making during the Syrian rebellion in 2011-2014
is an act of negligence that the US cannot afford to repeat.
In the next chapter I examine the literature associated with this issue and its
conceptual framework.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW32

“President Kennedy came into office believing that
American security would be challenged by guerilla
forces against whom American power would have
to be used in limited and quite special ways. He
therefore began an effort to develop such a
capability within the Army. That ran contrary to the
Army’s definition of its essence, which involved
ground combat by regular divisions, and by and
large the Army was able to resist Kennedy’s
effort.”33
--Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp

This dissertation concerns the US military’s decision-making process and its
inability to effectively generate strategic options for the national security decisionmakers that involve support to resistance movements. Consequently, the literature
review for this dissertation concerns national security decision-making -- not resistance
movements and not revolutions. In this chapter I describe the literature concerning US
national security decision-making in general, and specifically the US military decisionmaking process as it addresses support to resistance movements. In so doing, I
highlight the gap in the literature that this dissertation addresses.
Portions of this chapter appeared in earlier papers submitted during coursework at the
University of South Florida. Specifically, POS 6933 PhD Capstone in the Spring
Semester of 2017 and POS 6707 Qualitative Methods in the Fall Semester 2016.
33 Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy,
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 33.
32
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The analysis of the literature underscores the significant role of organizational
culture and how that shapes the inputs from the various institutions; e.g., the State
Department, the Intelligence Community, and the Defense Department. Furthermore,
the literature shows organizational cultural cleavages between the various Services of
the US military; i.e., the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. These are well known to
even the casual observer of national security affairs.
However, there are two other important institutional and cultural cleavages that
are not as well documented in the literature that manifest themselves in this research.
First is the cleavage between the conventional military and the Special Operations
Forces (SOF), which is somewhat known due to the recent wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Second, and arguably more salient, is institutional and cultural cleavage within the
Special Operations community: the cleavage between the units that specialize in
kill/capture operations and those who specialize in unconventional warfare – support to
resistance elements. It is this institutional and organizational cleavage between the
conventional military, including the kill/capture SOF elements, versus the
unconventional warfare organizations that have sparse literature coverage. This is the
arena of this dissertation and where the dissertation makes its contributions. This study
uniquely demonstrates the role of organizational culture within the US military between
the conventional military including the kill/capture SOF elements versus the
unconventional forces (support to resistance elements) and ties this cleavage to policy
outcomes in the early years of the Syrian rebellion. Although the literature shows a few
isolated sparks of brilliance concerning this line of thinking (Votel, Cleveland, Connett,
and Irwin, 2016), these sparks have not yet caught fire within the conventional military
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establishment nor within the national security enterprise. The conventional military
seems to minimize such thinking and writing.
This chapter is organized into the following seven sections, and the unifying
thread between all of them is the factor of organizational culture. From general to
specific, the first six sections, starting with a review of the conceptual framework from
Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, build a logic chain that demonstrates the critical role
or organizational culture in US national security decision-making. The seventh section
then culminates this chapter by showing how this dissertation contributes to this body of
knowledge.
•

The Base: The Conceptual Framework of Luhmann’s Systems Theory

•

The Big Picture: Foreign Policy and National Security Decision-Making

•

Role of Organizational Culture within the National Security Decision-Making

•

Organizational Culture and Cleavage within the US Military

•

Organizational Culture and Cleavage within Special Operations

•

Emerging Literature

•

The Contribution of this Dissertation: Addressing the Gap

The Base: The Conceptual Framework of Luhmann’s Systems Theory
As described more fully in the previous chapter, the core theoretical basis for this
study is Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory (Luhmann, 2002) that recognizes and
addresses complexity and a system’s or organization’s tendency to reproduce or
reinforce its own structure and activities rather than to more openly or holistically
address the challenge of change. Luhmann suggests that when an organization has
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established a mechanism to reduce uncertainty, other alternative options are likely to be
discarded.
Luhmann’s writings on complexity provide an interesting lens to view the Syria
case. Luhmann argues that a system or organization “bundles” complex developments
in the environment and then undertakes indifference or other arrangements to deal with
this complexity. The system engages in a “reduction of complexity” by ignoring or
treating the new developments with a template or design that it previously experienced
under different conditions.34 The system or organization has a “tendency to limit the
problem to the question of the arrangements that a system has at its disposal.”35
Joseph Pilotta, Timothy Widman, and Susan Jasko further developed Luhmann’s
theory with a focus on organizational culture. (Pilotta, Widman, and Jasko, 2014) The
authors argue “organizational culture serves the maintenance and development of
organizations by providing important ordering mechanisms that further the
organization’s domination of complex information environments.”36 They argue that
Luhmann reduces “complexity by simultaneously transmitting both a selected alternative
from among multiple action possibilities and the motivation for the acceptance of that
selection.”37 Of significance, they add, “Organizational culture consists primarily of

Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, trans. Peter Gilgen (Malden, MA:
Polity Press, 2013), 121.
35 Ibid., 124.
36 Joseph J. Pilotta, Timothy J. Widman, and Susan A. Jasko, “Meaning and Action in
the Organizational Setting: An Interpretive Approach,” in An Introduction to Niklas
Luhmann: Logic and Investigations, ed. Joseph J. Pilotta and Wei-San Sun (New York:
Hampton Press, 2014,148.
37 Ibid., 154.
34
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open-ended context framed by significant symbols and modes of legitimated social
action that enables selective responses to changes.”38
Luhmann posits that systems or organizations will avoid or exclude
developments that are deemed risky before they then rationally evaluate possible
response options. In Luhmann’s words, there is “always a non-rational zone outside the
marked space” for rational consideration.39 This comment provides a strong segue for
the following section on Alex Mintz’ theory of decision-making, which involves a twostage process that immediately eliminates unfamiliar options from consideration.

The Big Picture: Foreign Policy and National Security Decision-Making
Alex Mintz’ theory of foreign policy decision-making readily appears to be built
from the concepts of Luhmann’s systems theory, although much of their research was in
parallel during the 1990s. Mintz sequentially integrates cognitive and rational theories
concerning decision-making in a manner that Luhmann, Pilotta, Widman, and Jasko
would recognize.40 In this section, I first describe Mintz’ theory, then show how two
other researchers added to the theory.
As Mintz describes it, there are two general schools of thought for foreign policy
decision-making: rationale choice and cognitive psychology. Mintz integrates both of
these approaches by stating that decision-makers actually use a two-stage process that
first eliminates alternatives with unacceptable returns (the cognitive psychology
approach) and then analyzes the remaining options with the clear risk-gain lens (rational
Ibid., 155.
Luhmann, 136.
40 Alex Mintz, ed., Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories of Foreign Policy
Decision Making (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).
38
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decision-making). Mintz originally conceived of this cognitive psychology step with a
“non-compensatory principle” whereby a national decision-maker would exclude certain
options that brought unacceptable consequences, usually from a domestic political
dimension.41 However, of significance, Mintz added that political decision-makers would
also remove options that they considered to be “militarily unfeasible” which underscores
the significance of the advice they would receive from the military, even prior to
receiving a formal menu of options.42
Steven B. Redd extended Mintz’ theory in two important respects. First, he
highlighted the role of ambiguity and how familiar the decision-makers were with the set
of options presented to them. To Redd, such familiarity or unfamiliarity would have a
major impact in the cognitive psychology step that may result in the exclusion of options
not due to domestic political reasons but to a more basic unfamiliarity with the option.43
Second, within the framework of Mintz’ theory, Redd would become a strong proponent
and advocate for the process-tracing method linking the decision-making process to the
foreign policy outcomes.44 In this dissertation, I use the process-trace method to show
the linkage, too.
Vesna Danilovic reinforced and further developed Redd’s contribution that the
cognitive psychology step would exclude certain options from the subsequent rational
analysis phase. Danilovic specified the concepts of “prior beliefs” and “working scripts”

Ibid., 1-3.
Ibid., 6.
43 Steven B. Redd, “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making:
Experimental Evidence,” in Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories in Foreign
Policy Decision Making, ed. Alex Mintz (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 116.
44 Ibid., 106.
41
42
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as significant factors that shaped the responses and preferences of decision-makers in
the cognitive psychology stage.45
Of significance, although Mintz cites examples of military options presented to
national security decision-makers, he does not narrow this aperture to examine how his
theory might apply to the internal decision-making process within the military.
Thus, Alex Mintz’ theory of foreign policy decision-making, that integrates both
cognitive and rational theories into a two-step process, provides a more specific lens to
Luhmann’s conceptual framework for this dissertation. The further refinements from
Redd and Danilovic extend the understanding of the cognitive factors to include
familiarity with the options, prior beliefs, and biases as cognitive – not rational – factors
that preemptively exclude options before they can be rationally considered.
In addition to Mintz and his colleagues, several other key scholars critically
analyzed the NSC structure and decision-making. The classic textbook for basic
national security studies is Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Michael J. Meese, and
Suzanne C. Nielsen’s seminal work American National Security, originally published in
1981 with its sixth edition in 2009.46 Editors Karl Inderfurth and Lock Johnson’s text,
Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, provide unique insights from
numerous contributing researchers and practitioners into the NSC process and
deliberations.47 Christopher C. Shoemaker’s, Structure, Function and the NSC Staff
provides almost a staff officer’s handbook to understanding the decision-making
Vesna Danilovic, “The Rational-Cognitive Debate and Poliheuristic Theory,” in
Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories in Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed.
Alex Mintz (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 131-132, 136.
46
Amos A. Jordan. et al. American National Security, 208-229.
47
Karl F. Inderfurth and Lock K. Johnson, eds., Fateful Decisions: Inside the National
Security Council (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
45
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process.48 Finally, Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application from
editors Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson provided an excellent overview
of not only the decision-making process but to the analysis of what constitutes good
judgment.49
However, none of these well-known NSC and foreign policy decision-making
texts fully explore the role of organizational culture in the decision-making. A more
limited subset of this work is highlighted in the next section.

Role of Organizational Culture within the National Security Decision-Making
Whereas the literature concerning national security decision-making described
above focuses primarily on the various processes and organizations, it is apparent that
individual organizations and bureaucracies have their own cultures that do impact on
policy developments.50 This analysis is a key basis to this dissertation.
Morton Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp’s Bureaucracy Politics and Foreign Policy
provides an excellent analysis on the bureaucracies’ roles in foreign policy decisionmaking.51 This important work clearly described the entrenched bureaucracies and how
they approach initiatives or events that are neither anticipated nor part of the traditional
core functions of that agency. For the military, brought up with the understanding that
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Christopher C. Shoemaker, Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officer’s Guide
to the National Security Council (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College, 1989).
49
Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, eds., Good Judgment in Foreign
Policy (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).
50
This section was extracted from a previous paper I submitted as part of my studies at
the University of South Florida for POS 6045, November 29, 2015
51 Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy,
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
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they fight the nation’s wars with a deeply ingrained tradition of conventional war, any
significant deviation from this line of thinking is treated with suspicion and deflection.52
This finding is somewhat reinforced in Amos A. Jordan’s, et al, American National
Security, but not with the same clarity.53 More significantly, and germane to this post9/11 era, is a similar finding by Janine Davidson, a former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Plans. She is quoted in the opening citation in the Introduction section of
this dissertation, that the conventional military frequently failed to deliver creative
national security options that the president was seeking.54
Other authors more specifically highlight the fissures and frictions within various
departments, agencies, and other elements that collectively make up the national
security apparatus. This includes Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof’s, The National
Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, which is organized to highlight the
competing cultures within the agencies, departments, and other elements including the
press and the courts.55
This section on bureaucracy and organizational culture has a direct bearing on
the earlier section concerning national security decision-making, and in particular, Alex
Mintz’ theory of the two-step heuristic approach to decision-making. Coupling these two
together, the reader could anticipate the US military bureaucracy opposing initiatives
that are outside of the core function of conventional war. In Mintz’ theory, military
52

Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy,
25-61.
53
Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Meese, and Suzanne C. Nielsen,
American National Security, 6th ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2009), 170-189.
54 Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency”, 129.
55
Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating
the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011).
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national security practitioners would likely eliminate such alternatives from even being
considered during the development of strategic options in response to a crisis like the
Syrian rebellion.
In summary, the literature clearly records the role of institutional and
organizational culture of the various US government departments and agencies
impacting national security decision-making. However, do similar cleavages exist within
those organizations, specifically the US military?

Organizational Culture and Cleavage within the US Military
The topic of organizational culture cleavage within the US military is well known
to national security studies scholars. The various institutional and organizational
cultures between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines – which manifests itself into
distinct uniforms, most military schools, promotion systems, and most assignments -contributed to shortcomings in US military operations in Vietnam, Grenada, and the
Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980. This crescendo of military shortfalls from the
1960s through the early 1980s prompted Congress to enact the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation that placed strong emphasis on “joint duty” (that is, duty at a headquarters
that requires officers from more than one Service), even going so far as to tie officer
promotions to the admiral and general ranks to mandatory prior service in these joint
units. However, cultural changes occur over many years, arguably a generation, and
are seldom resolved with an individual law.
Yet there is second cross cutting element of cleavage within the US military
separate from the distinctions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, which is the
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cleavage between conventional military forces and Special Operations Forces (SOF).
Each of the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) has select units that are
designated as SOF – these include Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs (an acronym
meaning sea, air, and land; referring to their infiltration mediums), and Air Force special
aircraft and flight crews. Together, these select sub-elements from the Services
constitute SOF. There is an unmistakable cultural cleavage between those that are
recruited, trained, educated, and employed to conduct conventional combat and these
forces that are assessed and selected from the conventional forces’ junior ranks and
subsequently trained, educated, and employed to conduct special operations. That
said, today there is strong leadership attention within the Services and within SOF to
integrate these forces within their Services, as the needs of warfare in Afghanistan and
Iraq made clear to all commanders, but, as stated earlier, changing organizational
cultures can take many years.
There is a good amount of literature that documents this difference between the
conventional military and SOF. Perhaps the best that highlights the cultural aspects as
it relates to the function of risk-taking during the decision-making process is Yaacov Y. I.
Vertzberger in his 1998 study of five cases of foreign military intervention decisions. In
his text, somewhat based on Alex Mintz’ two-stage decision-making theory covered
earlier in this chapter, Vertzberger showed how military officers – by culture and
organizations – would overstate or minimize risk depending on their backgrounds. Of
note, however, Vertzberger addressed several variables in his sets, including context,
culture, the individual, and the group, which consequently did not fully examine the
organizational culture variable in sufficient light. Moreover, his one hundred pages
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addressed five different case studies. The focus of this one variable set in this one case
study on the Syrian resistance in this dissertation provides a more in depth examination
of this causal relationship.
A second significant text addressing this cultural cleavage between conventional
and SOF cultures is found in the research and writings of Colin Gray, a theorist of
strategic studies who has written extensively on nuclear strategy, arms control, maritime
strategy, and geopolitics. His 1996 work on strategy highlighted this organizational and
cultural cleavage between the conventional military and SOF officers. However, given
the time period of his research and writing on this important topic, he focused on neither
the post-9/11 environment nor the recent developments that highlighted the
opportunities to support resistance movements as a national security option, which this
dissertation does address.
A third and more contemporary text on this cleavage comes from Dr. Hy
Rothstein who published a detailed case study of unconventional warfare during the
Afghanistan war in 2006. In this work he documents the distinct cultural divide between
conventional and unconventional warfare forces, and consequently, how UW options
have become marginalized.56 However, his analysis led to more far-reaching
recommendations than this dissertation will present. The linkage of causality to
recommendations is important.
Yet the organizational culture and cleavage within the US military is only part of
the explanation. Within SOF itself, there is a significant cleavage.

Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional
Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006).

56
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Organizational Culture and Cleavage within Special Operations
To most outside observers, SOF is a small and elite element within the military
that probably has its own homogenous culture. Although that is true to an extent, there
is actually a significant organizational and cultural cleavage that divides the special
operators. Retired Army Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, a career Special
Forces officer who commanded the Army Special Operations Command from 2012 to
2015, wrote extensively about this dichotomy in SOF in the command’s professional
journal, Special Warfare. Although SOF is assigned several mission sets by law,
including unconventional warfare, direct action (kill/capture missions), foreign internal
defense (advice and assistance to foreign governments fighting insurgencies), and
special reconnaissance, General Cleveland binned the various missions into two
components that he called Surgical Strike (the direct action, counterterrorism, and
counter-proliferation mission sets) and Special Warfare (unconventional warfare, foreign
internal defense, civil affairs, and psychological operations). Within these two arms of
SOF, the surgical strike mission set requires a high degree of intelligence to “squeeze
out uncertainty” before striking, while the special warfare mission set requires the
operator to “wade into uncertainty” and still prevail. The skill sets, as well as the
psychological backgrounds of the operators themselves, likewise present a dichotomy
along these same lines. So it is not surprising to find different organizational cultures,
and indeed rivalries, between the two communities within SOF.
A review of the literature finds other authors confirming this same finding. Linda
Robinson, a RAND researcher and independent author, has written extensively about
SOF in the post-9/11 era and published several insightful works that address the gap in
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understanding and properly utilizing unconventional warfare and the broader category of
Special Warfare.57 As her focus on the unconventional warfare mission set shows,
there is a remarkable difference between the kill/capture units of SOF (e.g., Army
Rangers, Navy SEALs) and those in Army Special Forces who are assigned the primary
role of support to resistance forces.
David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb in their 2007 work, United States Special
Operations Forces, described SOF missions, organizations, and seminal operations, but
more significantly highlight the neglect that senior defense and even SOF leaders have
displayed in not pursuing strategic unconventional warfare options for the nation. The
authors, Tucker an associate professor on terrorism and irregular warfare at the Naval
Postgraduate School and Lamb a senior fellow at the National Defense University and
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans, provide a
persuasive argument for SOF leaders to provide independent strategic options for the
nation that would include unconventional warfare options to support resistance
elements.58
With ongoing wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, it is important to review not
just the decision-making literature of the past few decades, but to also see and
understand the emerging literature that is not fully absorbed into the body of knowledge.

For example see Dan Madden, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk,
John E. Peters, Linda Robinson and Abby Doll. Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in
U.S. Coercive Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014).
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR828.html.
58 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
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Emerging Literature
Certainly, how SOF addressed the Syrian conflict in the 2015-2018 period, where
it did partner with local forces and advised, assisted, armed, and shaped their activities
to fight ISIS, stands in marked contrast to the military’s reluctance to employ SOF with
the resistance in the 2011-2014 period, the time frame of this dissertation. Today, there
are several articles emerging that address these activities – and the wider implications
for unconventional warfare beyond Syria. Two such works bear mention for this
dissertation.
First, General Joseph Votel, the former commanding general of the US Special
Operations Command and current commanding general of the US Central Command,
co-authored a 2016 article entitled “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone”59 which
advocated for a stronger application of UW as part of a larger “political warfare” strategy
that was proposed by the scholar Max Boot in 2013.60 General Votel and his co-authors
reviewed not historical operations with resistance elements in this “gray zone” between
open war and diplomacy, but advocated a holistic approach within the national security
enterprise to employing such means as unconventional warfare, psychological
operations, covert actions, and other elements in conjunction with but beyond classic
diplomacy. Votel highlighted that the US seems to have lost much of its Cold War era
skills for operating in these gray zones with non-conventional means.

Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin,
“Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st Quarter 2016,
101-109.
60 Max Boot, “Political Warfare”, Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Innovations
Memorandum No. 33, June 7, 2013.
59
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The most directly applicable literature vis-à-vis this dissertation comes from Will
Irwin (who was also a co-author of the Votel article described above) who authored a
paper entitled “A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Unconventional Warfare”
that was based on the post-2014 period and the controversial Syria Train and Equip
Program.61 Of note, the Syria Train and Equip program was not UW; it was a classic
training mission to train and equip a force to conduct counterterrorist operations against,
in this case, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In fact, the Train and Equip
mission forbid any activities to unseat the Assad regime. That said, Irwin correctly
identified the root problem with the Train and Equip program in that it was initiated too
late and should have been framed and focused on UW. Moreover, Irwin strongly
argues for the need to make contact with resistance elements early to enable the US to
properly assess the feasibility and utility of working with such elements. In sum, this
short fifteen-page article is the most applicable item in the vast body of literature that
touches upon the research question of this dissertation.

Contribution of this Dissertation: Addressing the Gap
There are one major and four minor conceptual contributions of this dissertation
to the body of knowledge and literature involving the interagency and military decisionmaking processes concerning support to resistance elements.
The major contribution of this dissertation is the provision of a detailed case
study that demonstrates the role of organizational culture within the US military between
the conventional military, including the kill/capture SOF elements, versus the
Will Irwin, A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Unconventional Warfare
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, May 2016).
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unconventional forces (support to resistance elements) and ties this cleavage to policy
outcomes in the early years of the Syrian rebellion. In other words, a case study in US
interagency and military decision-making process that shows the marginalization of
MSRA/UW expertise in the formulation of strategic options provided to the president.
The four minor conceptual contributions follow. First, this dissertation provides a
case of theory testing for Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory, specifically the tendency
of an organization to discard options dealing with complexity when those options are not
part of the organization’s normal procedures and processes. Second, in a similar vein,
this dissertation provides a case study directly testing and supporting Alex Mintz’ twostage theory for foreign policy decision-making. Third, this dissertation also provides a
clear case for Mary Kaldor’s New War Theory, and specifically the element of that
theory which argues the conventional military does not fully comprehend the irregular
warfare activities that we are currently engaged in, and how a conventional military
approach to these types of violent political struggles has limited utility and applicability.
Fourth, this dissertation reinforces the rich literature on institutional and organizational
culture theory.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter I described the literature concerning US national security decisionmaking in general, and specifically the US military decision-making process as it
addresses support to resistance movements. The analysis of the literature highlights
the significant role of organizational culture and how that shapes the inputs from the
various departments and agencies of the US government; e.g. the State Department,
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the Intelligence Community, and the Defense Department. Furthermore, the literature
also shows organizational cleavages between the various military services within the
US military. These are well documented in the literature. However, there is also a
cleavage between the conventional military forces and the Special Operations Forces,
and within the Special Operations Forces there is also an organizational cultural
cleavage between those who specialize in kill/capture missions and those who
specialize in UW. It is this institutional cleavage – and resulting cultural cleavage – that
has sparse literature coverage. This is the arena of this dissertation, and this is where
the dissertation’s contribution is found. This study uniquely demonstrates the role of
organizational culture within the US military between the conventional military including
the kill/capture SOF elements versus the unconventional forces (support to resistance
elements) and ties this cleavage to policy outcomes in the early years of the Syrian
rebellion.
Given this background of the literature review, in three of the next fours chapters,
I sequentially examine each of the three supporting questions:
•

Was there a viable and acceptable resistance force for the US to partner?

•

If so, how did the US military miss this opportunity?

•

What are the implications?
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CHAPTER THREE:
WAS THERE A VIABLE AND ACCEPTABLE RESISTANCE FORCE IN SYRIA
DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 2011 TO JUNE 2014?

“The common refrain among people skeptical of
deeper involvement in Syria is that…America and
its allies no longer know who the opposition really
is. Ford refuted that notion head on. ‘We’ve
identified them quite well now.... We’ve worked
with them for years. They need to get the tools
they must have to change the balance on the
ground.’”
--Former US Ambassador to Syria Robert S.
Ford in an interview with Christiane Amanpour 62

Source:
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/cia-helping-arms-shipments-to-syria-rebelsthrough-turkey-report.aspx?pageID=238&nid=43580, accessed March 24, 2018.

Figure 7: Syrian Youth and Rebels in Aleppo March 22, 2013.

Krever, Mick, Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford: I could no longer
‘defend the American policy’, CNN, accessed at December 31, 2015,
www.http://amanpoir.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/03/former-u-s-ambassador-to-syria-icould-no-longer-defend-the-american-policy-robert-ford/.
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While the previous two chapters set the stage for the dissertation by
detailing the research design, methodology, data collection strategy, and
literature review, this chapter begins the analytical portion that provides the logicchain that links the first, second, and third key questions to the original research
question, the hypothesis, and ultimately to the findings. This chapter addresses
the first of those three key questions: Was there a viable and acceptable
resistance force in Syria during the period March 2011 to June 2014?
To answer the overall research question of why the US failed to provide
military support to the Syrian resistance from 2011-2014, one must first establish
that there indeed was a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria and that it
was recognizable during this period. The purpose of this chapter is to present
that argument, using data and information openly available during this period,
with no benefit of subsequent data.
The steps to unfold this argument – the major sections of this chapter –
are listed below:63
•

Framing the Analysis
--The Time Period
--Documenting the Resistance: A Note on Sources and Methods

Some of the text of this chapter was from a research paper “The Syrian Resistance
2011-2014” that I submitted at the University of South Florida for course CPO 5935
(Comparative Politics in the Middle East) on November 24, 2016. Portions of this text
also appeared in an unpublished paper that I emailed to my dissertation chair, Dr.
Mohsen Milani, on November 6, 2016. Portions of this chapter also appeared in the
author’s section of Paul S. Lieber, Richard Rubright, Tom Searle, Seth Leuthner, Will
Irwin, and Konrad Trautman, Syria Train and Equip: an Academic Study (MacDill Air
Force Base, Florida: JSOU Press, 2016).
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--Temporal Roots of the Rebellion: The Pre-Arab Spring Years
Show the Political, Economic, Historical, and Social Underpinnings to the
Rebellion
--Spatial Roots of the Rebellion: The Arab Spring Provides the
Regional Context and Spark
•

The Viable and Acceptable Resistance
--Defining the Viable and Acceptable Resistance
-- Evolution of Two Sequential and Overlapping Organizations
--Time Period 1: The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011
through December 2012) (See Figure 8 below for a graphic depiction of these
four time periods.)
--Time Period 2: The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the
Anti-Assad Fight (September 2012 through June 2014 and later)
--Time Period 3: The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in
Exile (December 2012 through June 2014 and later)
--Time Period 4: Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah, and other
Iranian Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces (February 2013 through June
2014 and later)

•

The Counterargument: “Yes, the resistance did exist, but it was too
fractured to be useful.” The Rebuttal: “Advise and Assist.”

•

Synthesis: The Missed Windows of Opportunity

60

2011

2012

2013

2014

!

1. The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011 through December 2012)

2. The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the Anti-Assad Fight
(September 2012 through June 2014 and later)

3. The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in Exile
(December 2012 through June 2014 and later)
For each of these time periods,
I show:
•
Description
•
Political organization and
leadership
•
Military operations
•
Strengths and weaknesses

4. Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah,
and other Iranian Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces
(February 2013 through June 2014 and later)

Figure 8: Four Time Periods in Analyzing the Resistance

Framing the Analysis
The Time Period
As a reminder, this dissertation is scoped to the time period of March 2011
to June 2014, which corresponds to the outbreak of violence in Deraa and
concludes when the US administration finally decided to provide military support
to the resistance when Mosul fell to ISIS.
This time period is significant because the grassroots resistance
movement at that time emerged from Sunni cities and towns throughout Syria.
Moreover, the resistance was politically moderate, non-Salafist, and trending
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towards gaining strength against the Assad regime. As this resistance
movement was gaining capability, paradoxically, it was essentially ignored and
received little support from the United States. Over time many of its fighters and
new recruits then shifted their allegiance to the rising extremist organizations, like
al Qaeda’s al Nusra Front and ISIS, both organizations being better armed and
supported from outside powers. The 2014 end point for this analysis is
important: in June 2014 Mosul fell to ISIS and the nature of this internal Syrian
rebellion became trans-regional with ISIS becoming the major anti-regime armed
element. The period from the summer of 2011 to the summer of 2013 was,
however, a missed opportunity when the United States could have supported a
moderate, local, resistance element that may have successfully challenged the
Assad regime while denying recruits to the then-fledgling Islamic State. This will
be explained in detail throughout this chapter.

Documenting the Resistance: A Note on Sources and Methods
To present the argument that a moderate resistance force did exist in
Syria during this March 2011 to June 2014 period – and that US intelligence and
military officials should have seen and recognized it – it is important to show the
existence of this force using information and data that was openly available
during that period, with no benefit of hindsight or subsequent information.
Given the significantly different security environment then, as opposed to
2018, it is not surprising that there was a rather extensive network of media
reporters, academics, and activists operating in the Syrian cities, towns, and
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countryside. Moreover, resistance leaders were active on social media, including
Skype, Facebook, and Twitter. All of this allowed unique insights and access into
Syria – albeit not the classic or traditional intelligence collection sources and
methods to which the US military was accustomed.
One of the leading sources of information was the Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights (SOHR), a non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in May
2006 for the purpose of documenting and reporting the human rights conditions
inside of Syria, even several years before the rebellion began.64 The SOHR was
founded by Rami Abdulrahman (also known as Ossama Suleiman), himself a
Syrian refugee, who fled to the United Kingdom in 2000 after spending three
terms in Syrian prisons as a pro-democracy activist.65
Once the rebellion broke out, the SOHR shifted its focus to documenting
the fighting. In December 2011, in an interview with Reuters, Rami Abdulrahman
claimed to have expanded his source network from fifty-four, when the uprising
began, to over two hundred.66 The SOHR posted these direct source reports
onto its website that provided a running-analysis of the fighting.67
Media reporters from across Europe, the Middle East, and the United
States, including the New York Times, Washington Post, and al Jazeera,

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights website, accessed February 22, 2017,
www.syriahr.com.
65 Coventry – an Unlikely Home to a Prominent Syria Activist, Reuters, accessed
December 8, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-syriaidUKTRE7B71XG20111208.
66 Ibid.
67 In an interview with US Ambassador to Syria Robert S. Ford, on March 30, 2017, the
ambassador assessed that the SOHR was reliable up through the 2012 period, but was
accused of being politicized in the following years.
64
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descended upon Syria. One of the most famous was Washington Post’s
Anthony Shadid, who won two Pulitzer Prizes for his coverage of the Iraq war,
but who died in Syria while covering the rebellion in February 2012.68
Dr. Joshua Landis, then an assistant professor at the University of
Oklahoma who later became its Director of the Center for Middle East Studies,
wrote a detailed expose of the Syrian opposition in 2006-2007. He served
previously as a senior Fulbright researcher in Damascus in 2005, living a total of
four years in Syria until the rebellion began. He went on to established Syria
Comment, a daily web-based newsletter on Syrian politics using his extensive
contacts in Syria. He published articles from these sources and provided his
analysis as the rebellion unfolded.69
Another such organization, Syria Direct, emerged as a non-profit
journalism organization that produced timely coverage of Syria while training
Syrian and American journalists in professional newsgathering techniques.
Although founded late in this time period in 2013, the organization made
important contributions in tracking the rebellion.70
Indicative of the relatively open border during this time period, in May
2013 Senator John McCain walked across the border into Syria and met with
moderate resistance leaders of the Free Syrian Army.
Paul Farhi and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Correspondent Anthony Shadid, 43, Dies in
Syria,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2012, accessed February 22, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/correspondent-anthony-shadid-43dies-in-syria/2012/02/16/gIQAo2NyIR_story.html?utm_term=.b21cc5212ea0.
69
College of International Studies, Department of International and Area Studies,
University of Oklahoma, accessed February 28, 2017,
http://www.ou.edu/content/cis/ias/faculty/joshua-landis.html.
70 See http://syriadirect.org/pages/about-us/
68
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It is one thing to gather, collect, and report such information as a media
reporter or activist would normally do, but it is quite another task to digest that
information and produce an analysis that is useful for decision-makers. A key
private organization that accomplished that task was the Institute for the Study of
War (ISW).71 A non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization, ISW
produced six major studies during this period: The Struggle for Syria 2011
(December 2011), Syria’s Armed Opposition (March 2012), Syria’s Political
Opposition (April 2012), Syria’s Maturing Insurgency (June 2012), Jihad in Syria
(September 2012), and The Free Syrian Army (March 2013). Together these
documents provide 248 pages of high quality analysis of the Syrian resistance.
Later in this chapter I introduce examples that provide a graphical display of not
only the resistance units and leaders active during this period, but also the
evolution and growth of their units.
Of special note, the ISW analysts did not just harvest reporting coming
from the SOHR, the media, and others on the ground in Syria; they also
established direct contact with many moderate resistance leaders via Skype,
email, and telephone. Utilizing fluent Arab-speaking analysts at ISW, the
Institute established contact, rapport, and communication with resistance
leaders.72

In an interview with the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, on March 30, 2017,
the ambassador gave high marks to the reporting and analysis coming from the Institute
for the Study of War on Syria during this period.
72 See the methodology sections in the above mentioned six studies, which can be
found at the Institute for the Study of War’s website, www.understandingwar.org.
71
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Another private research organization or think tank actively studying and
publishing on the Syrian resistance during this period was the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). In September of 2012 WINEP produced
a thoroughly researched study on the Syrian resistance, similar and consistent
with ISW’s research, that documented the various fighting elements and showed
their political and military evolution throughout the rebellion. One of the lead
authors of this study was Andrew Tabler, the co-founder and former editor-inchief of Syria Today, Syria’s first private-sector English language magazine.
Tabler resided in the Middle East for fourteen years and achieved widespread
access throughout Syria before the rebellion.73
There is one additional source and method that bears special mention.
Near the beginning of the rebellion, Pechter Polls, which conducted opinion
surveys in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, directed a poll of Syrian opposition
leaders and elements in December 2011.74 Pechter Polls administered a followup survey in June and July 2012 under contract for the International Republican
Institute (IRI).75
The 2011 survey used the snowball polling technique with five starting
points that polled over 186 opposition activists inside Syria. The results showed

Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Zelin, Syria’s Military Opposition: Howe
Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, September 2013).
74 Pollock, David, “What Does the Syrian Opposition Believe?,” Wall Street Journal, May
30, 2012 accessed February 24, 2017, http://washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/what-does-the-syrian-opposition-believe.
75 See
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20August%2017%20Survey%20of%20Syrian
%20Opposition,%20June%201-July%202,%202012.pdf.
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the opposition activists with a moderate political vision looking to Turkey as their
governmental model. This survey also showed only a small fraction of activists
that strongly favored sharia law, clerical influence in government, or a heavy
emphasis on Islamic education.76 The survey concluded that the “core of the
Syrian opposition inside the country is not made up of the Muslim Brotherhood or
other fundamentalist forces, and certainly not of al Qaeda or other jihadi
organizations.”77
The subsequent polling in 2012 confirmed and expanded the findings of
the earlier study. The activist respondents now expanded to 1,168. The survey
showed strong preferences for elections, a new constitution, a strong judiciary,
and a need for a revitalized economy. The respondents identified the Free
Syrian Army and Syrian National Council as legitimate representatives of the
Syrian people.78
I do acknowledge that these are low polling samples and the inherent
limitations of the snowball polling technique; i.e., its non-random nature and
propensity to oversample, albeit in small numbers. Nonetheless, this is
additional information pointing to the viable and acceptable nature of the Syrian
resistance during this period.

Pollock, David, “What Does the Syrian Opposition Believe?”, Wall Street Journal, May
30, 2012, accessed February 24, 2017, http://washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/what-does-the-syrian-opposition-believe.
77 Ibid.
78 See http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20August%2017%20
Survey%20of%20Syrian%20Opposition,%20June%201-July%202,%202012.pdf.
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All of this information was openly available to military, intelligence, and
other national security practitioners during this period; however, none of this
information was collected or reported by conventional intelligence means. The
above sources and methods documented a clear resistance inside Syria, a topic
examined in the next section.
Finally, there was a significant source of information and analysis that was
inherent within the US government whose reporting was credible and readily
available to US senior military and defense leaders: the US Ambassador to Syria,
Robert S. Ford. Ambassador Ford served in Damascus from the very beginning
of the rebellion until the embassy was forced to close in February 2012. He then
returned to Washington to lead the State Department’s Syria team for two years;
thus, he served during the entire time of this dissertation’s frame. Previously, he
served five tours in Baghdad as the senior political advisor and later the deputy
chief of mission. In those assignments he served under Ambassadors John
Negroponte, Zalmay Khalilzad, Ryan Crocker, and Chris Hill.79 He frequently
visited various locales during the rebellion to meet with rebel leaders, civilians
caught in the unfolding humanitarian disaster, and Syrian government officials.
His insights and assessments were vital to those responsible for navigating US
policy through these challenging shoals. His writings and official Congressional
testimonies figure prominently in this dissertation.

Robert S. Ford, Testimony: US Strategy to Defeat ISIS, (Washington, DC: The Middle
East Institute, September 24, 2014), accessed December 31, 2015,
http://www.mei.edu/content/at/testimony-us-strategy-defeat-isis.
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Temporal Roots of the Rebellion: Pre-Arab Spring Years Show the
Political, Economic, Historical, and Social Underpinnings to the Rebellion
There is perhaps a tendency to believe that the Arab Spring in general
and the Syrian rebellion in particular simply sparked with the confluence of
conditions unique to 2011 – like a chemical reaction. That is a very incomplete
and misleading judgment. Indeed, the seeds of rebellion were sewn well before
2011. To be sure, the sprouts in Syria were weak and nascent, but they
nonetheless existed and oppression nurtured them to blossom into rebellion by
2011.
In 2010, a year before the Arab Spring uprising began in Tunisia, Dr.
Walid Phares published The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the
Middle East. In this prescient work, Dr. Phares predicted the upcoming uprisings
and provided a constructivist description of the various social, economic, and
political underpinnings of the upcoming upheavals that had been percolating over
the previous decades. Although he described the historical roots of the inevitable
revolutions in the Maghreb, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, his
descriptions of Syria are illuminating for this study. Phares described the political
oppression beginning in the early 1960s under the Hafez Assad regime that
culminated with the 1982 uprising in Hama that left more than 18,000 dead.80
With Hafez Assad’s death in June 2000, the control of the regime passed to his
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Walid Phares, The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East (New
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son Bashar Assad and his five security services, all involved in financial,
business, and corrupting influences in Syria and Lebanon.”81
Although the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would complain in
2012 that no one could identify moderate resistance leaders to him, Phares
identified resistance leaders as early as 2010. Resistance leaders like Ammar
Abdelhamid, Michel Kilo, Riad Seif, Farid Ghadri, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and
political organizations like the National Council for the Damascus Declaration, the
Social Peace Movement Party, Syrian Reform Party, all of which would form the
cadre and nucleus of much of the initial resistance activities by 2012. Well
before that, however, in 2006 three hundred Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals
signed the Beirut-Damascus Declaration calling for functional democracies in
both countries.82 Phares prophetically wrote in 2010: “When (the Syrian masses
mobilize for change)…democracies around the world must stand by Syria’s civil
society, all the way to a democratic revolution. No doubt about it — it is
coming.”83
Walid Phares was not the only scholar to document the existence of the
roots of the resistance well before the uprising. In 2006-2007 Dr. Joshua Landis
published a detailed scholarly article in The Washington Quarterly describing the
Syrian opposition.84 In his article, co-authored with Joe Pace, another
researcher who spent ten months in Syria, Landis described in detail the Syrian
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regime opposition elements, including their contacts with the US embassy,
beginning in 2000.
The political opposition to the Assad regime began to surface in January
2001 when over one thousand political activists signed a manifesto demanding
comprehensive political reform in Syria. This Damascus Spring document was
followed with a swift regime crackdown.85 Nonetheless, the embryos of
resistance movements – human rights groups, civil society forums, political
parties, and Islamist organizations like the Moslem Brotherhood – began to form.
Twelve human rights organizations and centers plus other organizations like the
Free Political Prisoners Committee formed and became part of the opposition.86
Civil society forums like the Committee for the Revival of Civil Society and the
Jamal al-Atassi Forum for Democratic Dialogue also organized.87 Kurdish
political parties, although confined to the north, were indicative of the broad albeit
not deep opposition efforts. Collectively, popular protests, civil society
gatherings, dissident presence in the media increased from 2002 through 2005.88
The Syrian regime’s collusion in assassinating the Lebanese political
leader Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005 stimulated further movement within the
opposition ranks, particularly towards unifying efforts for a broader-based
resistance. The formation of the National Coordination Committee for the
Defense of Basic Freedoms and Human Rights and a separate initiative from

Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 48.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 50.
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another civil society group to open dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood are two
examples.89
On October 18, 2006 a diverse group of five opposition elements issued
the Damascus Declaration that called for democratic change based on
nonviolence and opposition unity. Within hours, dozens of other groups pledged
their support. Landis evaluated this development: “For the first time in Syrian
history, an assemblage of bickering parties and scattered intellectuals
representing Kurdish nationalists, Arab nationalists, Socialists, Communists,
liberals, and Islamists united under a single platform for democratic change.”90
Two months later, former Vice President Khaddam defected and joined
the Muslim Brotherhood, exiling himself to Paris and eventually forming a new
opposition coalition known as the National Salvation Front.91
In the few short years from the Damascus Spring of 2001, through the
formation of a multi-group coalition advocating for democratic change in 2005,
and to a high level defection from the regime in 2006, the seeds of Syrian
rebellion were indeed germinating.
Phares’ and Landis’ works provide stunning detail to the Syrian opposition
inside of Syria years before the rebellion began. Had these works been stamped
“Secret” and appeared in official military and intelligence channels, military
leaders would likely have read them. But because they were found in scholarly
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journals and bookstores, perhaps most senior military and intelligence leaders
never saw them.

Spatial Roots of the Rebellion: The Arab Spring Provides the
Regional Context and Spark
In addition to placing the Syrian uprising in its historical context of
oppression and resistance beginning in the 1960s, one must also place the
Syrian uprising within the context of the regional Arab Spring uprisings that
began December 17, 2010 when “Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi set himself
on fire in front of a local municipal office after being harassed by police officers in
the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid.”92 Given the underlying political, social,
and economic grievances against the many corrupt and repressive regimes
throughout the region, this spark ignited the uprisings of the Arab Spring.

Source:
https://arabspringanditscontexts.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/arabspring-m
ap-black-and-white.jpg accessed March 11, 2017

Figure 9: Map of the Middle East and North Africa
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These revolts spread rapidly to Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and
Yemen, with protests of various intensities in Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco,
Sudan, and the Gulf States.93 (See Figure 9) From December 2010 to June
2013 approximately 90,000 people in 16 countries would die, but only the leaders
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen would fall.94 As Brownlee, Masoud, and
Reynolds argued in their 2015 study, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression
and Reform, the variation in the outcomes seemed to be shaped by structural
factors of relative strength of the state and the degree of pluralism within the prodemocratic forces.95
Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds extended their argument with “…the
best hope for breaking down authoritarianism was peeling off the top military
commanders from the autocrat”96 and foreign intervention (read: foreign advisors
as in the Libya case) plus the development of democratic institutions were also
critical factors in their final analysis.97
In contrast to Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds’ text, Steven Cook, in his
2017 work, challenged the idea of a new dawn emerging from the Arab Spring by
arguing three factors conspired to preclude such a development: “the nonrevolutionary nature of the uprisings, the way leaders have leveraged institutions
and their stickiness, and the search for identity among many in the region.”98
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Cook’s thoroughly descriptive yet deeply pessimistic analysis seems to conclude
with a prescription to do little but watch. Moreover, his thesis suggests that short
of a revolution, with the horrendous violence normally inherent in such
endeavors, no democratic changes will emerge from the Arab Middle East.
Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds seem more measured in their analysis with
their prescription to develop democratic institutions, separate the security and
military institutions from the autocrat, and provide foreign support and assistance
for political reforms short of revolution. Indeed, most violent political struggles
are less catastrophic than full-scale revolutions.

The Viable and Acceptable Resistance:
Defining The Viable and Acceptable Syrian Resistance
This phrase “viable and acceptable resistance” holds a prominent role throughout
this dissertation. Although I defined this term in the research design chapter, it bears
some revisit here.
The word viable means feasible or capable of working successfully; in this case,
capable of successfully executing unconventional warfare. As cited in Chapter One,
unconventional warfare is defined as activities to enable a resistance movement or
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.
So, in the Syrian context, viable refers to having that capability to disrupt, coerce, or
overthrow the Assad regime. Keeping in mind that the words “disrupt, coerce, or
overthrown” are on a spectrum, a resistance force that is not yet able to overthrow the
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Assad regime, but one that can still disrupt it, is also, by definition, a viable resistance
force. Moreover, once US support, like weapons, ammunition, and training, is
effectively provided to such a resistance force, one would expect to see the capabilities
of the resistance force expand from simple disruption to coercion and then overthrow.
The word acceptable means suitable or allowed. Given the topic of this
dissertation, I focus specifically on acceptable to the United States. In this case, I argue,
an “acceptable” resistance force would need to meet three criteria. First, the interests
and objectives of the resistance force must align with interests and objectives of the US.
This does not necessarily mean that the resistance force likes or supports the US, only
that the interests and objectives align. So, to the extent that the US sought the removal
of the Assad regime and the resistance force did as well, then this first criteria is met
regardless of whether the rebels were pro-US or not. Second, the political end state of
the resistance could not contradict US values; i.e., the resistance force could not be
striving to establish a dictatorship while receiving US support. Third, the resistance
force could not use terrorist tactics, i.e. deliberately targeting civilians for political affects
on a different entity, normally the governing or occupying power.
While the term resistance has many variants, most support the idea of an
organized political opposition to a governing or occupying power. Often this political
opposition, or at least core elements of it, must initially remain clandestine or
underground to avoid arrest from the governing or occupying power. This organized
political opposition – and the term “organized” spans a spectrum of various degrees
from incipient to highly organized – could espouse violent and/or nonviolent measures
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in its resistance activities. Violent political struggles are not uncommon in world history,
especially in the development of liberty for oppressed groups.

Evolution of Two Sequential and Overlapping Organizations
The timeframe of this dissertation extends from March 2011, the beginning of the
violence in Deraa, to June 2014, the fall of Mosul and the change of US policy. During
this period, the resistance elements evolved both politically and militarily. In the
beginning of this period through December 2012, most of the grassroots, bottom-up
resistance elements manifested themselves in the entity of the self-proclaimed Free
Syrian Army (FSA). These non-extremist, mostly secular fighters, made-up largely of
Syrian military defectors, constituted the bulk of the resistance in these early years.
With the formation of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) – subordinate to the
political entity of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces
(SOC) -- in December 2012, the aperture of the resistance changed: it now included a
wider variety of resistance elements, not just the secular-minded FSA. The SMC
included the Syrian Liberation Front (SLF), a Salafist but not extremist organization, and
the Syrian Islamist Front (SIF), which included al-Nusra Front and the Ahrar al-Sham
extremist groups. Thus, only portions of the SMC met the litmus test of viable and
acceptable resistance elements, as defined and framed in this dissertation.
These two sequential but overlapping organizations roughly align themselves to
time periods one and three in the following sections.
In summary, I argue that the viable and acceptable resistance from March 2011
to December 2012 was the Free Syrian Army. From December 2012 to June 2014 the
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viable and acceptable resistance rubric expanded to include the SMC, which included
the remnants of the FSA and the SLF, but not the SIF. To further describe this evolving
resistance and to support my main argument, namely that the Free Syrian Army was the
dominant oppositional force in Syria during the early years of the rebellion, the following
four sections examine distinct but overlapping time periods, each providing a general
description of the period, the political organization and leadership, military operations,
and an assessment of the resistance’s strength and weaknesses during that specific
time period.

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/syria-map.jpg
accessed March 11, 2017
Figure 10: Map of Syria
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Time Period 1: The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011
through December 2012)

Description
The resistance had its origins under the oppression of the Hafez Assad
regime as described earlier in this chapter. These political, social, and economic
grievances festered under Bashar Assad and then erupted within the context of
the regional Arab Spring. Dr. Fouad Ajami, in his 2012 book The Syrian
Rebellion, provided an exceptional analysis of the political, economic, and social
underpinnings of the Syrian rebellion during this period. With 32% of the
population living below the poverty line, 20% unemployment (57% unemployed
for those under 25 years of age), and a rating of 19th out of 22 for economic
performance of Arab countries, the basis for social discontent was already
strong.99
The spark for the Syrian rebellion occurred a few months before the
summer of 2011. In March about a dozen boys, aged 10 to 15, from Deraa were
arrested for painting anti-Assad graffiti. When they were finally released from
their detention, the boys reported their abuse and torture. One boy, Hamza alKhatib, died during his detention. When residents of Deraa took to the streets,
security forces shot and killed several protesters. 100

Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 2012), 7374.
100 Fouad Ajami, 65, 71. See also BBC, Syrian Profile Timeline, accessed at bbc.com
on December 10, 2015.
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Within Syria the viable and acceptable resistance in the summer of 2011
through December 2014 was a Sunni-based classic local resistance to
government repression.101 Violent resistance began in the summer of 2011 and
became a threatening force by January 2012.102 In October 2011 the US
Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, described and assessed the resistance as:
“The Syrian protest movement remains very large, widespread, and
predominantly peaceful. Yet violence is on the rise, most notably in Hama, Dayr al-Zar,
Latakia, around Homs. The Local Coordination Committees (LCC) are trying to keep
protests peaceful, but as the regime continues to arrest and kill demonstrators, calls to
take-up arms have become more common.”103

Political Organization and Leadership
At this time, there was no effective national leadership echelon to this
grassroots resistance, neither within Syria nor in the expatriate community. In
September 2012, the Syrian National Council (SNC) formed as an umbrella
political organization ostensibly uniting liberals, the Muslim Brotherhood,
Salafists, and Kurds, but since the SNC was dominated by exiles supported by
Turkey and Qatar, it had no close connection with the rebels actually doing the

Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition:
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, September 2013), 7.
102 Ibid., 3.
103 Robert S. Ford, Syria: The Battle for Democracy and Change, Washington, DC: The
Washington Institute, October 18, 2011, accessed at December 31, 2017,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syria-the-battle-for-democracyand-change.
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fighting.104 Moreover, the inability of the SNC to arrange any significant Western
support disappointed and angered most rebel elements.105
During the 2011 and early 2012 period, provincial military councils formed
in Homs, Hama, Idlib, Deraa, and Damascus, each including local Free Syrian
Army (FSA) battalions.106 The local fighters were grassroots guerrillas that
emerged from the villages and suburbs to fight first the local security and police
and then the Syrian military, as the latter was deployed to restore order. Many of
these resistance fighters were defectors from Assad’s military, Sunni soldiers
who could not bring themselves to fire on the unarmed predominantly Sunni
civilians.
In addition to the local fighters, there were three other components to the
local resistance. First, there was an openly public political resistance movement
that manifested itself with a mixture of some expatriate political opponents and
other activists still inside Syria. Another key component of this resistance was
the clandestine underground element within Syria.107 This was manifested in the
village or neighborhood Local Coordination Committees, the district or city level
Revolutionary Councils, and the major city or provincial Revolution Command

Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition:
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, September 2013), 20.
105 Ibid
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Joseph Holliday, Middle East Security Report 5: Syria’s Maturing Insurgency
(WASHINGTON, DC: Institute for the Study of War, June 2012), 7.
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Councils.108 The final key component is termed the auxiliary and consisted of the
Syrian public, which provided either tacit or expressed support to the resistance.
By mid-2013, the national level political-military structure took shape, as
displayed in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Political-Military Opposition Structure
Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, June 2012,
19.
To some extent it is useful to examine line-and-block charts of
organizations. But often it is more useful to actually “meet the leaders.” This is
108

Elizabeth O’Bagy, Middle East Security Report 4: Syria’s Political Opposition
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, April 2012), 16-25.
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particularly relevant when one recalls how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff during this period chastised his questioners and critics to actually show him
the resistance leaders. To that end, the following section is instrumental. The
Institute for the Study of War compiled this depiction of the leadership of the FSA
in March of 2012. As one can see from the photos, this layout is based on these
leaders’ announcements on YouTube and Skype sessions where they explained
their defections and described their combat activities inside Syria. The
depictions of these leaders follow on the next eight pages, beginning with the
leadership element based in Turkey and then progressing to show the leaders by
their operating regions.109
The first two of these eight pages show key FSA leaders in Turkey. These
commanders included Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush who founded the
Free Officers’ Movement in June 2011 and Colonel Riad Asaad, the first
commander of the FSA.

109

Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012, 39-45.
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Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey
Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush
Aﬃliated With:
Free Oﬃcers Movement
Area of Opera1ons:
N/A

Lieutenant Colonel Harmoush started the Free Oﬃcers Movement when he announced
his defec>on in an early June 2011 video statement. Syrian security forces detained
Harmoush in mid-September 2011 and executed him in January 2012.

Colonel Riad Asaad
Commander:
Area of Opera1ons:

Free Syrian Army
N/A

Colonel Ahmed Hijazi
Deputy Commander:
Area of Opera1ons:

Free Syrian Army
N/A

Colonel Malik al-Kurdi
Deputy Commander:
Area of Opera1ons:

Free Syrian Army
N/A

Colonel Riad Asaad formed the Free Syrian Army at the end of July 2011, and by midOctober his umbrella group was aﬃliated with many of the key rebel groups opera>ng on
the ground in Syria.

Colonel Hijazi escaped to Turkey aMer his frequently par>cipates in video statements and
press interviews from the Free Syrian Army headquarters in Turkey where he acts as a
deputy to Colonel Asaad.

Colonel Malik al-Kurdi escaped to Turkey aMer his late August defec>on from the Syrian
Navy. He has made numerous video and press statements during his >me in with the FSA
leadership.

Captain Mohammed Hamdo
Spokesman:
Free Syrian Army
Area of Opera1ons:
N/A

Captain Mohammed Hamdo has not appeared in video statements but frequently
conducts press interviews in which he is cited as a “spokesman” or “senior leader” in the
FSA’s media headquarters in Turkey.

Figure 12: Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey110
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Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey
General Mustafa Ahmed al-Sheikh
Commander:
Syrian Higher Revolu;onary Council
Area of Opera.ons:
N/A

General Mustafa al-Sheikh did not defect un;l late January 2012, but when he did he
became the highest ranking oﬃcer to defect. He formed the Higher Revolu;onary
Council outside of the FSA, but the two groups merged in February.

Captain Baseem al-Khalid
Aﬃliated With:
Syrian Higher Revolu;onary Council
Area of Opera.ons:
N/A

Captain al-Khalid made the video statement that announced the forma;on of the Higher
Revolu;onary Council, in which he said he would act as General Mustafa al-Sheikh’s aide.

Colonel Abdul Satar Yunsu
Commander:
Hamza Ba(alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Idlib city and suburbs

Colonel Yunsu has par;cipated in a number of video statements from the FSA
headquarters in Turkey, and ostensibly leads the Hamza Ba(alion around Idlib. However,
there is li(le evidence that links him to eﬀec;ve rebel groups in Idilb.

Captain Ahyam al-Kurdi
Commander:
Qashoush Ba(alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Hama

FSA leadership named Captain al-Kurdi the commander of the Qashoush Ba(alion in
Hama province. While al-Kurdi con;nues to appear in FSA statements; however, there is
li(le evidence that links him to eﬀec;ve rebel groups in Hama.

Figure 13: Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey (continued)111
The next five commanders led units in key cities, like Aleppo, Damascus, and
Jebel al-Zawiya, all outside of the provincial organizations depicted on subsequent
pages.
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Free Syrian Army Unit Leaders
Captain Ammar al-Wawi
Commander:
Ababeel Ba-alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Aleppo

Captain al-Wawi ostensibly leads a rebel unit in Aleppo, and he has reported on the
groups opera7ons there. However, the frequency of his video and press statements
suggest that he has remained in Turkey and has become closely aligned with FSA leaders.

Captain Ibrahim Munir Majmour
Commander:
Hourriyeh Ba-alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Aleppo

Captain Majmour par7cipatesdin several video statements from Turkey in July and
September of 2011 before returning to Syria to lead a rebel group in November. It is
diﬃcult to a-ribute limited engagements around Aleppo to Captain Majmour’s group.

Major Maher Rahman al-Nuemi
Commander:
Moawiyah Bin Abi Suﬁan Ba-alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Damascus

Major al-Nuemi’s oratory skill and press interviews from inside Syria have made him a key
ﬁgure in the movement. His unit has conducted some of the a-acks around Damascus.
Unlike other FSA leaders he was ini7ally included by the Higher Revolu7onary Council.

Captain Qais Qataneh
Commander:
Area of Opera.ons:

Omari Ba-alion
Dera’a province

Captain Qataneh leads the most eﬀec7ve rebel organiza7on on the Hawran plain. He
leading raids and ambushes along an arc of small towns and avoids sustained conﬂict with
security forces. He has also coordinatetd with other rebel units in Dera’a province.

Captain Yousif al-Din Yahya
Commander:
Harmoush Ba-alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Jebel al-Zawiya, Idlib

Captain Yahya joined up with FSA leadership in Turkey a\er his August defec7on from the
Syrian Army. He returned to the mountainous Jebel-al Zawiya region to lead a large rebel
force conduc7ng raids and ambushes.

Figure 14: Free Syrian Army Unit Leaders112
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The following three pages show the FSA commanders and officers operating in
Homs province in early 2012.

Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province
Major Abdul Rahman Sheikh Ali
Commander:
Khalid bin Walid Brigade
Area of Opera.ons:
Rastan

Major Shiekh Ali became the leader of the armed resistance movement around Homs in
September 2011, organizing the various defected oﬃcers under the Khalid bin Walid
Brigade.

Major Ali Mohammed Ayoub
Commander:
Hamza Ba(alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Rastan

Major Ayoub commands Khalid bin Walid’s Hamza Ba(alion. Although he appears to be a
late-comer to the broader organizaBon, he played a key role in wresBng control of
Rastan’s western neighborhoods from loyalists in late January 2012.

Lieutenant Ibrahim Ayoub
Deputy Commander:
Farouq Ba(alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Rastan

AMer his defecBon in July 2010, Lieutenant Ayoub was a key parBcipant in the formaBon
of the Khalid bin Walid Brigade. He currently acts as a leader within the Hamza Ba(alion
and conBnued his leadership role during the late January 2012 Rastan oﬀensive.

Major Ahmad Bahboh
Aﬃliated with:
Area of Opera.ons:

Khalid bin Walid Brigade
Rastan

Major Bahboh was the ﬁrst leader of Khalid bin Walid in June 2011, and his brother
Abdullah has maintained close Bes with MAJ Sheikh Ali. Bahboh lead rebels against
loyalist forces in Rastan, January-February 2012.

Captain Abdullah Bahboh
Commander:
Mohammed Tlas Ba(alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Rastan

Captain Abdullah Bahboh joined his brother Ahmad during iniBal formaBon of Khalid bin
Walid, and has maintained close Bes with Major Sheikh Ali since then, appearing in a
number of key video statements. He fought with Ahmad in Rastan in February 2012.

Figure 15: Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province113
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Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province
Lieutenant Abd al-Razaq Tlass
Commander:
Farouq BaEalion
Area of Opera.ons:
Bab Amr, Homs city

Lieutenant Tlass, nephew of a long-<me Syrian Defense Minister, was an inspira<onal
leader in command of Khalid bin Walid’s Farouq BaEalion in Bab Amr, Homs. He was
killed in a regime ar<llery barrage on 9 February 2012.

Lieutenant Walid al-Abdullah
Deputy Commander:
Farouq BaEalion
Area of Opera.ons:
Bab Amr, Homs city

Lieutenant al-Abdullah has appeared beside Lieutenant Abd al-Razaq Tlass in both video
statements and clips showing the two young defectors working with their mili<a group
inside Homs’ Bab Amr neighborhood.

Captain Yousef al-Hamoud
Commander:
Fadi al-Qassim BaEalion
Area of Opera.ons:
Bab Dreib, Homs city

Captain al-Hamoud was one of the ﬁrst member of Khalid bin Walid under Major Ahmad
Bahboh. In January and February 2012 he led rebels against loyalist forces in Homs’ Bab
Dreib neighborhood.

Lieutenant Faez Ahmed al-Abdullah
Commander:
Ali bin Abi Talib Company
Area of Opera.ons:
Houleh region, Homs countryside

Lieutenant al-Abdullah par<cipated in early video statements before appearing days a?er
the late September 2011 Rastan baEle to announce the Khalid bin Walid Brigade’s
withdrawal and claim responsibility for eﬀec<ve aEacks in the Homs countryside.

Captain Rawad Ahmed al-Aksah
Commander:
Special Tasks BaEalion
Area of Opera.ons:
Zafaraneh

A rela<ve late-comer within Khalid bin Walid, CPT al-Aksah announced his defec<on at the
end of December 2011, when he formed the Special Task BaEalion under the leadership
of Khalid bin Walid.

Figure 16: Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province (continued)114
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Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province
Captain Ayad al-Deek
Aﬃliated with:
Area of Opera2ons:

Khalid bin Walid Brigade
Rastan

Captain al-Deek, who has been called Khalid bin Walid’s chief of staﬀ, was one of the
inaugural members of the organizaIon under Major Ahmad Bahboh, and has parIcipated
in a series of video statements claiming responsibility for operaIons in Rastan.

Lieutenant Ahmed Mustafa Khalaf
Aﬃliated with:
Khalid bin Walid Brigade
Area of Opera2ons:
Rastan

Lieutenant Khalaf was one of the ﬁrst and most respected free oﬃcers around Homs
aMer his defecIon in late June 2011 and subsequent involvement with Khalid bin Walid.
He was killed in acIon during the late September 2011 regime assault on Rastan.

Lieutenant Mohammed Abd al-Aziz Tlass
Aﬃliated with:
Khalid bin Walid Brigade
Area of Opera2ons:
Rastan

Lieutenant Abd al-Aziz Tlass ambushed security forces along the road from Homs to
Rastan in September and fought in Rastan at the end of that. He has not appeared in
video statements since then, and may have been killed.

Lieutenant Amjad al-Hamid
Aﬃliated with:
Khalid bin Walid Brigade
Area of Opera2ons:
Rastan

Lieutenant al-Hamid was an early member of the Rastan Free Oﬃcer’s movement before
joining Khalid bin Walid in September 2011. The Rastan naIve appeared in a number of
key video statements during Khalid bin Walid’s formaIve period.

Lieutenant Omar Shamsi
Aﬃliated With:
Khalid bin al-Walid Brigade
Area of Opera2ons:
Rastan

Lieutenant Shamsi was an early member of the Rastan Free Oﬃcer’s movement before
joining Khalid bin Walid in September 2011. He appeared in a number of key video
statements during Khalid bin Walid’s formaIve period.

Figure 17: Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province (continued)115
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The following two pages show the FSA commanders and officers operating in the
Hama area in early 2012.

Hama Countryside & South Idlib
Captain Zuhair Al-Sheikh
Commander:
Osama bin Zaid Ba-alion
Area of Opera.ons:
Idlib & Hama

Captain al-Sheikh announce his defec>on, joining the Abou al-Fidaa Ba-alion in early
November. At the end of that month, he announced the forma>on of the Osama bin Zaid
Ba-alion from the head of over 75 rebels organized into 5 ‘companies.’

Lieutenant Ayman Hallaq
Aﬃliated with:
Abou al-Fidaa, Osama bin Zaid Ba-alions
Area of Opera.ons:
Northern Hama countryside

Lieutenant Hallaq appears alternately as the commander of the Mohammed Hussein alHallaq Company and the Iman bin Hussein Abdallah Company. In February 2012 his unit
captured and then released 11 Iranian pilgrims travelling through Hama.

Lieutenant Abdel Majid Ayoub
Commander:
Kifah Sirmala Company, Osama bin Zaid Bn
Area of Opera.ons:
Khan Shaykhun, Idlb

Lieutenant Ayoub has appeared as a ‘company’ commander under Zuhair al-Sheikh. In an
early December video statement claimed credit for defending a demonstra>on in Khan
Shaykhun and destroying armored troop carriers in the engagement.

Lieutenant Mohammed Base
Commander:
Mohammed al-Sheikh Company, Osama bin Zaid Bn
Area of Opera.ons:
Idlib & Hama
Lieutenant Base has appeared in two videos with Cpatain Zuhair al-Sheikh as a
subordinate leader in his organiza>on.

Lieutenant Mahmoud Ahmed Hummadi
Commander:
Hassan Al-Hassan Company, Osama bin Zaid Bn
Area of Opera.ons:
Idlib & Hama
Lieutenant Hummadi has appeared in two videos with Cpatain Zuhair al-Sheikh as a
subordinate leader in his organiza>on..

Figure 18: Hama Countryside & South Idlib116
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Hama Countryside & South Idlib
Brigadier General Radwan al-Madloush
Commander:
Suleiman Ba,alion
Area of Opera1ons:
Maarat al-Numan, Idilb

General Madloush defected Air Force Intelligence, a rare example of defec@on from the
regime intelligence apparatus. The FSA named him commander of the Suleiman Ba,alion
in Idlib. Loyalist forces killed him when they raided his safe house in November 2011

Captain Zahir Abdul Karim
Aﬃliated With:
Suleiman Ba,alion
Area of Opera1ons:
Karnaz & Muhradeh, Hama

Captain Karim claimed responsibility for some of the earliest eﬀec@ve a,acks against
regime convoys travelling through the Hama countryside in September 2011. He was
severely wounded in the same raid that killed Radwan al-Madloush.

Colonel Adnan Hallaq
Aﬃliated With:
Area of Opera1ons:

Abou al-Fidaa Ba,alion
Hama

Colonel Hallaq defected in December 2011 with a small group of soldiers, announcing his
plans to joint the Abou al-Fidaa ba,alion of the Free Syrian Army “under the leadership
of Riad Asaad.

Lieutenant Talal al-Masri
Aﬃliated With:
Khouder al-Sharif Company, Osama bin Zaid Bn
Area of Opera1ons:
Kafr Nabuda, Hama

Lieutenant al-Masri announced his defec@on from Syrian Special Forces in December
2011 and appeared in mid-February video, sta@ng his connec@on to both Osama bin Zaid
and Abou al-Fidaa Ba,alions before engaging regime forces with an advanced AT
weapon.

Lieutenant Mohammed al-Khal
Aﬃliated With:
Kouder al-Sharif Company, Osama bin Zaid Bn
Area of Opera1ons:
Kafr Nabuda, Hama

In December 2011 Lieutenant Mohammed al-Khal announced his defec@on from the
Syrian Army and the forma@on of the Khouder a-Sharif Company of the Osama bin Zaid
Ba,alion.

Figure 19: Hama Countryside & South Idlib (continued)117
To summarize the annotated photos of the previous eight pages, these selfidentified leaders described their defections, activities, and intentions on publically
available media. To an outsider, it is probably difficult to understand why and how the
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US military and intelligence community failed to see, understand, and present such
information to senior US military leaders. (But that is the subject of the next chapter.)

Military Operations

Source: Institute for the Study of War, The Struggle for Syria in 2011, December
2011, 12.
Figure 20: Fighting in 2011

In March 2011, protests began in Deraa, which were immediately suppressed by
regime forces.118 The resistance spread to Homs in May, but by September the regime
was effectively reacting to those events.119 Demonstrations then flared in Damascus,
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but never materialized to the extent of threatening the regime.120 Then the first
significant armed resistance emerged in the border area with Turkey in June.121 The
regime fought back again, only to have the armed resistance re-appear in Idlib by
October, by some reports under the direction of the Free Syrian Army.122
By the spring and summer of 2012, the rebels extended their control over
large areas of northern Syria.123 Indeed, fighting had spread throughout most of
Syria.124 In March 2012 the three most effective rebel units inside Syria included
the Khalid bin Walid Brigade operating near Homs, the Harmoush Battalion in the
northern Jebel al-Zaiya mountains, and the Omari Battalion in the southern
Hawran plain.125 Figure 21 depicts the above-mentioned Harmoush Battalion
and Figure 22 shows a map of the fighting by March 2012.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012,
27.
Figure 21: Harmoush Battalion in Formation, March 2012
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012, 8.
Note: References to page numbers in this map refer to the original ISW
publication, not this dissertation.
Figure 22: Map of Fighting, March 2012
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By June 2012, liberated rebel safe zones appeared in Idlib, as shown in
the map in Figure 23, and resistance activities progressed, as shown in the map
of Figure 24. At this time, the private research group Institute for the Study of
War was publishing not only detailed line-and-block organizational charts, but
also the analytically more significant link-diagram charts detailing the various
subordinate leaders and their relationships with others. These link-diagram
charts identified and displayed the rebels’ military councils and leaders in Homs,
Hama, Idlib, and Deraa.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, June 2012,
12.
Figure 23: Rebel Safe Zones in Idlib
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, June 2012, 8.
Note: References to page numbers in this map refer to the original ISW
publication, not this dissertation.
Figure 24: Map of Fighting, June 2012
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By the winter of 2012 to 2013, the rebels controlled large portions of Idlib,
Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor plus portions of Homs province, Quneitra, Daraa,
and Hasaka provinces.126

Strength and Weaknesses
By May 2012 this non-extremist resistance force grew to 40,000
fighters.127 However, that number can be misleading since there was a wide
spectrum of capabilities within that seemingly impressive number. That said,
even during this period it was possible for researchers to discern the capable
from the not-so-capable units. The below chart is an example of one of those
assessments that triages the various rebel units between those that were
effective and affiliated with the FSA, those displaying little evidence of their
effectiveness, those with the FSA but infrequently engaging regime units, and
those claiming to operate in areas with little to no reported engagements.
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012,
15.
Figure 25: Free Syrian Army Units, March 2012
During this period, the rebels enjoyed an increase in the number of
recruits and the provision of significant quantities of arms and ammunition,
primarily from captured regime stocks.128 The rebels now had heavy machine
guns, shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, mortars, recoilless rifles, and
artillery rocket launchers.129 External sources of arms and ammunition reportedly
came from the Gulf States and Western countries, with the weapons smuggled in
through Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.130 The rebels seized facilities and
inflicted losses on regime forces, all while the government forces became less
capable.131
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Although conventional military personnel and researchers would judge
such a loose organization without a unified political organization as a negative
feature,132 to a rebellion or insurgency this is a desirable feature as it denies the
regime the ability to identify and then strike a critical command and control
headquarters or leader. The diffused nature of any rebellion is useful and often
necessary for its survival in these early stages.
The resistance was still weak in its ability to forge cooperation above the tactical
fighting level. Moreover, of significance, extremist Islamist fighters that later announced
themselves as ISIS began to emerge on the battlefields.133 I will describe this in detail
in the following time period section.
Despite the rebels growing strength by the late summer, in relative terms the tide
began to turn, primarily due to Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and Iraqi Shia militias direct
and increasing involvement in the fighting. As another researcher wrote, “Without this
assistance, the regime’s downward trajectory very likely would have continued and
perhaps even steepened.”134 I detail the Iranian involvement later in this chapter.

Time Period 2: The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the
Anti-Assad Fight (September 2012 through June 2014 and later)
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Description
By September 2012, however, other groups emerged on the battlefield as
well. Figure 26 shows the array of various rebel groups along a religious
ideology spectrum. Extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, Fatah al-Islam, and al
Qaeda in Iraq (predecessor organization of ISIS) appeared, while less extreme
Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Sham appeared, too. These latter Islamist groups
rejected the killing of innocents and working with al Qaeda, but were still
markedly distinct from the more secular FSA, which did remain the largest force
in the 2012 to 2013 period.
Of significance to this dissertation and the definition of the viable and
acceptable resistance, neither Jabhat al-Nusra nor Ahrar al-Sham fit the criteria
of “acceptable.” In Jabhat al-Nusra’s case, neither its political goals nor terrorist
tactics were acceptable. In Ahrar al-Sham’s case, its political goal of establishing
an Islamist state in Syria was not congruent with US objectives. The fact that
Ahrar al-Sham would eventually lead the umbrella group Syrian Islamic Front
(SIF) as part of the SOC would complicate US support to the SOC.135
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Jihad in Syria, September 2012, 18.
Figure 26: Spectrum of Ideology, September 2012
Political Organization and Leadership
In the 2012 to 2013 period, the two major fighting elements that can be described
as violent Salafists were Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. The former was
established July 2011 and led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who pledged his support
to al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.136 The latter, Ahrar al-Sham, publically
announced itself in January 2012 and is led by Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi.137
Although both groups are violent Salafists, they have distinctly different political
goals and objectives. Jabhat al-Nusra, an off-shoot and affiliate of al Qaeda, has transregional and global aspirations and has no reservations about attacking innocent men,
woman, and children if it serves the larger purpose of influencing political leaders to
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alter their course – the classic definition of terrorism.138 Indeed, the US officially
declared Jabhat al-Nusra a terrorist organization on December 11, 2012.139
By contrast, Ahrar al-Sham has not practiced such terrorist tactics and has not
called for a global caliphate; instead, it advocated for the establishment of an Islamic
state only within Syria.140

Military Operations
Unlike most of the grassroots resistance elements described elsewhere in this
chapter, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham operated throughout the country. This can
be at least partially explained due to the groundwork (the underground) laid by Jabhat
al-Nusra’s predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq inside Syria during the US-Iraq war. It can also
be explained by the role of foreign fighters who entered the conflict in Syria without the
responsibility of defending their hometowns and villages that is inherent in any
grassroots resistance element.
Both Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham had forces deployed in each of the
geographic fronts of the fighting. In most cases, both Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar alSham partnered with non-extremist resistance elements to orchestrate tactical military
operations against regime forces. Indeed, many of the military engagements described
earlier in this chapter included elements from Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.
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Strength and Weaknesses
Some researchers assessed that the Salafist groups Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar
al-Sham became stronger relative to the other groups due to better foreign support and
more effective governance in areas they controlled.141 Others have noted that their
ascendency is at least partially attributable to the lack of Western leadership and
support to the more moderate factions, like the FSA.142 Another factor attributed to the
rise of these Salafist groups is their better performance at addressing local grievances
than the other groups, including the FSA.143
Acknowledging that obtaining an exact count of such irregular forces while
fighting was still occurring was difficult and obviously imprecise, some researchers
suggested that Jabhat al-Nusra’s strength was between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters by
early 2013.144 Similarly, Ahrar al-Sham’s strength was estimated at 5,000 to 6,000
fighters during this same period.145 These personnel numbers are much lower than the
estimates for the FSA, but their fighting ability was consistently rated as higher due to
the better outside support they received from their sponsors and their ideological
commitment and motivation.
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Time Period 3: The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in Exile
(December 2012 through June 2014 and later)

Description
November and December 2012 was a significant time period marking the
establishment of both political and military nodes at the national echelons for the
resistance, although both nodes remained outside of Syria. In December the United
States Government (USG) and much of the international community recognized this
national political entity as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people -- not an
inconsequential event.
Prior to this time, the resistance was a grassroots, bottom-up led activity. Now it
had a national-level political organization, albeit outside of Syria for its own security, that
presumably would unify behind a common political vision. Moreover, a centralized
military organization would supposedly provide a specific node for outside military
assistance to then funnel weapons, ammunition, and logistics support to the resistance.
This section describes the evolution of these political and military organizations, their
leadership, and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these
developments.

Political Organization and Leadership
In November 2012, the Syrian National Council met in Qatar and
transitioned its authority to the newly founded National Coalition for Syrian
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Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC).146 In December 2012 in Morocco,
the United States and its partners in the Friends of Syria framework, recognized
the SOC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.147 The SOC
formed a military component, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) to manage the
armed resistance.148 Over time both of these organizations evolved with
changing relationships to other groups. Of note, the FSA, headquartered in
Turkey, also associated itself with the SMC; yet other FSA units and other nonFSA units were also active as grassroots fighting elements inside Syria.149
On December 7 in Antalya, Turkey, the various rebel groups agreed to
merge their coordination efforts into one organization, the Supreme Joint Military
Command Council (SMC) in an effort to provide both a coordination platform for
military operations and to provide a more streamlined conduit for funding support
from the various foreign countries assisting the different rebel groups.150 By this
time the rebels had organized themselves into five major fronts (northern, Homs,
southern, western/middle, and eastern fronts) each with varying combinations of
fighters including forces from the Syrian Liberation Front, Syrian Islamic Front,
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Jabhat Nusra, and other units.151 Of significance, this new SMC structure
merged the previously separate support networks from Saudi Arabia and
Qatar.152
While the grassroots elements of the rebellion existed inside Syria, the
senior political and military leaders were in sanctuaries outside the country.
Moaz al-Khatib, an Imam from the Umayyad Mosque, the largest mosque in
Damascus, became the President of the SOC.153 General Salim Idriss became
the leader of its military component, the SMC.154 The US provided $117 million in
non-lethal assistance to the SOC in 2012-2013, which included training for over
1500 local leaders and activists inside of Syria.155
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Figure 27: Moaz al-Khatib, President of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC)
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Source: chronicle.co.zw

Figure 28: General Salim Idriss, leader of the Supreme Military Council (SMC)

The following chart shows the structure of the Supreme Military Council.156

Figure 29: Structure of the Supreme Military Council
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By March 2013 the resistance organized into five fronts as depicted below.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, The Free Syrian Army, March 2013, 18.
Figure 30: The Five Fronts and their Areas of Operation, March 2013
Of significant note, however, for all the advantages inherent in such an
umbrella organization as the SMC, there were some disadvantages. The
resistance, as embodied now in the SMC, was not just limited to secular
defectors from the Syrian military and other grassroots local fighters. Salafist
organizations were now part of the formal political structure of the resistance.157
The color codes in Figure 31 are noteworthy: this figure shows the integration of
three ideologically distinct organizations integrated into geographical commands
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fighting the regime.158 The yellow icons represent units of the Syrian Liberation
Front (SLF); units that supported FSA units, but not the leadership in Turkey.
The blue icons represent units of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), which had a
Salafist ideology, aspired to a theocratic state, but were Syrian and without global
or regional ambitions. The red icons represent units of Jabhat al-Nusra, an al
Qaeda affiliate with local, regional, and ultimately global ambitions. This triage of
these units is important for two reasons. First, for local and tactical survival and
effectiveness against the regime, the various forces united despite their
ideological differences. Second, in terms of the “viable and acceptable” litmus
test for the resistance, the SLF would be acceptable, but not the SIF or, of
course, Jabhat Nusra. This complicated matters for US policy makers and
planners, but it should not have been a showstopper. However, it could also be
reasonably argued that if the US had channelized military support to the FSA and
SLF, while denying support to the SIF, the US would have strengthened the very
units whose goals were aligned with those of the US.159
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, The Free Syrian Army, March 2013, 39.
Figure 31: Opposition Groups by Front, March 2013
Military Operations
During this period, rebels seized the majority of the eastern sections of
Syria including the provincial capital of al-Raqqa in March 2013. However, in the
western portions of Syria (e.g. Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus) the fighting
essentially stalemated.160 It appeared to some researchers that the rebels had
reached their limit in their ability to challenge regime strongholds.161
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Major General Idriss of the SMC stated that the top priority for the rebels
would be to attack and seize regime airfields, targeting the regime’s strength and
capabilities for air support.162 When the rebel’s northern front conducted their
operations in the Idlib and Aleppo areas during this period, they correspondingly
focused on seizing the Taftanaz airfield, which they did on January 11, 2013.163
The rebels subsequently seized the airfield at al-Jarra.164 In the eastern front, in
addition to seizing al-Raqqa city, the rebels seized Syria’s largest hydroelectric
dam at al-Thawra and then placed the airfield at Deir ez-Zour under siege.165 In
the central/west front, the rebels strengthened their positions in Jabal al-Akrad
and Jabal al-Turkman, causing the local Alawite population to flee to Tartus and
Latakia.166 In the Homs front, the rebels were forced to withdraw from Homs city
due to regime counterattacks.167 In the southern front, rebels captured the Marj
al-Sultan airport on the outskirts of Damascus on November 12, 2012.168
Violence in Damascus escalated during this period, due in part to coordinated
FSA and Jabhat al-Nusra operations.169
Strength and Weaknesses
In April 2013 Ambassador Ford, provided this assessment of the
opposition during this period:
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“The balance on the ground already has changed against the regime, and
if you look at a map of what the regime controls now compared to what it
controlled four or five months ago, you will see that the armed opposition has
made steady, slow but steady gains.”170
Other researchers have highlighted weaknesses; a shortage of heavy
weapons, inadequate logistics, weak command structures, ideological divisions,
and disconnection from political opposition.171
Casualties on both sides climbed during this period. The Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights estimated that as of June 2013, the number killed
amounted to:172
13,539 Syrian rebels
2,518 foreign fighters (minus Lebanese Hizballah and other Iranian Shia
militias)
25,407 Syrian soldiers
17,311 pro-regime, shabbiha irregular fighters and pro-regime militias
169 Lebanese Hizballah fighters
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effectiveness of the fighting forces on the ground and not the higher-level
headquarters in exile. On the other hand, if the SMC had become an effective
conduit for the receipt and allocation of targeted US military support to select
rebel units, it could be argued, such an efficient transfusion of aid could have
inspired and led to greater tactical results on the battlefield.
Although the rebel’s strength grew during these three years, the
resistance never approached the capability to topple the Assad regime. That is
not surprising, however, for two key reasons. First, the US military never
provided assistance until the December 2014 Train and Equip legislation was
signed into law, with assistance not beginning until 2015.173 Second, by contrast,
the large scale intervention to support the Assad regime forces provided by Iran,
Lebanese Hizballah, and Iranian-sponsored Iraqi Shia militia groups Kata’ib
Hizballah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahi al-Haq (AAH) escalated in 2012-13. This rebalance of power effectively checked the developing moderate resistance force
strength and capabilities. The final tipping point then occurred when Russia
intervened with its own military forces in September 2015. Moreover, in the
closing years of this period in late 2013 and early 2014, as the extremist Islamist
rebel units (ISIS and al Nusrah Front) received arms, ammunition, and other
military support from other suppliers, individual grassroots and otherwise
moderate fighters were enticed to join the ranks of these better-equipped and
capable units.
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Time Period 4: Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah, and other Iranian
Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces (February 2013 through June 2014
and later)

Description
As early of 2011, it was evident that Iran had deployed a multi-prong
advisory effort into Syria to assist the Assad regime’s fight against the rebellion.
The advisory effort included specialists from the Iranian ground forces,
intelligence, law enforcement, and special forces organizations. Some would
argue that such a deployment of forces, perhaps characterized as advisors, is
not much different than US advisory efforts in other crisis areas of the world.
However, the Iranian effort also involved the commitment of its surrogate force
Lebanese Hizballah, the deployment of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Quds Forces (IRGC-QF) trained Shia militants from Iraq, and the formation of
Syrian militant groups. By early 2013, if not before, it became unmistakably clear
that Lebanese Hizballah (LH), Shia militants from Iraq, and militants formed and
trained from within Syria, all under the guidance and direction of the IRGC-QF,
were directly engaged in combat operations and were able to ultimately shift the
balance of forces in favor of the regime.174
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One element that confirms these activities well before February 2013 is
the US Department of Treasury’s designation of the IRCG-QF Commander,
Qassan Suleimani, for his role in the “violent repression against the Syrian
people” in May 2011.175 The following month, the European Union sanctioned
the IRGC’s intelligence chief Hossein Taeb for his role in helping the “Syrian
regime suppress protests.”176 Additional Treasury designations in 2011-2012
designated three Iranian airlines, Yas Air, Iran Air, and Mahan Air, for their roles
in smuggling weapons and personnel into Syria.177
A second element that confirms these activities is the words from the
leaders themselves. In April 2013, LH’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah,
along with the leadership of the Iraqi militants Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) and Asa’ib
Ahl al-Haq (AAH), confirmed their involvement in combat operations in Syria.178

Political Organization and Leadership
With the IRGC-QF immediately subordinate to the Iranian Supreme Leader
Seyyed Ali Khamenei, there is no doubt that Khamenei is responsible for authorizing
and ordering these activities. Under his direction, a combined expeditionary force of
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces (IRGC-GF), Quds Forces,
intelligence services, and law enforcement elements operated inside Syria in support of
the Assad regime.179
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In executing these activities, the IRCG-QF Commander, Qassan Suleimani,
undoubtedly played the key leadership role in orchestrating the involvement of LH, KH,
AAH, and the various Syrian militia units.

Military Operations
In the early years of the rebellion, LH simply augmented regime units with
specialized support like providing snipers to assist with regime military operations. But
by 2012, when the regime began losing control over parts of Syria, LH began to take on
a direct combat role.180 A battle in early 2012 in Zabadani near the Lebanese border
saw LH deployed and engaged with rebel forces along this historical supply route from
Baalbek to Damascus.181 In February 2013, LH fighters launched a ground offensive
against rebel forces near al-Qusayr, with the FSA publicizing the fact of direct LH
intervention in the fight.182
In April 2013, both KH and AAH fought in the Damascus suburb of Sayyeda
Zeinah, with these two groups actually publishing videos and photos on the internet to
document their operations.183
In addition to the employing LH, KH, and AAH, the IRGC-QF formed pro-regime
militias, like the Jaysh al-Shaibi, that provided native irregular forces to fight on behalf of
the regime.184
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Strength and Weaknesses
There are two key strengths to the Iranian use of LH and other surrogates in this
conflict. First is the sheer size of the fighting force that the Iranians generated. Not
including the LH, KH, and AAH fighting strength numbers, which were both formidable
in size yet difficult to obtain, the IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari
identified the Jaysh al-Shaibi Syrian irregular forces as numbering 50,000 fighters in
September of 2012.185 Such a force size actually exceeded the 40,000 force identified
with the FSA during this same period.
The second strength to the Iranian use of LH and other surrogates is Iran’s ability
to generate or surge additional support as required. As described in the opening
paragraph of this section, Iran employed advisors from its ground forces, intelligence,
law enforcement, and special forces organizations. The Iranians also committed its
surrogate force of Lebanese Hizballah. The IRGC-QF trained and deployed Shia
militants from Iraq and formed parallel militant groups from Syrian irregular fighters.
Iran could ratchet-up additional support as required, taking full advantage of geography
as a regional power with ground and air supply lines through Iraq into Syria and
Lebanon.
The major weakness of these activities would not manifest themselves in
immediate military capabilities; rather, they would weaken the long-term strategic
mystique or psychological value of LH. Long considered and billed as an Arab
resistance force against Israel, LH demonstrated itself as a force that fought Syrian
rebels attempting to overthrow their oppressive autocrat. Those Sunni rebels could and
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would be seen as the true resistance fighters, with the modern age LH emerging as a
force that supported the repression of Sunni Arabs. This psychological shift is not yet
fully manifested, but indeed it will emerge as a key weakness and vulnerability for LH in
the future.
These Iranian-directed reinforcements to the Assad regime shifted the balance of
forces away from the rebels and back towards the regime. But it took the arrival of the
Russian forces and the further dissipation of rebels from the moderate factions to the
extremists of ISIS and the al Nusrah forces to decisively tip the scales against the viable
and acceptable resistance force.

The Counterargument: “Yes, the resistance did exist, but it was too
fractured to be useful.” The Rebuttal: “Advise and Assist.”
A careful review of this chapter clearly shows that a variable and
acceptable resistance did exist in Syria in the time period of 2011 to 2014. The
maps, charts, photographs, and screen shots from video testimonies – all
contemporaneous to this time period – demonstrates the existence of this force.
Moreover, analysis from academics, other researchers, and think tanks – again
during this same time period – document that this information was publically
known.
At this point, the skeptic might now acknowledge that a viable and
acceptable resistance did exist, but the critic would be quick to add that it was too
fractured to be useful or not dominant within the rebel coalition that formed in
2012. Indeed, the nature of a grassroots uprising suggests there would be no
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unified command and control structure to such an organization. The skeptic
would also add that when the national-level political and military headquarters
finally did appear, they were located well outside of Syria and they enjoyed little
respect from the actual fighters in Syria.
I acknowledge the above points. But I add that having a diffused
leadership structure is actually advantageous for an emerging resistance
organization. Had there been one unified headquarters, leader, or command
post, it would have been catastrophic for the resistance if the regime identified
and raided that location. By contrast, a diffused leadership structure, like a multiheaded hydra, would be able to absorb the loss of any one particular
headquarters, leader, or command post. That said, ultimately the resistance
would need to unify itself, express one clear political vision for the future, and
provide strategic guidance and direction for all of the resistance, but in 20112012 that was neither necessary nor desirable. This chapter also showed that
the resistance was subsequently on track with the political SOC and its
subordinate military SMC to achieve these political objectives of a unified vision.
I would also add that with the formation of the SMC, Western supporters now had
a central node to funnel support into the resistance, and such channelized
support is also a useful means to align the activities of individual resistance units
towards common goals and objectives.
Although the SMC could perform the above function at the strategic level,
once weapons and supplies got into Syria, the function of further infiltrating and
disseminating these supplies to the right units in the proper amounts needed to
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be supervised and executed by a reliable infrastructure within Syria. Here
diffused distribution networks would not be advantageous. But this is precisely
the role that Western or other competent military advisors could have performed.
To be sure, this is not a conventional military activity to advise and assist rebels
behind enemy lines, but it is the classic doctrinal mission of US Army Special
Forces units.
It is interesting to highlight a relevant historical case study that
demonstrates the utility and effectiveness of an advise and assist mission in a
denied area behind enemy lines.186 Prior to the Allied invasion of France in
World War II, British, Free French, and American “Jedburgh” teams parachuted
into France. These teams made contact with existing Free French resistance
fighters hundreds of miles behind German lines and trained, armed, advised, and
assisted these local resistance fighters in guerrilla warfare and sabotage actions
against German forces. There were less than one hundred Jedburgh teams
(three members in each team), which included eighty-three Americans.187 Their
battlefield successes are well known to military historians, but the Jedburghs also
achieved success in organizing and orchestrating the various resistance bands to
have a common strategic and political vision, united behind French General
Charles de Gaulle, with sequenced combat activities in support of the larger
strategic campaign. Without the Jedburghs, it is doubtful that the French
resistance would have organized into anything more effective than local and
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disparate raiding bands. Researcher Will Irwin, in a remarkable case study of the
Jedburghs, succinctly stated:
An often unrecognized contribution of the Jedburghs was their ability to
keep marquis groups of wide-ranging political and ideological
backgrounds focused on working together to defeat the common enemy –
the Germans. More than a few Jedburgh veterans have told me that they
expended as much effort in preventing clashes between rival marquis
groups as they did in fighting the Germans.”188
After reviewing the maps, charts, and photos of the Syrian resistance in
this chapter, one might wonder about how a small element of modern day
Jedburghs would have enabled the resistance to more effectively fight the Assad
regime and the Iranian surrogates, while keeping the emerging ISIS organization
at bay.
A viable and acceptable resistance force did exist, and an US military
advise and assist effort could have enabled their effectiveness by organizing,
training, equipping, and arming these proper resistance elements within Syria.

Synthesis: The Missed Windows of Opportunity
This chapter reveals that not only did a viable and acceptable resistance
exist during this period, but also, as time went on over this three-year period,
other factors and players emerged that impacted the military conditions on the
ground. Clearly, the rise of the Sunni extremists and the increasing Iranian
involvement complicated the calculus for when and how best to support to
resistance.

188

Ibid., 236.
121

2011

2012

2013

2014

!

Primary Window
of Opportunity
1. The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011 through December 2012)

2. The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the Anti-Assad Fight
(September 2012 through June 2014 and later)
Secondary Window
of Opportunity
3. The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in Exile
(December 2012 through June 2014 and later)
For each of these time periods,
I show:
4. Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah,
•
Description
and other Iranian Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces
•
Political organization and
(February 2013 through June 2014 and later)
leadership
•
Military operations
24
•
Strengths and weaknesses

Figure 32: Windows of Opportunity to Support the Resistance
Given these conditions, when would have been the best period or periods
to support the resistance? The analysis of the four time periods addressed in
this chapter suggest that the primary window of opportunity would have been
between the summer of 2011 through December 2012. (See Figure 32) During
the window, the resistance was bottom-up and grassroots in nature. Similar to
the Jedburgh experience described above, small Special Forces elements could
have made direct contact with several of the various fighting units, assessed their
capabilities and intentions against the litmus text of “viable and acceptable”, and
supported the proper resistance units accordingly. Moreover, of significance,
during this time neither the Islamist extremists nor the Iranians had established
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powerful forces; the balance of power shifted from the regime forces to the FSA.
A second window of opportunity existed with the establishment of the SOC and
SMC in December 2012 and extended until roughly the summer of 2013. By the
time this six-month window closed, the Sunni extremists, the Iranians, and the
Iranian surrogates had established sufficient strength to shift the balance of
power away from the FSA and the SMC. Supporting the latter was still viable,
but became much more difficult with these shifting conditions and force ratios.
All this said, the best way to judge and assess these actual windows of
opportunity would have been to dispatch contact or assessment teams to the
resistance forces to determine a ground-truth assessment. However, it is clear
that these windows of opportunity did exist and no US military action was taken
to assess the resistance force units’ viability and acceptability.

Chapter Summary
This chapter showed that a viable and acceptable Syrian resistance
element did exist in the March 2011 to June 2014 time period. The chapter
detailed the pre-Arab Spring political, economic, and social underpinnings to the
rebellion, as well as the regional context and spark of the Arab Spring. The
chapter detailed a concise yet thorough description of the Syrian resistance of
2011-2014 using sources and information contemporaneous to this period.
In this chapter I also addressed the counterargument that the resistance
was too fractured to be useful by providing the rebuttal that a diffused command
and control element is actually desirable in this stage of resistance development
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and that an advisory and assistance effort would have enabled both the
development of more effective combat capabilities and a more unified chain of
command at a more appropriate time. I concluded this chapter with an
assessment of a primary and secondary window of opportunity for supporting the
resistance that the US ignored.
As will be shown in the following chapter, the conventional US military,
perhaps looking for a well organized conventional military force vice a resistance
movement, failed to see, recognize, and understand the significance of this
resistance. Perhaps too the conventional intelligence establishment was
oblivious to or prejudiced against the manifestation of the resistance via social
media, YouTube videos, and real-time Skype interviews vice conventional
intelligence collection. Perhaps both deficiencies together conspired to form
glaucoma against what should have been seen and understood.
Regardless, no serious US military planning or effort occurred to assess or
support the resistance during this period. This void subsequently became filled
with Iranian, LH, and other Iranian surrogates – and later Russian military
intervention – that tipped the balance against the resistance. Why and how this
US military failure occurred is the subject of the upcoming chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
WHY AND HOW DID THE US MISS THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAIN, ADVISE,
AND EQUIP THE SYRIAN RESISTANCE?

“A broad study of special operations seems to
indicate a trained incapacity, a deformation
professionnelle, on the part of conventional military
minds to grasp the principles of special warfare….
A civilian generally will have difficulty grasping just
how alien and even distasteful special operations
often appear to those trained and socialized in
regular military behavior. This point is important
because if superior commanders do not appreciate
or do not like what special operations forces might
do, the strategic utility of those forces will be
strictly moot. In many cases the strategic utility of
special operations rests in the hands of military
officers who have attitudes, interests, and an
understanding of war unfriendly to the potential of
special warfare.”189
--Colin S. Gray, British-American strategic
theorist and defense analyst.
“Culture, psychology, and decision-making
structure place limits on the development, delivery,
and impact of effective military voice in national
security policy discussions.”190
--Retired U.S. Army Major General William E.
Rapp, former Commandant of the U.S. Army War
College
Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998),
150-151.
190 William E. Rapp, Major General, “Toward Strategic Solvency: Ensuring Effective
Military Voice,” Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter
2016-2017, 13.
189
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This chapter is the heart of the dissertation. Once it is clear that a viable
and acceptable resistance did exist in Syria in the March 2011 to June 2014
period, as the previous chapter explained, one can reasonably expect answers
as to why and how the US missed the opportunity to train, advise, and equip
these resistance elements.
In this chapter I first review some elements of the research methodology
described in chapter one that provide the framework for the analysis in this
chapter. I will then transition to the following major sections of this chapter:
•

The Evolving US Policy and Strategy

•

Process-Tracing the Key National Security Decision-Making

•

The Conceptual Framework Applied to the How and Why Questions

•

How Did the US Make this Decision?

•

Why Did the US Make this Decision?

The dissertation is a qualitative methods single case study with using processtracing as described by Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, and Jeffrey T.
Checkel.191 Primary source evidence included Congressional testimonies and memoirs
from the key participants in the decision-making plus senior-level interviews. This
research also included reviewing and harvesting dozens of US government policy
statements that both reacted to and attempted to influence events in Syria. It was very
important to place those information pieces onto a timeline and to then look for the

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). See also Andrew Bennett and
Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge, UK:
University Printing House, 2015).
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relationships between the events that either influenced or reflected the US decisionmaking.
To answer the “how and why” the US made this decision, I based the analysis on
Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory as the conceptual framework. Luhmann’s analysis of
as to how systems or organizations deal with complexity, and specifically how they tend
to deflect or dismiss developments or ideas that do not fit their established paths of
similar decision-making, is remarkable for its similarity to the Syrian situation and how
the US military assessed or failed to properly assess this complex situation. To answer
the “how” portion I used this systems theory and the more simplistic structuralfunctionalism theory approach to examine the military decision-making process for
providing inputs to the National Security Council. This approach revealed the inherent
flaws for developing military support to resistance activities by marginalizing
unconventional warfare experts from the key operational positions in the decisionmaking. To answer the “why” portion, I showed that the conventional senior military
leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are prone to see and react to
developments in their environments that make sense only from their autopoiesis-based
frame of reference. The military leaders – intelligence, operations, and planners –
showed no ability to generate an unconventional response to complex unconventional
situation unfolding in Syria, as this chapter will show.
In both of these cases – the how and the why – the analysis is fully congruent not
only with Luhmann’s system theory but also with Alex Mintz’ Integrated Cognitive and
Rationale Theory of Foreign Policy Decision-Making, as described in chapter one.
Moreover, the “how” portion is consistent with classic structural-functionalism and the
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“why” portion is consistent with institutional (or bureaucracy) culture theory, which would
suggest that conventional military officers would offer conventional military solutions.
Examining the analysis, writings, and decision-making inputs from the key
national security participants was essential. These leaders included the President,
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US
Ambassador to Syria and lower ranking but key persons privy to the decision-making.
In addition to the background research of this data, I interviewed the US Ambassador to
Syria at the time, Robert Ford, and retired Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, who
was the most senior Special Forces (Green Beret) commander in the US during this
period. Ambassador Ford’s insights to the US decision-making were key and essential,
while General Cleveland’s decades-long observations on the cultural conflict between
conventional and unconventional military forces was equally significant to the causal
analysis of the research question.
Given the data above, I constructed both macro-level process-trace charts that
highlighted important events on one timeline, and then I distilled seven key decisionmaking events into micro-level process-trace charts that dissected the decision-making
by showing who made what input, when, how, and why. It is important that readers
familiarize themselves with the macro-level process-trace charts in Appendix A before
proceeding in this chapter.
But first, to set the context of the decision-making, a review of the evolution of the
US policy during this period is essential.
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The Evolving US Policy and Strategy
From 2011 to 2014 – and indeed beyond this time as well – US policy evolved in
reaction to and with the aim of influencing events on the ground. What began as public
expressions of support to the viable and acceptable resistance elements, coupled with
the provision of non-lethal assistance to activist networks within Syria, evolved through
calls for Assad’s removal from power, the establishment of “red lines” over regime use
of chemical weapons, the disregard of violations of that red line, an apparent limited
provision of weapons to the resistance, to a somewhat passive US response to the
military interventions from Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and Russia. Only after Mosul’s fall
to ISIS in June 2014, which marks the end of the time period focus for this dissertation,
did the US president decide to provide military support to the Syrian resistance, albeit in
the form of a train-and-equip program vice MSRA/UW.
Appendix A provides the macro-level process-tracing charts and data in a mosaic
depiction of this evolving picture. The first section of the appendix shows the activities
on an integrated timeline organizing the events by actions taken by Syrian elements
(e.g., regime, resistance forces, ISIS), other regional actors and international
organizations (e.g., Iran and the United Nations), and the US government. The second
section of the appendix provides the detailed public statements issued by the US
government during this period.
Beginning with a press statement on July 5, 2011, the US government urged the
Assad regime to stop its repression against the protests that blossomed in the opening
months of the Arab Spring. The statement expressed support for a transition to
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democracy and stated that the US would stand with the people of Syria in seeking their
human rights.192
On February 24, 2012 the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian
People, an organization of more than sixty countries with representatives from the
United Nations, the European Union, and the Arab League, met in Tunis to discuss the
Syrian situation. In a joint statement, the participants strongly condemned the Assad
regime and called for a political transition to a democratic, plural political system. The
statement also specified that Assad would need to delegate his full authority to his First
Deputy during the transition period. The Friends Group also expressed disappointment
at the UN Security Council’s inability to produce similar statements due to Russian and
Chinese opposition. The Friends Group also recognized the Syrian National Council as
the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and called for increased support to
the Syrian opposition.193
In February 2013, the US government would back these calls for a political
transition to a democratic and pluralist system of government with significant material
support. In an official statement, the State Department noted that over seventy
thousand Syrians had been killed in the previous two years of political unrest and that
the regime had “sacrificed all legitimacy in a vicious effort to cling to power.”194 The
statement specified that the US government had provided nearly $385 million in
Victoria Nuland, Department of State, Washington, DC, July 5, 2011, accessed
March 3, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167577.htm.
193 Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, February 24,
2012, accessed March 3, 2017, https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184642.htm.
194 Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, February 22,
2013, accessed March 3, 2017, https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205092.htm.
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humanitarian assistance and over $54 million in non-lethal support for local opposition
councils and civil society inside Syria.195 Of significance, this support to the opposition
included “training and equipment to build the capacity of a nation-wide network of
ethnically and religiously diverse civilian activists to link Syrian citizens with nascent
government structures.”196 This support was also intended to enhance the information
security of Syrian activists, human rights organizations, and media outlets.”197
Within two months Secretary of State John Kerry announced the doubling of this
non-lethal support to the opposition to $123 million, specifically mentioning the
resistance force’s Supreme Military Council (SMC) as the recipient of some of this
support.198 The total for non-lethal support to the resistance was now pledged at $250
million.199
In April 2013 Elizabeth Jones, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, summarized US policy and strategy during testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. She reiterated US policy for a political transition in Syria
that removes Assad and assures that Assad has no role during the political transition.
She stated, “Assad has long lost his legitimacy…(he) will not play any role in that
transitional governing body.”200 She added, “We are preparing for a Syria without
Assad by helping the opposition lay the foundation for a democratic transition…. (We)
and our partners are helping build the Syrian political opposition, including by
Ibid.
Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, April 20, 2013,
accessed March 3, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207810.htm.
199 Ibid.
200 US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 6.
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recognizing the Syrian Opposition Coalition as the legitimate representative of the
Syrian people.”201
Jones highlighted the international coalition that was backing this political goal.
In her statement she referred to the Geneva communiqué and its framework for the
political transition that was agreed to in June 2012 by the members of the UN Security
Council, Turkey, and the Arab League.202 In this testimony she added that the United
States did not believe it to be in its best interests to provide lethal support to the Syrian
opposition at this time.203
At this same hearing, the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, in response
to a question to list the key strategic objectives for the US in Syria, replied that the US
goals consisted of ensuring Syria’s chemical weapons do not fall into the hands of
terrorist groups, Syria does not become a base for terrorist operations, Syria becomes a
source of stability in the region (more specifically, ensuring the refugee flow does not
destabilize the region), and a political transition occurs that removes Assad from regime
from power and transitions the government to a democratic and pluralistic form.204
Ambassador Ford continued, “The groups that we are supporting, Senator, are
talking about a vision of a country and a vision of a state that is inclusive and that will
treat citizens equally regardless of their religion or their ethnicity. And that is the best
opportunity we have to isolate extremists. I do not think it will be easy to isolate those
extremists, Senator, but I think there is an opportunity to contain the sectarian divisions
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with the kind of outreach that I mentioned from both the political opposition as well as
the Syrian Supreme Military Command.”205
Six months later, testifying to the same committee, Ambassador Ford, added to
this policy description by stating the transition governing body would be established by
mutual agreement between the Syrian regime and the opposition. He stated, “Mutual
consent would mean the opposition has a veto on the formation and the details of that
transition government…. That said, the regime also has a veto.”206 Ambassador Ford
underscored the fact that the USG had already identified and was working with the
moderate armed opposition when he stated, “Our nonlethal support of a moderate
armed opposition is therefore vital and is a point that General Idris of the Supreme
Military Council has made to me repeatedly.”207
On August 21, 2013 chemical weapons were used on protestors near Damascus
resulting in the deaths of 1,429 people; on August 30, the US formally attributed to
attack to the Syrian regime.208
President Obama on September 7, 2013 called for limited military actions to “hold
the Assad regime accountable for its violation of international norms prohibiting the use

Ibid.
Robert S. Ford. Opening Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, October 31, 2013, accessed February 8, 2016,
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/216163.htm.
207 Ibid.
208 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Government Assessment of the
Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013”, August 30, 2013,
accessed March 3, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemicalweapons-august-21.
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of chemical weapons.”209 He asked Congress to vote to authorize this use of force; a
vote that never occurred.
Four months later the State Department announced that the USG was now
providing nearly $260 million in direct support to the moderate Syrian opposition. This
January 17, 2014 statement specifically mentioned the “Supreme Military Council
(SMC) of the Free Syria Army” and detailed the assistance as including support to local
councils to create linkages among opposition groups, and strengthen grassroots
organizations and local administrative bodies. This statement specified that training and
equipment would go towards a network of “over 2,000 grassroots activists…from more
than 100 opposition councils and organizations” within Syria. The stated purpose of this
support was to enhance “the linkages between Syrian activists, human rights
organizations, and independent media outlets…(and) training for networks of citizen
journalists, bloggers, and cyber activists.” This statement also detailed the provision of
vehicles, tons of medical equipment, satellite access equipment, laptops, and radio
communication equipment to the Supreme Military Council.210 It is striking to note that
during the years of 2012-2014, the US military would excuse its lack of developing
MSRA/UW options on the “fact” that no one could identify an opposition in sufficient
detail or organization to properly support.

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Weekly Address: Calling for
Limited Military Action in Syria,” September 7, 2013, accessed March 3, 2017,
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With this brief overview of the evolving US policy and strategy as background,
acknowledging that more details can be found in Appendix A, I now turn to processtracing the key decision-making events.

Process-Tracing the Key National Security Decision-Making
Before presenting the analysis as to how and why this decision-making occurred,
it is necessary to clearly describe the decision-making events themselves. In this
dissertation, I used Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s technique of processtracing, which they define and describe as a method “to identify the intervening causal
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable
(or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”211 George and Bennett
describe several varieties of this technique, each rooted in detailed descriptions or
narratives of the events, but each using theories in varying degrees.212
In my application of process-tracing in this dissertation, I first recorded the
important political, military, social, and economic events occurring within the context of
the Syrian rebellion of March 2011 to June 2014, to include those related events
occurring prior to and after this period. I then categorized and arranged over one
hundred of those events not only by date but also of events by Syrian actors (Assad
regime, resistance elements) and ISIS, actions by other states (minus the US) and
international organizations, and actions by the US government to include internal
decision-making events. This categorization and arrangement of these events more
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clearly show the constructivist-like relationships between some of these events. This
thirty-plus page chart is captured in Appendix A to this dissertation. The reader should
review that appendix before proceeding to the next section of this chapter.
Appendix A is divided into two sections: the first is the chart of the events and the
second contains the detailed and exact policy statements from the White House and
State Department that are associated with the policy pronouncement events of the
process-tracing chart. Having these exact words is essential to chart the decisionmaking process.
Next, from within this chart I identified and extracted seven key US government
decision-making events, which are highlighted in blue ink in the appendix. These key
events require a further deep analysis to examine their contribution to and illumination
of the US government decision-making. These events are:
1. Senior US defense and military leaders assess that “it is not clear what
constitutes the Syrian armed opposition” (February and March 2012).
2. Interagency senior leaders express frustration at DoD’s thinking (mid-2012).
3. President Obama rejects National Security Council recommendation for the
CIA to arm the rebels (September 2012).
4. Significant divergence apparent between DoD senior leaders and the US
Ambassador in Syria on assessing the resistance (April 2013).
5. Two months later President Obama approves plan for CIA to arm the
resistance (June 2013).
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6. In the wake of the fall of Mosul, President Obama orders the military to train
and equip the resistance in their fight against ISIS, but not the Assad regime
(June 2014).
7. Congress approves the funding for the DoD train and equip operation
(December 2014).
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Figure 33: Overview of Process Tracing the Decision-Making
(Micro-View)
I next arrayed these seven events on a synchronization matrix that shows their
relationship to each other over time and by principal actor. (See Figure 33 above.) The
principal actors are shown as the President, the Secretary of State, the US Ambassador
to Syria, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the highest
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uniformed member in the US military and the principal military advisor to the President),
the Commander of the US Central Command (the military command with operational
responsibility for the geographic area in the middle east and south-central Asia that
includes Syria), and the Director of the CIA. Since the actual people that held these
positions varied over this three-year period from March 2011 to June 2014, with the
exception of the president, the individuals’ names are listed on the chart with a timeline.
In other words, the charts dissect the decision-making in these seven events by
capturing which senior national security leader said what, where, when, why, and how.
What follows is an examination of each of these seven key events.

Event One: Senior US Defense and Military Leaders Assess that “It is Not
Clear What Constitutes the Syrian Armed Opposition” (February and March 2012)
The first key event occurred in February and March of 2012 when the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, and the Secretary of Defense,
Leon Panetta, made separate statements to separate audiences that there was no
identifiable armed opposition in Syria. (See Figure 34) In an interview with CNN’s
Fareed Zakaria that aired on February 19, 2012, General Dempsey stated "I think it's
premature to take a decision to arm the opposition movement in Syria, because I would
challenge anyone to clearly identify for me the opposition movement in Syria at this
point.”213 The Chairman would continue to echo this sentiment for the next two years,
much to the resulting frustration of US Ambassador to Syria, the Secretary of State, and
eventually even Leon Panetta. But at this time, Secretary of Defense Panetta was in
213

“U.S. Military Chief Dubious About Arming Syrian Rebels,” CNN, accessed February
4, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/19/us/syria/.
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lockstep with the General Dempsey as they testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee March 7, 2012.
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February and March 2012: In separate but related events, first the Chairman of the JCS and then the
Secretary of Defense state that there is no identifiable armed opposition in Syria

Figure 34: Senior US Defense and Military Leaders Assess That
“it is not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed opposition”
(February and March 2012)
Panetta testified, “It is not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed opposition.
There has been no single unifying military alternative that can be recognized, appointed,
or contacted” Panetta testified.214
General Dempsey added that there are “…approximately one hundred groups
that we’ve identified as part of the opposition….(but) some kind of coherent core…it
doesn’t exist today.”215
The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23,
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG112shrg7621.htm.
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It is important to view this military testimony in March of 2012 and its contrasting
assessment to what Jeffrey D. Feltman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, testified to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs just four months prior on
November 9, 2011. The assistant secretary testified that armed resistance to the
regime was increasing, and that:
“One of the more promising recent developments is the establishment of the
Syrian National Council (SNC), a coalition including secularists, Christians, Islamists,
Druze, Alawis, Kurds, and other groups from both inside and outside of Syria who have
joined together to form a united front against the Assad regime…. We continue to meet
regularly with members of the opposition, including, but not exclusively, many SNC
members.”216
Returning to General Dempsey’s testimony on March 7, 2012, a heated
exchange developed between the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs on one side and Senator John McCain on the other, when Panetta stated, “It is
not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed opposition.”217 With General Dempsey at
Secretary Panetta’s side, Senator McCain responded, “General Dempsey, again I hear
the same old refrain that I’ve heard for many, many years: ‘It’s not clear what constitutes
Ibid.
U.S. Policy on Syria, written statement from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs, November
9, 2011, accessed February 7, 2017,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jeffrey_Feltman_Revised.pdf.
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the Syrian armed opposition.’ That was the same argument that this administration
used for not intervening in Libya at the beginning.”218
Senator McCain continued, “We can find out who they are. They’re not fighting
and dying because they’re al Qaeda. They’re not fighting and dying and sacrificing their
lives because they’re Muslim extremists. They’re fighting and dying because they want
the same universal rights and freedom that we are guaranteed in our Constitution. So I
reject the argument that we ‘don’t know who they are’…. We should know who these
people are and it would be easy enough to find out. The best way, of course, to help
them organize is to provide them with a safe haven where they can organize and train
and equip.”219 (Of note, in a highly publicized move in May 2013 Senator McCain
himself would cross into Syria from Turkey to meet with rebel commanders.)
In trying to rectify the apparent conflicting comments coming from the
Departments of Defense and State leaders, the reader may focus on the words “armed
opposition” rather than the political opposition that Feltman referred. While this is a
valid distinction, it seems inconceivable that at least some of the political opposition
leaders inside Syria would not know at least some of the armed resistance leaders.
What General Dempsey was failing to appreciate about MSRM/UW – and what
Senator McCain actually did – is that given information gaps of “exactly who are these
people” with their “lack of organization”, the best course of action may be to dispatch a
small team to make contact with those resistance leaders, assess their capabilities and
intentions, and if so warranted, to assist them in organizing into a more coherent
resistance. This was not only the approach that the Department of State was pursuing
218
219
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with the political opposition leaders, but this is exactly the approach that General
Joseph Votel, a recent commander of US Special Operations Command, described in
his article Unconventional Warfare in the Grey Zone. General Votel described the
World War II era example of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Jedburgh teams
who parachuted into German-occupied France to assist in organizing, arming, and
advising the French resistance.
“Many Jedburgh veterans later testified that they spent much of their time
preventing the various resistance factions—each with different postwar political
agendas and often violently opposed to one another—from fighting each other and
keeping them focused on the common enemy, the German occupiers.”220
General Votel continued, “One need look no further than Syria today to imagine
how much more difficult the Allied ground campaign to liberate France might have been
had this internecine rivalry not been held in check. With all of their tactical and
operational successes, the Jedburgh’s greatest strategic contribution might have been
in keeping the tenuous French Forces of the Interior coalition intact.”221
Although General Votel’s advice and counsel cited above would occur four years
after General Dempsey’s testimony, Will Irwin, a co-author with General Votel,
published a 2005 book documenting the history and operational use of the Jedburgh
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teams. In that text he described the Jedburgh’s role in unifying the various resistance
elements by making contact with them and embedding as advisors.222

Event Two: Interagency Senior Leaders Express Frustration at DoD’s
Thinking (mid-2012)
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July 2012: The Secretary of State and the CIA Director discuss supporting the Syrian resistance.
Clinton: DoD reluctant to get involved; consistently offering dire projections.
Even Panetta frustrated with lack of military options. “He knew from his own time
leading the CIA what our intelligence operatives could do.” (Clinton, Hard Choices, 2014, 462)

Figure 35: Interagency Senior Leaders Express Frustration at DoD’s
Thinking (July 2012)

The second event involved interagency senior leaders – including Secretary of
Defense Panetta – expressing frustration at DoD’s conventional thinking. As Figure 35

Will Irwin. The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces,
France 1944 (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 236, based on correspondence
and interviews with more than sixty US, British, and French Jedburgh veterans
from 1985 to 2005.
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shows above, in July 2012 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and CIA Director David
Petraeus discussed supporting the Syrian resistance with weapons. As Clinton writes in
her memoirs, DoD was reluctant to get involved and consistently offered dire
projections. She added that even Leon Panetta – then the Secretary of Defense – was
frustrated with the lack of military options coming from his generals. “He knew from his
own time leading the CIA what our intelligence operatives could do.”223
Here not only do we see frustration within the elite levels of the National Security
Council (the Secretaries of Defense and State, plus the Director of the CIA), but we see
frustration at the very top of the Department of Defense with the assessments and
options being presented by the conventional generals.

Event Three: President Obama Rejects National Security Council
Recommendation for the CIA to Arm the Rebels (September 2012)
According to Clinton, this frustration would lead to CIA Director Petraeus
to not wait for the military and instead independently recommend a proposal to the
president for the CIA to arm and assist the Syrian resistance. This is the third key event
in this decision-making, which occurred in September 2012. Petraeus’ proposal was
supported by both the Department of State and the Department of Defense; however,
as Clinton later described the event, the president was “worried that arming the rebels
was not likely to be enough to drive Assad from power…. unintended consequences to
consider.”224 (See Figure 36)
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Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 462.
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Sept 2012: NSC Meeting with the President.
Petraeus leads unanimous recommendation (CIA, State, DoD) to arm resistance.
President was “worried that arming the rebels was not likely to be enough to drive
Assad from power….unintended consequences to consider.” (Clinton, Hard Choices, 2014, 463)

Figure 36: President Obama Rejects National Security Council
Recommendation for CIA to Arm the Rebels (Sept 2012)
While this may seem prudent to the casual observer, it really suggests that the
planners either did not present a comprehensive and coherent campaign plan, which
would link individual tactical actions to a holistic approach with strategic objectives – in
this case to topple the Assad regime – or that the president simply did not agree with
either that assessment or projected outcome. What we do know, according to Clinton in
her memoirs, is that the president did reject such a course of action from the CIA and
the senior interagency leaders at this time. He would reverse his own decision,
however, by the following year after the Assad regime used chemical weapons against
his own people.
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It is also important to note the timing of this decision, which occurred within two
months of the presidential elections of 2012. One could reasonably argue that
President Obama, who campaigned in 2008 in large part with themes of no more wars
and bring the troops home, would not support any re-insertion of US troops into the
Middle East, especially during the run-up to the election. After all, President Obama did
withdraw all combat troops from Iraq by December 2011, as he promised in his 2008
election campaign. But there is a distinction between overtly committing US troops to a
combat role and authorizing a presumably secret CIA activity. However, that could
arguably be a distinction without a difference, given the backdrop of the upcoming
election. As mentioned above, the president would reverse this decision nine months
later in June 2013, after the Syrian regime used chemical weapons against its own
people – and seven months after he won re-election.
Did the backdrop of the 2012 election affect the military’s thinking? Certainly
given the president’s campaign rhetoric and his action of withdrawing US troops from
Iraq, it would appear unlikely that the military would recommend any re-insertion of
conventional US troops absent any significant threat to US national security interests.
At the same time, however, it is important to note the increasing role of the State
Department in addressing the Syrian situation in 2012, which included orchestrating a
coalition to condemn the Assad regime and call for his removal, recognizing the Syrian
National Council as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people, and increasing
humanitarian aid to the Syrian people. During this 2012 election campaign season,
while the State Department increased its efforts in Syria, there was no supporting US
military involvement and no serious consideration for unconventional warfare.
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Event Four: Significant Divergence Apparent Between DoD Senior Leaders
and the US Ambassador in Syria on Assessing the Resistance (April 2013)
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Amb Ford testifies April 11th to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the State Department has trained
and equipped (non-lethal) over 1,500 local leaders and activists within Syria; the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff testifies April 17th that he cannot identify the resistance. “If we could clearly
identify the right people, I would support it.”

Figure 37: Significant Divergence Apparent Between DoD Senior
Leaders and the US Ambassador in Syria on Assessing the Resistance
(April 2013)
As described above in Figure 37, the fourth event involved two separate
testimonies to different Congressional committees which occurred within seven days of
each other in April 2013 which demonstrated the significant disconnect between the US
Ambassador to Syria – living in Damascus at this time – and the senior generals in
Washington. On April 11, 2013 the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, testified
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Department of State, under his
cognizance as the ambassador, trained and equipped over 1,500 local leaders and
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activists inside Syria.225 To be sure, this training, advice, and equipment were all nonlethal, but any student of resistance movements knows that advice and assistance on
organizing a resistance movement is essential to both non-violent and violent resistance
activities.226
In describing and presenting this critical event, it is important to read the actual
words from these senior leaders. Ambassador Ford testified:
Since December 2012, the United States, along with our international partners,
has recognized the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) as the legitimate
representative of the Syrian people. Comprised of diverse representatives inside
and outside Syria free from the influence of violent extremists.227
We are providing $117 million in non-lethal, transition assistance to the Coalition
and a range of local councils and grassroots groups inside Syria to build a
network of ethnically and religiously diverse civilian activist from the top down as
well as the bottom up. These funds are strengthening local councils, civil society
groups, unarmed political activists, and free media to improve governance,
accountability, and service delivery at the subnational and national level…. The
United States has supplied Syrian activists with thousands of pieces of
communications gear…. We boosted private radio station signals, extending the
reach of broadcast on FM stations, and funded media outlets….228
The United States also trained over 1,500 local leaders and activists…from over
one hundred different provincial councils.229

In a subsequent interview with Ambassador Ford by the author, the ambassador
added that this 1,500 number was a cumulative accounting of recipients of this training
and not a current student roster. Moreover, some of this number could have been a
recipient of more than one type of training event. Ambassador Robert S. Ford, former
ambassador to Syria, in an interview with the author March 30, 2017.
226
Nathan Bos, ed., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies,
nd
2 ed. (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 3536, 290-293.
227 US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 11.
228 Ibid.
229
Ibid.
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Of note, Ambassador Ford also spoke of the vetting of these leaders:230 “To
mitigate the risk that our assistance might end up in the hands of extremists, we will
continue to rely on the effective, formal processes that have been established across
various agencies in the government to vet the recipients of US assistance.”231
Thus, in this concise pronouncement of US diplomatic objectives for Syria in
early 2013, one clearly sees significant levels of support ($117 million) to an obviously
identifiable network of activists. The network included leaders both inside and outside
of Syria, over 1,500 local leaders and activists from over 100 different provincial
councils, a military or armed component, and with a “formal (and) effective” interagency
vetting process.
During this testimony Ambassador Ford mentioned that in the previous week, he
had personally met with the commander of the opposition armed forces in the Aleppo
region.232 Such a statement would be in sharp contrast to the following week’s
Congressional testimony from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A significant divergence became apparent with conflicting assessments
concerning the identification of these resistance elements between the Department of
State and the Department of Defense. The April 2013 Department of State statements
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, cited above, were not congruent with the
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Martin
230

The following several paragraphs – through the exchange between Senator McCain
and General Dempsey – are taken verbatim from the author’s previously published
work, Paul S. Lieber, Richard Rubright, Tom Searle, Seth Leuthner, Will Irwin, and
Konrad Trautman, Syria Train and Equip: an Academic Study (MacDill Air Force Base,
FL: JSOU Press, 2016).
231
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United States Senate, 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 11.
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Dempsey’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee just six days later. In
that testimony General Dempsey, while acknowledging that State, Defense, and the CIA
all supported the late-2012 CIA initiative to provide arms to the resistance (which
President Obama disapproved), by implication General Dempsey acknowledged that
the US government did identify supportable resistance elements in 2012. More
incredulous, however, in this 2013 testimony the general then stated that he could no
longer identify the proper elements within the resistance to support. The exchange with
Senator McCain is illuminating:
Senator McCain: General Dempsey, when you and Secretary Panetta testified
that both of you recommended the supply of weapons to the resistance, what led
you to that conclusion and recommendation?
General Dempsey: At the time, the recommendation was based on – we felt like
we had a clear enough understanding of the moderate opposition and we felt as
though it was in the long term interest of Syria as a nation state, that the
institutions would not fail. At that time, it was proper at that moment to intervene
that way.
Senator McCain: Is it proper now to provide them with weapons?
General Dempsey: To tell you the truth, it is actually more confusing on the
opposition side today than it was six months ago. There are more weapons in
Syria.
Senator McCain: So if we had made the decision then to supply them with
weapons, it would have been less complicated than now?
General Dempsey: That is a potential conclusion yes, sir.
Senator McCain: I do not know about potential. Let me get this straight. So now
you think the situation is too complex to provide the resistance with weapons?
Have you changed your recommendation?
General Dempsey: I have not been asked for a recommendation.
Senator McCain: I am asking for your opinion.
General Dempsey: My military judgment is that now that we have seen the
emergence of al-Nusrah and Ahrar al-Sham notably and now that we have seen
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photographs of some of the weapons that have been flowing into Syria in the
hands of those groups, now I am more concerned than I was before.
Senator McCain: Does that mean you do not think we should supply the
resistance with weapons, the right people?
General Dempsey: If we could clearly identify the right people, I would support
it.233
Thus, in another heated exchange between Senator McCain and General
Dempsey, this time over the revelation that the Chairman supported the previous year’s
recommendation from Petraeus to arm the resistance, but during this 2013 testimony
General Dempsey was again saying he could no longer identify the proper resistance
elements.
Contrast this testimony from General Dempsey with that provided by
Ambassador Ford the previous week. Not only did Ambassador Ford detail the $117
million in assistance to 1,500 activists, he stated that he had personally met with the
commander of the armed opposition in the Aleppo region in the previous week.
Moreover, the following exchange between the ambassador and Senator Robert
Menendez is striking:
Senator Menendez: How confident are we that we can differentiate between
groups that espouse our values and those who do not within Syria?
Ambassador Ford: Mr. Chairman, we know a lot more about the armed
opposition then we did six months ago or a year ago. It is dynamic. It is always
evolving and new groups appear and there are mergers and others. But we do
know a set of commanders, for example, the gentlemen that I met in Gaziantep
on Tuesday, Colonel Abdel Jabar al-Akidey, who was reached out to Alawis. He
has reached out to Christians. His fellow commander in Idlib province next to
Aleppo, Afef Soleimani, has done the same. People like them have facilitated
United Nations humanitarian convoys to get to camps and to people in need.
233

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 113th Congress, 1st Session,
April 17, 2013. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, accessed
September 23, 2014, www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
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They have actually tamped down in some cases the extremists. For example,
extremists tried to block the UN humanitarian convoys up in Idlib, and the
gentleman I met actually intervened on the ground himself to stop that…. There
are good people that we could work with, Senator.234
Event Five: Two Months Later President Obama Approves Plan for CIA to
Arm the Resistance (June 2013)
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June 2013: NSC Meeting with the President.
President approves plan to arm the resistance; aftermath of the Assad regime chemical strikes.
(Panetta, Worthy Fights, 450)

Figure 38: Two Months Later President Obama Approves Plan for CIA to
Arm the Resistance (June 2013)
As the above figure shows, the fifth event would occur only two months later in
June of 2013. During an NSC meeting, the president approved a CIA plan to arm the
moderate resistance in the aftermath of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons

US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 20.
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against his own people. The US military concurred with this proposal.235 As significant
as the use of chemical weapons is in its own right, one is struck with how did the DoD
so quickly come to now recognize the existence of a moderate resistance force that
they denied existed just two months prior?
Another interesting piece to this puzzle is a memorandum from General
Dempsey to Senator Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, on July 19, 2013 – just one month after President Obama approved the CIA
proposal to arm resistance elements. In the memorandum, General Dempsey outlines
five options “on how military force could be used in order to decide whether it should be
used.”236 General Dempsey listed the five options as: train, advise, and assist the
opposition; conduct limited stand-off strikes; establish a no-fly zone; establish a buffer
zone; and control chemical weapons. In describing the train, advise, and assist the
opposition, the general labeled the advisory force as a “nonlethal force,” implying the
advisors would be in a sanctuary area outside of Syria and not advising the resistance
elements in combat in Syria. Moreover, while acknowledging that these options could
not be assessed without the context of an overall whole-of-government strategy for
achieving policy objectives, the general framed the option as one that would “help
develop a moderate opposition – including their military capabilities – while maintaining
pressure on the Assad regime.”237 It is interesting to note that this July option sounds
very similar to what the general stated he could not support in his April testimony, and
235
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then what he concurred to for the CIA to undertake in June. When did the unfeasible
option become feasible again? Only after CIA planners crafted such an option?

Event Six: In the Wake of the Fall of Mosul, President Obama Orders the
Military to Train and Equip the Resistance in Their Fight Against ISIS, but not the
Assad Regime (June 2014)
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June 2014: Administration requests funding from Congress to begin the military’s
Train and Equip program for Syria. (Congressional Research Service, T&E Program,
June 9, 2015)

Figure 39: In the Wake of the Fall of Mosul, President Obama Orders the
Military to Train and Equip the Resistance; Requests Funding from
Congress (June 2014)
In June 2014 the major northern Iraqi city of Mosul fell to ISIS insurgents. This
sixth significant event sent reverberations throughout Baghdad and Washington.
Suddenly, Washington felt compelled to do something to respond, react, and reverse
the ISIS advances. (See Figure 39 above.) In the wake of Mosul’s fall, the US
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president directed and approved DoD plans to not only deploy US troops back to Iraq to
assist the Iraqi military, but also to train and equip Syrian resistance forces to fight ISIS
– but not Assad’s forces. The administration requested the necessary appropriations
from Congress in June.238 Did the viable and acceptable Syrian resistance suddenly
and coincidentally present themselves to US government representatives?

Event Seven: Congress Approves the Funding for the DoD Train and Equip
Operation (December 2014)
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Dec 2014: Congress passes legislation authorizing funding for military’s Train and Equip (T&E)
Program. (Congressional Research Service, T&E Program, June 9, 2015, 3)

Figure 40: Congress Approves Funding for DoD’s Train and Equip
Mission (Dec 2014)

238

Congressional Research Services, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US
Response (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service report RL33487,
October 9, 2015), 2.
155

The seventh and final decision-making event occurred in December 2014 when
Congress finally passed legislation authorizing funding for the military’s train-and-equip
mission with the Syrian resistance.239 (See Figure 40 above.) Nearly four years after
the Syrian rebels rose up in opposition to the Assad regime did the US government
appropriate money for the military to assist them – and then, only with the very limited
aim of the counter-ISIS fight, with prohibitions on fighting Assad’s forces except in selfdefense.
Given the full context of the framework behind these seven key events in the
macro-level process-tracing chart in Appendix A, and the resulting detailed analysis of
the seven events in the micro-level process-tracing charts above that shows which
national security decision-maker provided what input, when, why, and how, the reader
should clearly see the following findings. First, a viable and acceptable Syrian
resistance did exist. It was manifested not only in the sheer number of fighters, as
shown in chapter 3, but in a loose but recognizable organization that allowed the US
embassy in Damascus to establish contact with local resistance leaders and provide
them with advice, assistance, and equipment to enable a network of resistance activists
that numbered 1,500. Second, what is even more remarkable than the first finding
above, is that the US military did not recognize this and conducted no commensurate
planning that could have supported the resistance. The US military did not provide such
an MSRA/UW plan for the president to consider beyond the thin list of options provided
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in July 2013.240 The frustration level that the Secretary of State and even the Secretary
Defense would express towards the conventional military’s inability to provide such
options is striking.

Did President Obama’s Views on War Skew his Subordinates’ Inputs?
This is a valid concern. Skeptics might say that the preceding charts are too
antiseptic and sterile; they fail to include the fact that the president was arguably largely
elected by running a campaign focused on ending two unpopular wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Deliberately or inadvertently initiating another war would unravel his
domestic and international political goals. Moreover, even if he never overtly or directly
made such comments to his department and agency chiefs, they would have clearly
understood them from witnessing the political campaign and being with the president for
many months, or in some cases years. The skeptic would argue that this accounts for
the decision-making and it might not be apparent in a frame-by-frame depicted that I
presented.
I would disagree. First, there would be no reason for Clinton and Panetta to
mask that presidential guidance – either delivered formally or informally – in their
accounts of these events in their memoirs. Moreover, the president himself, in a lengthy
interview he conducted with the television news program 60 Minutes, instead talked
about his desire to assist the Syrian resistance to replace or coerce Assad to negotiate
a political transition, but he had doubts it was achievable. In his words, he wanted to,

Martin E. Dempsey, General, untitled memorandum to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, accessed at
thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/Dempsey.pdf on November 17, 2017.
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“explore all the various options that are available”.241 As Janine Davison, the former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans wrote, ultimately the military failed to
“deliver the type of nuanced advice in the form of creative options that the president
needs.”242
I will elaborate and dissect this interview in detail in Chapter Five when I address
the rival hypotheses, including this one, in much more detail.
To close this section, however, it is important to remember that regardless of a
president’s desires or political tendencies towards when, how, and why the US uses its
military forces, it is incumbent upon the US military to provide the best military advice,
which should include a full menu of options. The shortcoming was not with the
president, but with his conventional military advisers who could not comprehend the
idea of supporting the resistance as a suitable and feasible option. This argument is
further advanced in the following sections of this chapter.

The Conceptual Framework Applied to the How and Why Questions
The theoretical basis for this dissertation is Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory
that addresses complexity and an organization’s tendency to reproduce or reinforce its
own structure and activities rather than to more openly or holistically address the

Interview by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired October 11, 2015, and was
accessed February 5, 2016, http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutessyria-isis-2016-presidential-race.
242 Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and
Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 43 no.1, March 2013, 129.
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challenge of change.243 This focus from Luhmann on complexity and an organization’s
processing of complexity is significantly more advanced than earlier systems theorists’
work that tended to focus on structural-functionalism and relatively simple input and
output designs. Although I refer to structural-functionalism in a later portion of this
chapter, I frame this under the more useful theoretical construct of Luhmann’s systems
theory, which captures complexity and ultimately organizational culture in a much more
illuminating and applicable manner. Specifically, Luhmann suggests that when an
organization has established a mechanism to reduce uncertainty, other alternative
options are likely to be discarded. As such, Luhmann’s approach to system theory and
its work with complexity are more applicable to today’s national security environment
than the earlier simplistic structural-functionalism theories.
There are several main components to Luhmann’s theory applicable to
answering the how and why questions in this dissertation: autopoiesis, complexity,
rationality, communications, and decisions.
Autopoiesis, literally meaning self-production or creation, refers to a system or
organization that reproduces or maintains itself or its boundaries like a biological cell.
Luhmann emphasized the reflective and self-reproductive nature of this action for
systems or organizations.244 Luhmann argued that the environment is a distinct
element that exists outside or beyond the boundaries of the autopoiesis system. In this
case of this dissertation, “environment” refers to the Arab Spring uprisings in general
and the Syrian rebellion in particular. How well the system or organization could

Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, trans. Peter Gilgen (Malden, MA:
Polity Press, 2013).
244 Ibid., viii-xiv.
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recognize and respond to developments in the environment, especially with the
organization’s desire to continue to reproduce itself in its current image (of a
conventional military), bears a strong resemblance to how the US military responded –
or did not respond -- to the rebellion in Syria.
Luhmann’s writings on complexity provide an insightful lens to view the Syria
case. Luhmann argued that a system or organization “bundles” complex developments
in the environment and then undertakes indifference or other arrangements to deal with
this complexity. The system engages in a “reduction of complexity” by ignoring or
treating the new developments with a template or design that it previously experienced
under different conditions.245 Consequently, the organization is not fully seeing,
understanding, and then developing appropriate responses to the new development
Instead, the system or organization has a “tendency to limit the problem to the question
of the arrangements that a system has at its disposal.”246 As the reader saw in the
preceding section, this helps to explain how and why the conventional military
essentially generated only conventional military responses to the Syria situation.
In his discussion on rationality, Luhmann posits that systems or organizations will
avoid or exclude developments that are deemed risky before they then rationally
evaluate possible response options. In Luhmann’s words, there is “always a nonrational zone outside the marked space” for rational consideration.247 Although the
military planners mentioned supporting the resistance, this option always appeared as
outside the list of the “rational” options more readily under consideration.
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Luhmann considered communications as essential for the system or organization
to reproduce or reinforce itself.248 The flow of information, from recognition, to
understanding, to crafting responses, all underscore the significance of
communications, or the transmission and reception of information, to shaping decisionmaking for an organization or system. This flow of information was the focus of the
process-tracing methodology used to examine the decision-making associated with the
Syrian rebellion, and in this upcoming section I provide additional research that
underscores how the structure and culture of the US military excludes subject matter
expertise of unconventional warfare community from effectively entering the decisionmaking process.
Luhmann considered organizations as social systems that would reproduce
themselves on the basis of their internal decisions.249 Based upon the organization’s
processing of information, the organization would decide what actions to take and these
decisions would shape the conditions for future decisions or adaptation. Thus, prior
conventional warfare decisions, like the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, would form a
precedent for shaping future decisions and adaptations.
Joseph Pilotta, Timothy Widman, and Susan Jasko further developed
Luhmann’s theory with a focus on organizational culture. The authors argued
“organizational culture serves the maintenance and development of
organizations by providing important ordering mechanisms that further the
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organization’s domination of complex information environments.”250 They argued
Luhmann reduced “complexity by simultaneously transmitting both a selected
alternative from among multiple action possibilities and the motivation for the
acceptance of that selection.”251 Of significance, they added, “Organizational
culture consists primarily of open-ended context framed by significant symbols
and modes of legitimated social action that enables selective responses to
changes.”252 As this dissertation shows, the “selective responses to change”
would not include MSRA options.
Luhmann’s theory raises the question: Was the conventional military open
to new or creative ideas to support the Syrian resistance? A glimpse of the
answer may be found with research published at the Army War College in
2013.253 Researchers Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong wrote, “Personality
data gathered at the US Army War College from lieutenant colonel and colonel
students show that the most successful officers score lower in openness than the
general US population…. To make matters worse, though, those … students
selected for brigade command score even lower than the overall (student)
average. This raises an interesting paradox: The leaders recognized and

Joseph J. Pilotta, Timothy J. Widman, and Susan A. Jasko, “Meaning and Action in
the Organizational Setting: An Interpretive Approach”, in An Introduction to Niklas
Luhmann: Logic and Investigations, ed. Joseph J. Pilotta and Wei-San Sun (New York:
Hampton Press, 2014, 148.
251 Ibid., 154.
252 Ibid., 155.
253 The Army War College is one of several senior service colleges that the military
operates for senior military officers one or two grade levels below the rank of general or
admiral. Indeed, it is intended to be the last military education for these officers before
some of them are selected to become generals or admirals, and thus, becomes their
last educational preparation before that rank.
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selected by the Army to serve at strategic levels – where uncertainty and
complexity are greatest – tend to have lower levels of one of the attributes most
related to success at strategic levels.”254 Of note, this is not to say that Army
senior officers are not intelligent, indeed, their IQs are above average; however,
the research suggests that the highly successful officers may have narrow career
paths that result in their deflection of considering options that do not fit their
experiences. This finding is very much in accordance with Niklas Luhmann’s
theory of how an entity deals with complexity by rejecting or deflecting new
information that does not comport with its views. As Gerras and Wong continue,
the officer can “…often fail at exploring the issue fully to appreciate other
perspectives and perhaps change their minds.”255
With this review of the theoretical construct of the dissertation as a
prelude, the stage is set to examine the how and why questions.

How Did the US Make this Decision?
To answer the “how” with greater specificity, I used a systems theory approach
that that included structural-functionalism to examine the military decision-making
process for providing inputs to the National Security Council. This approach revealed
the inherent flaws for developing military support to resistance activities by
marginalizing such experts from they key operational positions in the decision-making
process.
Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong, Changing Minds in the Army: Why It Is So
Difficult And What To Do About It (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press,
October 2013), 9.
255 Ibid., 10.
254

163

There are two supporting structural-functionalism elements to the “how”
explanation. The first is the split in operational responsibilities between the two types of
combatant commands of the military, which consequently marginalizes the operational
contributions of US Special Operations Command and its inherent UW expertise. The
second is the assignment of Special Forces generals primarily to positions in these nonoperational commands. I examine each of these in the following sections.

Structural-Functionalism: The Split in Operational Responsibilities
and Marginalization of US Special Operations Command
The US military’s decision-making process, and how it provides inputs to the
National Security Council deliberations, is a classic example of systems theory and
structural-functionalism. The process is codified in military directives and doctrinal
publications and is taught throughout the various military universities and colleges. The
directives and doctrine define and prescribe the various planning inputs and outputs;
who produces what estimate, plan or order; and how it is provided to the Secretary of
Defense and President for a decision.
The highest echelon of this military decision-making process is the Secretary of
Defense. He is directly responsible to the President, and indeed, only the President and
the Secretary of Defense are authorized to provide orders to the military to execute
combat operations.256 The senior generals and admirals of the military cannot make
such orders without the prior order of the President or Secretary of Defense.
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), II-15.
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The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the
President and to the Secretary. When the President or Secretary issue orders to the
various elements of the military, the President and Secretary use the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and his Joint Staff to prepare, write, and transmit those orders to the major
combatant commands of the US military.

http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/03/cocom-not-official-acronym-for-combatant-command-butdod-uses-it-anyway/ accessed February 8, 2017

Figure 41: The Nine Combatant Commands:
Six Regional and Three Functional
As Figure 41 above shows, there are two distinct types of combatant commands:
the geographic combatant commands (shown in the top two rows of the above figure)
and the functional combatant commands (shown in the bottom row). The former are
responsible for conducting military operations in a geographic region of the world while
the latter are responsible for functional activities, like special operations (i.e., US Special
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Operations Command) or strategic nuclear weapons (i.e., the US Strategic Command).
Within this dichotomy of responsibilities, however, the geographic combatant
commands have emerged as the first among equals. Indeed, US Special Operations
Command’s mission is largely constrained to providing special operations forces to the
geographic commands for the latter to actually conduct the operations. To be sure, US
Special Operations Command is also responsible for synchronizing the planning of
special operations worldwide, but the actual conduct and execution of those operations
are almost exclusively the responsibility of the geographic combatant command.257
(See Figure 42 below.)
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US Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, June 2015), 2-1.
166

Secretary of Defense

support side

warfighter side

Special Operations Command
Mission: Synchronize planning
of special operations and provide
Special Operations Forces
to the regional combatant commands

Army Special
Operations
Command

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Joint Staff

Central Command
Mission: Plan and Conduct
Military Operations in the
Central Command
Area of Responsibility

Special Ops
Command
Central
Command

Other Component
Commands
(Navy, Marine,
Air Force)

Component
Commands
(Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marines)

Figure 42: The Structure of the Chain of Command and Operational
Responsibilities Between Special Operations Command and
Central Command

Given that construct, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon procedurally would task the geographic combatant
command for a strategic estimate and plan to address an emerging conflict or
contingency, like the Syrian rebellion. By doctrine this tasking would go to any
combatant command, geographic or function, but in practice, in situations like the Syrian
rebellion, it would go to the geographic combatant command, in this case US Central
Command.258 In the opening years of the Syrian rebellion, according to testimony
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), B-1, xiii. It is interesting
to note that although the text of this joint publication states that this guidance applies to
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provided by General Dempsey in March 2012, the options under consideration were all
conventional military responses – “humanitarian relief, no-fly zone, maritime interdiction,
humanitarian corridor, and limited aerial strikes.”259 As confirming evidence to the
above, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta would write in his 2014 memoirs, “We
presented a set of options to the National Security Council — ranging from…limited air
strikes…protecting refugee camps and supporting regional allies.”260 However, as
referenced earlier in this chapter, in July 2013 the Chairman did provide a list of options
that included training, advising, and assisting the opposition, but that list of options was
neither a plan nor a recommendation for one specific option.261

Structural-Functionalism: The Assignment of Special Forces General
Officers to Non-Operational Positions
Given the split of combat responsibilities between the types of commands, it is
significant to examine where the Special Forces general officers are assigned to see if
the UW expertise is “plugged into” the organizations with operational responsibilities
(the geographic combatant commands) or to the commands with supporting
responsibilities (e.g., Special Operations Command). Additionally, one needs to

combatant commands (implying both the geographical and functional types) it is listed
under the heading of “geographical combatant commanders”.
259 The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23,
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG112shrg7621.htm.
260
Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York:
Penguin Press, 2014), 448.
261 Dempsey, Martin E., General, untitled memorandum to Senator Carl Levin,
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, accessed at
thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/Dempsey.pdf on November 17, 2017.
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examine the Joint Staff structure to see if Special Forces general officers hold influential
positions there. (See Figures 43 and 44 below.)
The Combatant Command Commander
or Chairman of the Joint Staff

Black Triangle indicates
a conventional or
Non-Special Forces officer

The Deputy Commander or Vice Chairman

Green Triangle indicates
a Special Forces officer

Chief of Staff or Director of the Joint Staff

Senior Staff Officers:
Intelligence, Operations, and Plans

The Component Commanders, including
the Theater Special Operations Command Commander

Figure 43: Senior Leader Legend to Describe Figure 44
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Figure 44: The Structure Overlaid with Key Leader Assignments
Filled by Special Forces Generals (2011-2014)
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The key operational military decision-making positions – the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, his Vice Chairman, the Director of the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff’s
senior intelligence (J-2), operations (J-3), and plans (J-5) officers, and the
commensurate positions in the geographic combatant commands – are almost always
held by conventional military officers with neither experience nor significant education in
UW. Rarely has a Special Forces general officer been assigned to one of these
positions. Indeed, since 9/11 and through 2013, only once has a Special Forces
general officer been assigned to any of these positions, and then for only a one-year
period.262
Aside from the key positions within the geographic combatant commands of the
commander, the deputy commander, the chief of staff, and the intelligence, operations,
and plans staff principals, there is also the position of the commander of the subordinate
theater special operations command (TSOC), which is under the operational control of
the geographic combatant commander. The TSOC commander is always a Special
Operations Forces (SOF) general or admiral, whose career path is usually not Special
Forces. He could be a special operations pilot, SEAL (naval special warfare operator;
the acronym stands for “sea, air, or land” infiltration environments), Marine Raider, or
Army Ranger. But recall that none of these other special operations officers are
immersed by their professional career in the mission area of UW. By the military’s
design, structure, doctrine, training, and career patterns, UW is the domain of the
262

This one exception was Major General Sal Cambria who held the J3 position in the
Africa Command from 2011-2012. One might also argue that General Hugh Shelton,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1997-2001 also fits this categorization.
Although General Shelton did serve with Special Forces in Vietnam for sixteen months,
that is the extent of his Special Forces experience. For the remainder of his career, he
served in conventional Infantry officer assignments. See his biography at jcs.mil.
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Special Forces profession. Consequently, although each geographic combatant
command has a SOF general officer or admiral commanding a subordinate SOF
headquarters, one is as likely to see a non-Special Forces SOF officer commanding a
TSOC as one is to find a Special Forces general in command. Even then, however, this
is a subordinate element to the geographic combatant command, so any mission tasks
or responses for the development of UW plans or operations is still subject to the review
and filter from the conventional senior officers in the higher geographic combatant
command headquarters.
Within this structure the influence or clout exercised by a TSOC within a
geographic command may not be as strong and influential as an outsider might believe.
In a recent study from the Council on Foreign Relations, Linda Robinson, who
specializes in researching SOF, wrote: “They (the TSOCs) are supposed to be the
principal advisors on special operations to their respective geographic combatant
commanders, but they rarely have received the respect and support of the four-star
command.”263
Robinson details her findings with, “The most glaring and critical operational
deficit is the fact that, according to doctrine, the theater special operations commands
are supposed to be the principal node for planning and conducting special operations in
a given theater – yet they are the most severely under-resourced commands. Rather
than world-class integrators of …capabilities, TSOCs are egregiously short of sufficient
quantity and quality of staff and intelligence, analytical, and planning resources.”264

Linda Robinson, The Future of US Special Operations Forces (New York: Council of
Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 66, April 2013), 15.
264 Ibid.
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Robinson concludes with, “Because of this lack of resources, theater special operations
commands have been unable to fulfill their role of planning and conducting special
operations.”265
Given the structural handicaps, one may reasonably ask, where are the Special
Forces general officers? Many are assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina where they
are in key positions within the Army’s Special Operations Command, the subordinate
Army command to the US Special Operations Command. The Army Special Operations
Command is responsible for training, manning, and equipping all Army SOF, which
includes the Special Forces units. In other words, the Army Special Operations
Command prepares its units for combat as opposed to leading them in combat.
Thus, by structure and function, the military has both an organizational design
and a decision-making process that marginalizes the Special Forces and their UW
expertise from operational decision-making.

Why Did the US Make this Decision? Institutional Culture: The Military’s
Conservative and Conventional Culture
As I wrote in the introduction to this chapter, to answer the “why” portion, I show
that the conventional senior military leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are
prone to see and react to developments in their environments that make sense only
from their autopoiesis-based frame of reference. In other words, they are biased
towards providing conventional warfare solutions. This aspect of Luhmann’s Systems
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Theory is congruent with classic institutional or bureaucracy culture theory, which
suggests that conventional military officers would offer conventional military solutions.
I divide this section into three supporting elements: first, an overview of some
data points which underscore the small size of unconventional warfare expertise within
the US military; second, an overview of current research on this topic; and third, results
of interviews with two retired senior military officers and one former senior Department
of Defense official, which are key to seeing the relationship between this institutional
culture and military inputs to national security decision-making.
First, some data points are illuminating. Using the rubric of follow the money,
less than 4% of the defense budget is allocated towards special operations forces
(SOF), the remaining 96% going to the conventional military.266 The 4% figure covers
both SOF-unique costs, like the specialized training and equipment required for SOF,
but also broader support services provided by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.
Of important note, this 4% covers the entire range of SOF missions – like the expensive
counter-terrorist operations – while UW remains just one of twelve missions or core
activities assigned to SOF.267 Thus, the actual percentage of DoD dollars applied to the
UW mission set is arguably well below 2% of the DoD budget.
In addition to examining where defense dollars are allocated, it is very revealing
to examine the military’s doctrinal writings. Although the US Army has published Army
doctrine on UW for several decades, the joint force doctrine (that doctrine used by all
William McRaven, Admiral, Posture Statement of the US Special Operations
Command to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012, accessed March
12, 2017, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McRaven%2003-06121.pdf.
267 US Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, June 2015), 1-6.
266

173

the services – Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines – to fight as a complete or “joint”
team) for UW was not published until September 2015, actually after the focus period of
this dissertation.268 This is clear evidence of the lack of attention and focus the
conventional military has had towards UW.
To the extent that military doctrine is a foundational element for the professional
education of US military officers, this lack of joint doctrine is an indicator of the absence
of UW within the professional development of the officer corps. Indeed, a review of the
curriculum for the National War College (one of several senior level colleges for military
officers at the grade immediately prior to becoming a general officer or admiral) reveals
no mention of unconventional warfare.269 Dr. Hy Rothstein, in his case study of
Afghanistan and unconventional warfare, wrote, “There appears to be precious little
thinking about UW going on in the institution of the profession of arms. The war
colleges are dedicated to the principle of thinking, but they appear to have produced
senior military leaders skilled in the art of attrition warfare, the war fighting approach that
succeeded in two world wars, (but) resulted in stalemate in Korea, and lost in
Vietnam.”270
Second, the US military’s conservative and conventional culture is well
documented in a wealth of national security and military literature and research. Morton
Halperin’s seminal work on bureaucracy theory and foreign policy documented this

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional
Warfare (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 2015).
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National War College Student Catalog. National Defense University,
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finding in his first edition in 1974 through his current edition in 2006.271 Similarly, Amos
Jordan’s research on American National Security first published in 1981 and updated
through 2009 also highlighted and confirmed the conservative and conventional nature
of these institutions, their culture, and resulting way of thinking.272 Roger Z. George and
Harvey Rishikof’s textbook The National Security Enterprise highlights the various
institutional cultures of the national security departments and agencies, and spares no
criticism of the military services’ cultures and “tribalism” that affect policy-making.273
Colin Gray, who I cited in the opening quotation to this chapter, extended this argument
and showed how the conservative and conventional officers exhibit a disdain towards
special operations, which include UW operations.274
To those that would argue the above literature is outdated, that the US military’s
wartime activities since 9/11 have upended such traditional writings, I highlight the case
study research that Dr. Hy Rothstein conducted on SOF in Afghanistan, which also
underscored the cultural cleavages between the conventional and unconventional
military forces, and within SOF between the direct action forces and the unconventional
warfare elements of Army Special Forces. Although his findings and recommendations
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are different than mine from this Syrian case study (I review those differences in chapter
6), the analysis of the cultural cleavages is quite similar.275
To continue this line of reasoning that challenges the presupposition that the
military’s post-9/11 operations have upended the traditional writings cited above, it is
illuminating to read Janine Davidson, the Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense for
Plans from 2009-2012. In 2013 she wrote about the military’s organizational culture and
detailed planning process that ultimately fails to deliver creative options that the
president needs.
What often appears to be a personality-driven or political debate between the
commander-in-chief and his strong-minded military advisors actually has deeper
institutional and cultural roots. The ‘professional’ military officer has certain
expectations about how to craft ‘best military advice’ for the president that are
deeply embedded into the organizational culture and in fact hard-wired into the
institutionalized and incredibly detailed military planning process…. Ultimately,
the output of the military’s planning process fails to deliver the type of nuanced
advice in the form of creative options that the president needs.276
Davidson’s reference to “creative options that the president needs” links to
President Obama’s views voiced in an interview in 2016:
The goal here as been to find a way in which we can help moderate opposition
on the ground…. I’ve been skeptical from the get go about the notion that we
were going to effectively create this proxy army inside of Syria. My goal has
been to try to test that proposition…. I think it is important for us to make sure
that we explore all of the various options that are available.277

Hy Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare
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A military option for supporting the resistance would not reach the president until
after Mosul fell in 2014, and then it was constrained to a counter-terrorism operation
against ISIS, not the unconventional warfare task focused on the Assad regime.
The impact of institutional culture and military decision-making was the topic in a
recently article in the US Army War College’s journal, Parameters. Written by its thenCommandant, Major General William E. Rapp, the article directly addressed this
institutional culture impact on decision-making. In examining military inputs to national
security policy discussions, he found, “Culture, psychology, and decision-making
structure place limits on the development, delivery, and impact of effective military voice
in national security policy discussions.”278 He went on to specifically highlight the
limiting factor that institutional culture has on providing military advice: “Strongly
ingrained military culture and the psychological biases of individual military leaders, and
those who support them, provide the first set of limits on effectively providing
unconstrained and high-quality military advice.”279 In direct accordance with Alex Mintz
theory on foreign policy decision-making, Major General Rapp added, “(these) biases
are ingrained, and cognitive heuristics guide our perceptions and interpretations of
reality.”280
Briefly making an excursion here from the institutional culture section of this
chapter and returning to the previous section dealing with structure and function, Major
General Rapp ties these two aspects together by noting, “Purposeful, restrictive access

William E. Rapp, Major General, “Toward Strategic Solvency: Ensuring Effective
Military Voice,” Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter
2016-2017, 13.
279 Ibid., 15.
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to the decision-making process is perhaps the most pernicious structural factor limiting
full and honest expressions of effective military advice.”281 He cautions there are
gatekeepers to the decision-makers that would act as “mind-guards” to “prevent offazimuth opinions from reaching the top decision-makers.”282
In an interview concerning this dissertation, Major General Rapp, now retired,
also added these institutional cultural divides exist not only between the conventional
military and special operations forces, but are also found within SOF between the direct
action units that specialize in the direct action missions of kill/capture raids and the
unconventional warfare elements traditionally in the US Army Special Forces units. In
his assessment, perhaps some of the confusion in crafting options to support resistance
activities actually emanates from within the SOF ranks themselves.283
Dr. Christopher Lamb, a former senior Department of Defense and State official
who served as the director of policy planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, offered this precise
assessment:

Most officers at the senior ranks who deal with political leaders have no
experience with special operations and have only a limited understanding of the
requirements and risks of these missions.... The military has traditionally not
valued SOF as much as it has conventional forces…. The combination of
ignorance of and prejudice against SOF that marks conventional commanders
means that those with whom civilians are most in contact and who hold positions
in the military bureaucracy between politicians and special operations are limited
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283 William E. Rapp, Major General, US Army (retired), former Commandant of the US
Army War College, in an interview with the author November 1, 2017.
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in their ability to provide the risk assessments and control that should accompany
any consideration of using these forces.284
In a subsequent interview with Dr. Lamb, he also extended this argument to
inside the SOF ranks, highlighting the divide between the direct action forces and those
who specialize in unconventional warfare. He spoke of the “different ethos, cultures,
and histories” of the two camps, and he experienced that divide even within his office at
the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
by the various officers assigned to his section.285
Additional discourse to this topic came from Lieutenant General Charles T.
Cleveland, US Army (retired) in an interview concerning this dissertation, too. General
Cleveland was the three-star commander of the US Army Special Operations Command
from 2012 to 2015, making him the senior Green Beret commander during nearly all of
the time period focus of this dissertation. Of significance to this dissertation, he spent a
thirty-plus year career in Special Forces living the experience of these organizational,
cultural, and structural issues. General Cleveland affirmed that in Syria the US did miss
this opportunity and that we were structured improperly. 286 But he cautioned against
an overly critical approach towards conventional military officers and likewise an overly
focused approach on expanding Special Forces officer assignments as the remedy.
Instead, he stressed the responsibility of the military, as an institution, to train and
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Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012-2015) in an
interview with the author March 27, 2017.
284

179

educate conventional military officers on these irregular and unconventional types of
warfare so that they can better represent all of these options to the geographic
combatant commanders and to the joint staff. In his words, “We don’t necessarily need
Green Berets in key positions; we need senior officers better educated and experienced
in Special Warfare, including unconventional warfare.”287
In summary, in addition to the rich literature that documents the conventional and
conservative nature of the US military; a review of current resourcing, doctrine, and
educational curriculum for senior officers; and three senior leader interviews -especially the interview with the senior Green Beret officer during this period – all point
to a conventional US military culture that will by its very nature marginalize
unconventional warfare expertise, sometimes even within the SOF ranks itself. In
Lieutenant General Cleveland’s words, “In Syria, we did miss this opportunity. We are
structured improperly and there are people who don’t believe in this type of warfare.”288

Chapter Summary
This chapter is the heart of the dissertation. The previous chapter clearly
showed that a viable and acceptable resistance did exist in Syria in the March 2011 to
June 2014 period. With that fact established, this chapter then explained how and why
the US missed the opportunity to train, advise, and equip these resistance elements.
To answer the “how and why” the US made this decision, I based the analysis on
Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory as the conceptual framework. To answer the “how”
portion, in addition to Luhmann’s system theory, I added a supporting structural287
288
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functionalism approach to examine the military decision-making process for providing
inputs to the National Security Council. This approach revealed the inherent flaws for
developing military support to resistance activities by marginalizing unconventional
warfare experts from the key operational positions in the decision-making. To answer
the “why” portion, I showed that the conventional senior military leaders, in accordance
with Luhmann’s theory, are prone to see and react to developments in their
environments that make sense only from their autopoiesis-based frame of reference. In
other words, they are predisposed to select those options – in this case conventional
warfare options – that they are comfortable with when faced with a complex situation,
the dynamics or details of which they are unfamiliar or unaccustomed.
In both of these cases – the how and the why – the analysis is fully congruent
with Alex Mintz’ Integrated Cognitive and Rationale Theory of Foreign Policy DecisionMaking, as described in chapter one. Moreover, the “how” portion is consistent with
classic structural-functionalism and the “why” portion is consistent with institutional
culture theory, which would suggest that conventional military officers would offer
conventional military solutions.
The co-reading of this chapter with Appendix A, the process-trace chart, was
essential. This methodology showed the interrelationship of over one hundred
significant events, which allowed for the distillation of seven key US national security
decision-making events that crystalized the decision outputs to the National Security
Council.
Moreover, reviewing and analyzing the decision-making inputs from the key
national security participants was equally important. These leaders include the
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Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US
Ambassador to Syria and other lower ranking but key persons privy to the decisionmaking. Ambassador Ford’s insights to the US decision-making were key and
essential, while General Cleveland’s decades-long observations and experience with
the cultural conflict between conventional and unconventional military forces was
equally significant in the causal analysis of the research question.
Collectively, this chapter showed a US military structure and process for
providing advice to the president as flawed due to the marginalization of UW expertise.
This marginalization resulted in inadequate consideration for applying UW as a strategic
option to the nation.
However, before we review the implications of these findings, I must explain and
analyze the counter-arguments and plausible rival hypotheses, the subject of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS, PLAUSIBLE RIVAL HYPOTHESES, AND
SYNTHESIZING THE RESULTS
--“The goal here has been to find a way in which we
can help moderate opposition on the ground, but we’ve
never been under any illusion that militarily we
ourselves can solve the problem inside of Syria.
--“Over time, the community of nations will all get rid of
them (ISIS) and we will be leading getting rid of them.
But we are not going to be able to get rid of them
unless there is an environment inside of Syria and in
portions of Iraq in which local populations, local Sunni
populations, are working in a concerted way with us to
get rid of them.
--“I’ve been skeptical from the get go about the notion
that we were going to effectively create this proxy army
inside of Syria. My goal has been to try to test that
proposition, can we be able to train and equip a
moderate opposition that’s willing to fight ISIL? And
what we’ve learned is that as long as Assad remains in
power, it is very difficult to get those folks to focus their
attention on ISIL.
--“I think it is important for us to make sure that we
explore all the various options that are available.”289
--President Barack Obama

Before moving to the final of the three questions in this dissertation (what
are the implications for national security practitioners?), which is covered in the
Interview by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired October 11, 2015 and was
accessed February 5, 2016, http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutessyria-isis-2016-presidential-race.
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next chapter, one needs to carefully consider the counter-arguments and
plausible rival hypotheses to this dissertation that challenge the findings of the
first two questions (was there a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria in
the period March 2011 – June 2014? and why and how did the US miss the
opportunity to train, advise, and assist them?) If the analysis that answers the
first two questions is faulty, the third question becomes irrelevant.

The Counter-Arguments
There are four counter-arguments that need to be understood and
addressed. First, the US historically fails at military support to resistance
movements (MSRM); it is not a good national security option to pursue in the first
place. Second, if one accepts the validity of this dissertation’s findings -- the
resistance did exist and that the military failed to recognize and plan accordingly
because unconventional warfare (UW) expertise was marginalized -- then the
subsequent events of 2014-2015, when the president did decide to allow the US
military to train and equip the moderate resistance, contradict this dissertation’s
hypothesis. This counter-argument states in the final analysis the military did
present a UW option to the president. Third, the CIA should conduct MSRA/UW,
not the Department of Defense; this type of operation is inappropriate for the US
military. Fourth, the current military structure can adequately consider UW
options; it just did not occur in this anomalous case. We need to review each of
these counter-arguments. The following paragraphs will unpack, document, and
analyze these arguments.
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At the president’s direction, in 2013 the CIA reviewed historical cases of
US support to resistance movements to gauge the effectiveness of this option.
Reporters immediately published articles claiming support to resistance
movements usually failed.290 However, evidence from the former commanding
general of the US Special Operations Command, General Joseph Votel,
contradicts this. In an openly published article on UW he lists the initial invasion
of Afghanistan (350 SOF and 110 interagency operatives embedded with 15,000
Afghan resistance fighters overthrew the Taliban regime), US support to the
mujahedeen in Afghanistan to eject Soviet forces, US support to the contra
resistance to the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime, US support to Croatian
resistance in the Balkans conflict, US support to Kurdish Peshmerga forces
during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as recent examples to the contrary.291 One
could argue that when US advisors were present and directly involved with
overseeing the delivery of the weapons and the necessary training, the degree of
success was markedly higher. In addition, one must note that even when the
conventional US military (non-SOF) is involved in arming a partner nation, there
is a risk that weapons will eventually fall into an enemy’s hands. Indeed, ISIS
recovered many weapons – including armored vehicles – when Iraqi
conventional army units deserted and fled in advance of ISIS forces on Mosul in
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2014. Thus, even setting aside General Votel’s cogent points, this
counterargument is not unique to UW activities and arguably not supported by
the facts. The significant factor of having US advisors with these resistance
elements should not be lost. This factor emerges again in the analysis of the
implications of these findings in the next chapter.
The second counter-argument states that since the president ultimately
did decide to train and equip the resistance in 2014, this is clear refutation of the
dissertation’s findings. However, upon closer examination, this is not the case.
The president’s decision to allow the US military to train and equip the Syrian
resistance in 2014 was just that – a train and equip program. It was not UW. It
was a counterterrorism program focused exclusively against ISIS vice a UW
activity to disrupt, coerce, or overthrow the Assad regime; thus, it was not UW.
Indeed, constraining the purpose of the assistance exclusively as an anti-ISIS
fight alienated much of the Syrian resistance that was more concerned with
unseating the brutal dictator in Damascus than in fighting ISIS.
The third counter-argument is the CIA should conduct MSRA, not the
Department of Defense. Proponents of this counter-argument state that activities
such as MSRA and UW belong to the CIA not the military. They would harvest
many of my points – e.g., the military is too conventional – to make this counterargument, plus they would add that such activities require secrecy and the
avoidance of publicity, something these antagonists would argue is anathema to
the military. While making some degree of sense on face value, and perhaps
much sense to a conventional military officer, this counter-argument is overly
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simplistic. The complexity and sophistication of MSRA and UW are such that it is
not the sole domain of any one agency or department. Successful MSRA
requires the partnership and teaming of both the CIA and the military. The CIA is
most useful when deniability is paramount; after all, covert action is by definition
deniable and a primary mission set of the CIA.292 But when a larger-scale UW
operation is required, such as toppling the Taliban regime in 2001 or harnessing
the Kurds in the opening stage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the military’s
Special Forces are the force of choice. The sophisticated planner would realize
that it is the combination of both of these elements, sometimes in a synchronized
fashion taking advantages of the unique advantages of each, becomes the
preferred method of employment. Indeed, even with the 9/11 Commission
recommendation that US Special Operations Command assume lead
responsibility for directing and executing all paramilitary operations (both the CIA
and military’s) a closer examination of the recommendation by the military
concluded that having capabilities resident in both the CIA and US Special
Operations Command was the most preferred solution.293 Thus, this counterargument presents a binary option of either the CIA or SOF; the optimum solution
is to recognize the unique roles that each play and to orchestrate them
accordingly.

For a precise accounting of the differences between the CIA’s covert actions and the
military’s sensitive activities see Mark M. Lowenthal’s Intelligence from Secrets to
Policy, 5th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE CQ Press, 2012), 181-197. For a more
practitioner’s view, see William J. Daugherty’s Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the
Presidency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004).
293 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 415-416.
292
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The fourth counter-argument is that the current military structure can
adequately consider UW options; it just did not occur in this anomalous case.
Although one may want to believe this – the status quo structure works – the
events described in the earlier chapters of this dissertation show this is not the
case. However, if you accept General Votel’s earlier argument that UW does
work, then apparently the structure is sufficient. It seems like the current
structure can work at times, and if so, why and how? For now, let me set this
argument aside until the synthesis section of this chapter and the following
chapter. There is more to this point than meets the eye, but it is important to
provide a complete and holistic look at the research question, hypothesis, and
the findings that were exposed in the previous two chapters. This can best be
done in the following chapter. The structural-functionalist and culturalbureaucracy frame is necessary to answer the research question, but it may not
be sufficient to completely address the issue.
In sum, these four counter-arguments are important to consider and
address. The first, that MSRA/UW national security options rarely succeed, is
shown to be not quite true. The cited study does point to an important fact that
when US advisors are embedded with the resistance forces, the degree of
success was markedly higher. The second counter-argument that the president
ultimately did decide to support to the resistance with an MSRA/UW option is
shown to be false. The president decided to provide a military “train and equip”
program, with restrictions against sending advisors across the border into Syria
and constraining the resistance elements to purely counter-ISIS objectives. By
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definition, a UW mission is intended to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a
government or occupying power; consequently, the train and equip program was
not UW. The third counter-argument, that this paramilitary realm should be the
exclusive domain of the CIA, is also shown to be too simplistic. Both the CIA and
the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena.
However, the fourth counterargument – that the current US military structure can
adequately support UW planning and activities – deserves further study.
Although this dissertation makes a compelling case to the contrary, it is
irrefutable that the US has conducted some successful MSRA/UW activities, as
General Votel has pointed out. So it seems that addressing the structuralfunctionalism and cultural-bureaucracy issues described in chapter four are
necessary, perhaps they are insufficient to fully address this issue. I will return to
this point in the concluding section of this chapter after the review of the rival
hypotheses.

Rival Hypotheses
As previewed in Chapter One, there are two rival hypotheses that need to be
addressed. In the analysis below, it is clear that the research evidence best supports
the original hypothesis and not the rival hypotheses. However, over time as more
information concerning the interagency decision-making proceedings on the Syria issue
becomes declassified, perhaps the new information will challenge this dissertation’s
findings and conclusions. Future researchers interested in this topic should be attuned
for such information releases. Of particular note would be any new public statements or

189

newly declassified documents from the now retired generals, Martin Dempsey and
James Mattis. Mattis was the commanding general of the US Central Command from
August 2010 through March 2013 and became the Secretary of Defense in 2017. His
public statements and writings concerning Syria during this time frame of 2011-2014
have been very sparse and worded at such a general level as to not shed any
meaningful light on this research question – at least at the time of writing this
dissertation in 2017.
With the above as prelude, the two rival hypotheses are:
•

Presidential guidance pre-empted any consideration of MSRA

•

DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the MSRA/UW option and did not
present it to the NSC

Rival Hypothesis #1: Presidential Guidance Pre-Empted any Consideration
of MSRA.
Under this rival hypothesis, the president would have provided guidance to the
NSC principals or military senior leaders to not surface any MSRA/UW options. I found
no evidence to support this hypothesis, although it is true that the president was
reluctant to get involved in Syria.
President Obama won the election while running on a platform that included
ending the existing wars and stopping perceived adventurous and interventionist military
policies. To this end, the president might also have concluded that the resistance
elements could not win, and even if they did, they would not be able to secure a peace
given the rising extremist forces and likely opposition from Iran. Such a pessimistic
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assessment could have precluded any consideration for supporting the opposition. This
pessimistic assessment was also reflected in surveys of the US population showing
reluctance for any involvement in the Syrian conflict.
Along these lines, as discussed in chapter four, the president is known to have
disapproved the recommendation from the CIA Director, which was endorsed by the
Secretaries of State and Defense, to allow the CIA to provide limited arms to the
resistance in September 2012.294 However, after the Assad regime used chemical
weapons against his own people, the president changed his position and approved the
CIA plan to arm the resistance in June 2013.295
Despite the president’s initial reluctance and subsequent approval to provide
limited CIA arms to the resistance, there are no indications that he provided guidance to
the military to not initiate any recommendation for a military UW option. Given Clinton’s
and Panetta’s disclosure and discussion of these debates in their memoirs, it seems
unlikely they would avoid commenting on this presidential guidance to the military, if it
occurred.
In an interview conducted with US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, he
stated that he had never received nor heard of such guidance from the President;
however, he added he would not have necessarily known of such guidance if it did
exist.296
It is important to review the exact words and texts that the president used to
describe these events and to review the texts of the Secretaries of State and Defense in
294
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their memoirs to see how they recorded the president’s guidance and decisions. The
following sections show these comments.

President Obama’s Words
On October 11, 2016 the television news program 60 Minutes interviewed the
president on topics that included the Syrian moderate opposition, ISIS, and Russia’s
intervention in Syria. The rambling and sometimes testy interview also included topics
of the presidential election and Congressional relations. But as I harvested and studied
the direct questions and answers from the 60 Minutes interviewer to the president, the
resulting product presented itself as a de facto interview with the president on this
dissertation. During that interview, the president made comments on his views of the
Syrian resistance and his assessment as to what the US options were. The president
framed his remarks with his goals and assessment as to how best to achieve them:
The goal here has been to find a way in which we can help moderate opposition
on the ground, but we’ve never been under any illusion that militarily we
ourselves can solve the problem inside of Syria.297
How the president saw this occurring is important.
Over time, the community of nations will all get rid of them (ISIS – my
insertion),298 and we will be leading getting rid of them. But we are not going to
be able to get rid of them unless there is an environment inside of Syria and in
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portions of Iraq in which local populations, local Sunni populations, are working in
a concerted way with us to get rid of them.299
In assessing the Syrian opposition, the president added:
I’ve been skeptical from the get go about the notion that we were going to
effectively create this proxy army inside of Syria. My goal has been to try to test
that proposition, can we be able to train and equip a moderate opposition that’s
willing to fight ISIL? And what we’ve learned is that as long as Assad remains in
power, it is very difficult to get those folks to focus their attention on ISIL.300
I think it is important for us to make sure that we explore all the various options
that are available.301
When responding to a question concerning the Department of Defense’s trainand-equip program for the Syrian moderate opposition – the 2014 and 2015 initiative
that provided training and equipment to the opposition that agreed to fight ISIS, not
Assad, and that prohibited the US trainers from crossing into Syria to become advisors
– the president had this to say:
There is no doubt that it did not work. And, one of the challenges that I’ve had
throughout this heartbreaking situation inside of Syria is, is that – you’ll have
people insist that, you know, all you have to do is send in a few – you know,
truckloads full of arms and people are ready to fight. And then, when you start a
train-and-equip program and it doesn’t work, then people say, ‘Well, why didn’t it
work?’ Or, ‘If it had just started three months earlier it would’ve worked.’302
Keeping in mind that this interview occurred in 2015, outside the scope of this
dissertation time period, the following quote is important not for its reference to the
Iranian and Russian presence on the ground in Syria, but for the president’s comment
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of not “reinsert(ing) ourselves in a military campaign inside Syria”, a comment that may
reflect earlier guidance he provided his military commanders. The passage reads:
America’s priorities has to be number one, keeping the American people safe.
Number two, we are prepared to work both diplomatically and where we can to
support moderate opposition that can help convince the Russians and Iranians to
put pressure on Assad for a transition. But that what we are not going to do is to
try to reinsert ourselves in a military campaign inside of Syria.303
President Obama concludes this Syrian portion of the interview with,
…the solution that we’re going to have inside of Syria is ultimately going to
depend not on the United States putting in a bunch of troops there, resolving the
underlying crisis is going to be something that requires ultimately the key players
there to recognize that there has to be a transition to new government. And, in
the absence of that, it’s not going to work.304
The president’s comments are significant and illuminating. Clearly, he was
looking for a way to assist the resistance to not only fight ISIS but also to drive towards
a political solution that transitions the government in Syria from the Assad regime to a
more pluralistic government that meets the aspirations and needs of the Syrian people.
The president was clear that this fight would be dependent on the support of the Syrian
populace – it was their fight, not something that a conventional US military invasion
could achieve on their behalf. Thus, a close reading shows a president hungry for
options that could satisfy these conditions and gain the political end-state that he
outlined. (This desired political end-state is covered more fully in the many State
Department public statements detailed in Appendix A.)
In summary, the president’s comments certainly do rule-out any consideration for
US conventional military operations inside of Syria. But a more careful reading of his
303
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comments show a president searching for options that support his political objectives
ground on his assessment that working with the local Sunni population would be the key
to resolving the conflict. Indeed, what the president appears to be describing is a
prescription for – not a proscription against – an MSRA/UW option. In the president’s
words: “I think it is important for us to make sure that we explore all the various options
that are available.”305

Secretary of State Clinton’s Words306
In her 2014 memoir, Hillary Clinton records the president’s guidance in the
following series of passages. She recounted in a March 2012 meeting in Riyadh with
GCC leaders, they “…discussed the need to do more to support the rebels in Syria.”307
She added that “The United States was not prepared to join such efforts to arm the
rebels, but we also didn’t want to splinter the anti-Assad coalition…. Some will be able
to do certain things, and others will do other things.”308 This statement implies a tacit
understanding that the resistance potential did exist, that it was recognized by at least
some of the US partners, but that the US was unwilling to directly arm that resistance.
Meanwhile by August 2012, in Clinton’s words, “…the casualties in Syria climbed into
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the tens of thousands, and the crisis spun further out of control.”309 She continued that
in the summer of 2012:
I and others on the …national security team began exploring what it would take
to stand up a carefully vetted and trained force of moderate Syrian rebels who
could be trusted with American weapons…. if rebels could be vetted and trained
effectively, it would be helpful….310
Clinton described a July 2012 meeting with the then-Director of Central Intelligence
Petraeus to discuss vetting, training, and equipping opposition fighters.311 She added:
Our military’s top brass was reluctant to get involved…consistently offering dire
projections….”312 “Secretary of Defense Panetta had become as frustrated as I
was with the lack of options in Syria; he knew from his own time leading the CIA
what our intelligence operatives could do.313

Sometime after August 2012, Petraeus presents the plan to the President, who
“worried that arming the rebels was not likely to be enough to drive Assad from
power…. (with) unintended consequences to consider.”314 Although Clinton concluded
that “… the plan to arm the rebels dead in the water….”,315 it is clear from her first-hand
account of these discussions with the NSC principals that the US foreign partners
recognized the Syria resistance potential by March 2012 and armed them, while the US
military did not craft or present any such options for NSC consideration. Indeed, it
would be Petraeus presenting such options from the CIA, with its much more limited
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ability to support resistance movements under its authorities than what a military
support to a resistance movement would entail.
More specifically to the point of what guidance the president may have
provided, one can conclude that by the late summer of 2012 the issue of providing
weapons to the resistance was back on the table for discussion in the NSC. It is at this
point, with either initial guidance or confirmatory guidance from the president, that the
US would not arm the resistance due to concerns that it would be insufficient to drive
Assad from power and that unintended consequence might result. What is also clear in
the Clinton passages is the US military’s “reluctance” and “dire projections.” It appears
that instead of the president simply providing guidance for the military not to get
involved, it was perhaps the military’s “dire projections” that influenced the president’s
concerns over the potential to drive Assad from power without unintended
consequences that influenced the president’s decision-making. It would appear that the
military’s failure to properly recognize and assess the resistance potential – as chapters
three and four show -- might have influenced the president’s decision-making.
Interestingly, it may have been the military shaping the president’s guidance,
and not the president’s guidance shaping the military’s planning.
The next section reveals the Secretary of Defense’s recollection of these same
events.

Secretary of Defense Panetta’s Words
Clinton’s account of these discussions are echoed and reinforced by Leon
Panetta in his 2014 memoirs. Of the 2011 and early 2012 period, he writes “We
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presented a set of options to the National Security Council — ranging from…limited air
strikes…protecting refugee camps and supporting regional allies….there was no strong
support among the president’s top advisors for direct military action.”316 He adds,
“…there was little coordination between the opposition groups, and some had unsavory
ties to terrorist groups…. so our initial support was nonlethal — training, for the most
part, as well as supplies, but not weapons.”317 By late summer of 2012, Panetta’s
assessment changed. He confirmed the post-August 2012 NSC meeting that Clinton
cited in her memoirs when Petraeus presented the CIA plan to provide weapons to the
resistance. Panetta wrote, “I supported the idea, as did David Petraeus and Hillary
Clinton. All of us believed that withholding weapons was impeding our ability to develop
sway with those groups and subjecting them to withering fire from the regime.”318
“President Obama was initially hesitant…. Only after Assad used chemical weapons in
mid-2013 did Obama reconsider supplying those arms, a step he approved in June of
that year.”319
In summary, between March and post-August 2012, the Secretaries of State
and Defense, along with the CIA Director, would change their assessments and jointly
recommend arming the resistance, albeit through the limited CIA channel rather than
through a military unconventional warfare option. Since the president made this
decision only after Assad used chemical weapons, this refutes the contention that the
US could not identify who the resistance leaders were or how to provide the weapons to
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the right people. Moreover, it is unclear if at this latter decision point (mid-2013) that the
president now saw a way to unseat Assad and ensure no unintended consequences,
the factors he previously cited for declining such an option earlier. What is clear is that
the Syrian situation continued to spin out of control in 2012-2013 – all well before the
Russian intervention – and the US belatedly took some MSRM activities although well
below the full capability inherent in a military unconventional warfare campaign option.
The Panetta and Clinton memoirs document a president who was skeptical and
leery of options to arm the resistance, who disapproved such an option sometime after
August 2012, but who did approve the CIA’s plan to arm the resistance in mid-2013. No
evidence suggests that the president pre-emptively provided guidance to preclude the
development of an MRSA/UW option. That said, it is also clear that the president did
not want to commit any conventional US military forces to this conflict and this was
undoubtedly shaped by domestic political concerns and his own beliefs. Nonetheless,
there is no evidence to suggest that a middle ground option of unconventional warfare
was ever recommended to the president in his national security council deliberations.

Variant to Rival Hypothesis #1: The Iranian Negotiations Factor
A variant to this rival hypothesis concerns the initiation of the then-confidential
negotiations between the US, Iran, and others to limit Iran’s development of nuclear
capabilities in exchange for the relaxation of the economic sanctions. Under this
scenario, the president would not want other areas of conflict to emerge between the
US and Iran lest they disturb or otherwise adversely affect the ongoing nuclear program
negotiations. In this case too, however, I have found no evidence supporting this
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option. That said, it is possible that this is true and that President Obama was
concealing or masking this factor even when he gave his interview with 60 Minutes cited
above. It also assumes that Panetta and Clinton would deliberately conceal these
discussions in their memoirs; a plausible statement given the confidentiality of classified
information. As a consequence, since absence-of-evidence is not evidence-of-absence,
this remains an open question for future researchers. As the years pass, it is
reasonable to expect at least some classified documents concerning this topic to be
declassified and available to researchers. Suffice it to say at this point, I found no
evidence of this option and continue to assess that the original hypothesis holds given
the available information.

Rival Hypothesis #2: DoD Leaders Deliberately Suppressed the UW Option
Under this rival hypothesis, there are two independent reasons why this would
have been plausible. First, concern over a looming possible war with Iran, it could be
speculated, would have caused the military leaders in the US Central Command and
the Joint Staff to deliberately suppress the MSRA/UW option so that they could marshall
the necessary resources in advance of that possible conflict. Second, a more general
war-weariness within the senior military ranks from years of fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan could have led the military leaders to suppress any consideration to
become involved in the Syrian conflict to include MSRA/UW.320

Although some might find it implausible that senior military officers would ever show
war-wariness or a reluctance to use military forces, while serving twenty-seven years in
uniform I did observe that many of the most combat-experienced officers, who saw the
up-close horrors of warfare, tended to be the most pragmatic and conservative when it
came to recommending combat options. Paradoxically, some of the senior civilian
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I found no evidence to support this. However, a careful review of Panetta’s
memoirs and General Dempsey’s testimony in March 2012 provide some indications
that this hypothesis would not be true. First, as cited earlier in this chapter, Panetta
wrote of providing Defense Department options in the 2011-2013 period to the NSC that
included limited airstrikes and protecting refugee camps, options that would have
suggested safe-zones with the associated assurances of an air defense umbrella and
perhaps airstrikes to neutralize the regime’s artillery, if they approached the safe
zones.321 Such options may be couched as “limited,” but they would be resource
intensive. Indeed, this approach would be more resource intensive than a classic small
footprint and low-visibility UW option. So Panetta’s statement does not seem to indicate
a military that was protecting resources for a potential Iran conflict. In a similar fashion,
General Dempsey testified in March 2012, that initial planning (a commander’s
estimate) was begun that included the options of no-fly zones, humanitarian relief,
maritime interdiction, limited airstrikes, and the establishment of a humanitarian
corridor.322
What the above shows is that there is no clear evidence that supports either
variant of this rival hypothesis; moreover, there are some indicators that seem to
suggest the opposite – at least on face value from what these senior leaders testified
and wrote. Given the lack of evidence associated with this rival hypothesis, one cannot
leaders in the Department of Defense, whom never served in uniform, tended to be
more hawkish.
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successfully argue its acceptance. The prudent researcher, however, would flag this
area as a subject for further research and analysis as more documentary evidence is
declassified over time.

Synthesizing the Results
I addressed two rival hypotheses in this chapter: presidential guidance preempted any consideration of MSRA and that DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the
MSRA/UW option and did not present it to the NSC. As the analysis showed, the
evidence available today best supports the original hypothesis and neither of the rival
hypotheses.
However, over time as more information concerning the interagency decisionmaking proceedings over the Syria issue becomes declassified, perhaps the new
information will challenge this dissertation’s findings and conclusions. Of particular note
would be any new public statements or newly declassified documents from the now
retired general and current Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, the former
commanding general of the US Central Command during much of this March 2011 to
June 2014 period.
Perhaps more significant than the rival hypotheses are the four counterarguments that this chapter addressed. The first, that MSRA/UW national security
options rarely succeed, is shown to be not quite true. The cited study does point to an
important fact that when US advisors are embedded within the resistance forces, the
degree of success was markedly higher. The second counter-argument that the
President ultimately did decide to support to the resistance with an MSRA/UW option is
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shown to be false. The President decided to provide a military “train and equip”
program not a UW operation. The third counter-argument, that this paramilitary realm
should be the exclusive domain of the CIA, is shown to be too simplistic. Both the CIA
and the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena. However,
the fourth counterargument – that the current US military structure can adequately
support UW planning and activities – deserves further study. Although this dissertation
makes a compelling case to the contrary, it is irrefutable that the US has conducted
some successful MSRA/UW activities, as General Votel has pointed out. So while it
seems that addressing the structural-functionalism and cultural-bureaucracy issues
described in chapter four are necessary, perhaps they are insufficient to fully
understand and address this issue.
A more complete explanation of the current research question, which is focused
exclusively on the early years of the Syrian rebellion, might involve a broader research
question as to why and how the US government executed MSRA/UW options in such
an uneven fashion. The MSRA/UW was not used in this period in Syria, but as
mentioned earlier in this chapter, UW was successfully used in the early months of the
Afghanistan conflict of 2001 (partnership with the Northern Alliance), the opening phase
of the Iraq war in 2003 (partnership with the Kurds), the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq in
2005 (partnership with the al Anbar tribes), and in Yemen fighting al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (partnership with tribal resistance), and arguably in Syria
2015-2017 (partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces). Why was there such an
uneven application of MSRA/UW?
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Although a comprehensive answer to that question is worthy of another
dissertation, an initial indicator or hypothesis lies within the observation that in every
case of a successful MSRA/UW option in the post-9/11 era, the US had some on the
ground contact with the resistance force well ahead of time. In the case of working with
the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the Kurds in Iraq, the US had face-to-face
contact with those fighters for years before the conflicts erupted and the US then
decided to execute the UW option. This was true too with the 2005 al Anbar uprising,
the Yemeni tribal resistance to AQAP, and, interestingly enough, with the Syrian
Democratic Forces by 2016. If this observation is confirmed with thorough research, the
implication is that to fully optimize MSRA/UW as a strategic option for the nation, the US
must be willing to establish contact with resistance elements in advance of a crisis goto-war situation. I will elaborate on this important point in the next chapter.

Chapter Summary
Careful consideration of the counter-arguments and rival hypotheses that
challenged the analysis and findings of chapters three and four was vital for a proper
critical analysis of this topic.
I addressed two rival hypotheses in this chapter: presidential guidance preempted any consideration of MSRA and that DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the
MSRA/UW option and did not present it to the NSC. As the analysis showed, the
research evidence available today best supports the original hypothesis and not the
rival hypotheses.

204

Arguably more significant than the rival hypotheses are the four counterarguments that this chapter addressed. The first, that MSRA/UW national security
options rarely succeed, is shown to be not quite true. The cited study does point to an
important fact that when US advisors are embedded with the resistance forces, the
degree of success was markedly higher. The second counter-argument, that the
President ultimately did decide to support the resistance with an MSRA/UW option, is
shown to be false. The President decided to provide a military “train and equip”
program not a UW operation. The third counter-argument, that these paramilitary
activities should be the exclusive domain of the CIA, is shown to be too simplistic. Both
the CIA and the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena.
However, the fourth counter-argument – that the current US military structure can
adequately support UW planning and activities – deserves further research to more
precisely determine other factors that stimulate or cause the successful application of
MSRA options. One such factor appears to be the use of contact teams and the
establishment of direct contact with resistance elements either early in the crisis or
ideally in the pre-crisis phase.
As Janine Davidson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning
from 2009-2013, would write: “Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning process
fails to delver the type of nuanced advice in the form of creative options that the
president needs.”323

Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and
Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 43 no.1, March 2013, 129.

323

205

Two concluding observations surfaced during the critical analysis in this chapter:
the need for contact with resistance elements before a crisis erupts and the need for
“creative options that the president needs.” These are perfect segues to the next
chapter, the implications for national security practitioners.
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CHAPTER SIX:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PRACTITIONERS

--“Our pilots fly combat missions in Syria
at significant personal risk. It is odd that
the administration prefers that risk to our
people and credibility instead of first
trying a middle path, that is, enabling a
serious indigenous force to counter the
extremist problem as well as the Assad
government, which is the root cause of
the problem in Syria.
--“One would wish that the CIA and the
rest of the administration, with
Congressional support, would use
additional policy tools like serious
material aid to the more moderate
opposition, and perhaps even a no-fly
zone, all properly conditioned, to press
Assad to the negotiating table.”
--Ambassador Robert Ford324
The earliest chapters to this dissertation established the research design and the
literature review, while the more recent chapters examined the arguments as to if viable
and acceptable resistance force existed in Syria, and if so, why and how did the US
military miss the opportunity to support them. The preceding chapter critically analyzed
the counter-arguments and plausible rival hypotheses and synthesized those results. In
Robert S. Ford, Wringing Our Hands and Endless Bombing Won’t Help Us in Syria,
Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, June 19, 2015. Accessed at
http://www.mei.edu/content/at/wringing-our-hands-and-endless-bombingwon%E2%80%99t-help-us-syria? on December 31, 2015.
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this chapter, I now examine the recommendations from this analysis for national
security practitioners, but first it is important to review the framing of this dissertation.
At some level there is perhaps an argument to be made that the strategic choice
of supporting the viable and acceptable resistance in the 2011 to 2014 period would
have significantly changed today’s situation in Syria for the better. Without MSRA the
conflict in Syria has now resulted in five hundred thousand dead325 and ten million
refugees or internally displaced Syrians.326 There is now also an extensive foreign
military intervention with Russian, Iranian, Iranian-sponsored proxy militias (from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), plus Lebanese Hizballah forces fighting alongside the
Assad regime. Moreover, the failure to assist the viable and acceptable resistance
elements contributed to a power shift from these forces to the extremists of the al-Nusra
Front by early 2013 and ultimately to the rise of the Islamic State with a sanctuary from
which to plan, organize, inspire, and conduct trans-regional terrorist acts.327
There are indicators that all of the above are true and that a MSRA campaign
could have mitigated and disrupted those developments. However, that was neither the

“The Syrian Conflict and Refugee Crisis”, The Brookings Institute, accessed July 12,
2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/flash-topics-folder/syria-conflict-refugee-crisis.
326 Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s
Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to Protect (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute
Press), April 26, 2016. See www.brookings.edu/research/books/2016/theconsequences-of-chaos.
327 Robert S. Ford and James F. Jeffrey, Acting Now Can Reverse an ISIS-Iran
Power Grab in Iraq (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, November 2,
2015), accessed December 31, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/acting-now-can-reverse-an-isis-iran-power-grab-in-syria. See also
Mick Krever, Former Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford: I could no longer ‘defend
the American policy,’ accessed June 3, 2014,
www.http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/03/former-u-s-ambassador-tosyria-i-could-no-longer-defend-the-american-policy-robert-ford/.
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purpose nor design of this dissertation and indeed the research and analysis here does
not demonstrate the causality between an MSRA option and necessarily a more
peaceful outcome for Syria today.
Instead, this dissertation focused on the US interagency and military decisionmaking concerning the Syrian rebellion in March 2011 to June 2014. During those early
years, the president was deprived of a full menu of military options, which should have
included an MSRA option. That much is argued and demonstrated in this dissertation.
Given this narrowed frame, what are the recommendations for national security
practitioners today? There are five directly derived recommendations from this
dissertation and two strategic level overarching recommendations synthesized from the
derived analysis. The causal linkages are more clear and apparent with the directly
derived recommendations, but the two synthesized recommendations are much more
significant for national security senior leaders. Adopting the five directly derived
recommendations is important, but only by adopting the two strategic level overarching
recommendations will the US begin to make real progress in addressing the
deficiencies in assessing and supporting resistance activities.

Five Directly Derived Recommendations
Before listing any of these recommendations, there should be a humbling
recognition that MSRA/UW is not a silver bullet: it will not, by itself, solve such complex
issues as the Syrian rebellion or civil war. MSRA/UW is just one element in a complex,
interagency, and multi-national campaign conducted under the leadership and direction
of the president to shape a desired outcome by coercion, disruption, or regime change,
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as necessary. As harsh as some of these latter words sound, their level of violence and
human suffering is far short of large-scale conventional war, revolution, or civil war.
Moreover, the holistic effort surrounding an MSRA/UW option is a very complex and
sophisticated undertaking; nonetheless, it is an option worthy of consideration and
presentation to the senior national security decision-makers, the president included.
The following five specific recommendations are directly derived from the
analysis presented in the dissertation. The reader will also see a logic chain that builds
and links the first recommendation through the fifth.

Department of Defense Organizational and Process Changes
First, the Department of Defense should make organizational and process
changes to ensure the inclusion of UW expertise into the decision-making process.
From a structural-functionalist perspective, DoD should expand the role of the US
Special Operations Command to provide commander’s assessments, estimates, and
courses of actions (options) for any developing situation that may require MSRA/UW
options for the president to consider. As this dissertation argued, the conventional
military geographic combatant commands and military services are, by structure and
personnel assignment patterns, not apt to be able to produce such well crafted UW
options, nor would they support this recommended change since it would be
bureaucratically interpreted as infringing on their current authorities and
responsibilities.328 In addition, DoD should expand the assignment of Special Forces
generals to key operational decision-making positions within the Joint Staff and
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Since 2014 there may be some movement in this regard.
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geographic combatant commands. This reform should also include assigning Special
Forces officers to positions within the National Security Council staff. Although these
NSC assignments are not operational decision-making positions, having the MSRA/UW
expertise in the NSC would also be beneficial for the effective interagency coordination
of such options. All of this will likely require a modest increase of Special Forces
generals and consequently more junior Special Forces officers who may then develop
into the senior ranks. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, conventional military
officers should receive greater education and experiences in the art of MSRA/UW so
that when they are assigned to key positions in the geographic combatant commands
and joint staff, they too are better able to recognize developing MSRA/UW opportunities
and to craft such options.
Certainly, these recommendations will not be supported by the conventional
military, just like the military reorganization inherent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that
required future generals and admirals to have assignments outside of their parent
service was opposed by the conventional military services. Reforms such as this will
need to be driven from either Congress or the President.
It is equally important that the US Special Operations Command broadens its
vision and accepts these strategic responsibilities. As Dr. Christopher Lamb, former
director of policy planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, wrote, US Special Operations Command “ought
to focus on its historic strategic value as an independent means of combating such
unconventional threats….and (Special Operations Command) must come to better
appreciate SOF’s role as an independent strategic option that can be applied indirectly
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in order to advise Pentagon leaders on the best means of employing SOF.”329 Dr. Lamb
continued that there are times when SOF should take the strategic lead rather than
simply supporting conventional forces.330 Finally, he argued, “Filtering SOF command
and control through a hierarchy of conventional-force commanders does not make
sense when SOF are given the strategic lead for operations.”331

The Significance of the “Initial Contact” Assessment
Second, this dissertation exposes the significance of the initial contact with
resistance leaders for the development of MSRA options. Consequently, the
interagency and military – and primarily US Special Operations Command -- should
expend more attention and effort to consider, develop, and execute such activities.
Assessments provided by this contact team would then better enable the development
of MSRA options. Just as significant, the contact may reveal that the resistance
element is not suitable for US assistance if its political goals or operational techniques
are not consistent with US policy and values. Shutting down the consideration for
MSRA options in this case is just as valuable when it can intelligently remove the MSRA
option from the menu of options for the president. The ability to have small, discrete
engagements with resistance leaders to assess their viability and acceptability to US
national security objectives, and then to be able to provide scalable supporting options

David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 202 and176.
330 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 177.
331 Ibid., 239.
329
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that may include a comprehensive MSRA option, is essential to developing and
providing the best military and interagency advice to the president.

More Carefully Define and Apply the “No Boots on the Ground” Mantra
Third, the overly simplistic label of “no boots on the ground” needs to be more
carefully defined and applied so that it does not become a needless and harmful tool
that excludes the use of contact teams and small footprint advice and assistance efforts.
Arguably, the no-BOG label was originally intended to signify the deployment of
conventional US military forces, like the first Iraq war in 1990-91 and the second war
beginning in 2003. National security practitioners, especially those with no or limited US
military experience, should either avoid using the BOG term or precisely define its use
when considering options; e.g., specify no conventional troops on the ground. Given
the criticality of making the initial contact with resistance leaders, as described in the
preceding paragraph, the “no BOG” label becomes an unintentional instrument that
stifles the development of MSRA options.

The Real Achilles Heel
Fourth, the logical extension of the preceding two key points – the significance of
the initial contact and the no BOG mantra – is to focus attention on the real Achilles heel
of the argument for greater MSRA activities. The Achilles heel issue is the political
consideration of what would happen if extremist non-state forces were to capture US
military personnel on these small unit missions. When one recalls the Islamic State’s
perverse 2015 execution of Jordanian pilot Muath Safi Yousef Al-Kasasbe by burning
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him to death in a cage, it is inescapable to exclude such events from considerations
inside the National Security Council. Politically, is the president ready, willing, and able
to deal with the resulting anger from the American people that would likely call for
revenge and retribution, likely to the detriment of the planned or ongoing MSRA
strategy? This is the kind of issue that needs to be intelligently understood, framed, and
considered by the national security practitioners, without a sophomoric reflexive
response of “no BOG.”

Expand Relationships with Foreign SOF Partners for MSRA/UW
Fifth, directly following from the above, the US should expand relationships with
foreign partner nation special operations forces to not only share the burden of such
activities, but also in recognition that from a cultural and linguistic perspective, our
regional partners will likely have better capabilities and strengths than US Special
Forces. The engagement of Emirati Special Operations Forces in Yemen and the
insertion of other partner nation military contact teams early in the Libya civil war
demonstrate that such capabilities already exist. Expanding this partnership – perhaps
with greater US advice, assistance, planning, intelligence sharing, and equipment -would maximize the advantages that partner nations already possess while mitigating or
minimizing the “US Achilles heel” argument above.

Two Strategic Level Overarching Recommendations
The above five directly derived recommendations are necessary to address the
issues uncovered in this dissertation, but they are not sufficient to address the
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underlying deficiencies. There are two strategic level overarching recommendations,
synthesized from the derived analysis, that need to be addressed. These
recommendations are most relevant to senior national security officials; they are:
•

Adapting the strategic level organization and processes in Washington

•

Evolving the interagency institutional culture to support resistance
activities

Adapting the Strategic Level Organization and Processes
The changes addressed in the above section dealing with DoD organization and
processes are important, but such changes need to extend into the US interagency.
Without a strategic level node within the Washington interagency, the changes at US
Special Operations Command and the Pentagon would be like separate spinning gears
not connected to the larger machine.
Within the National Security Council (NSC), there is no one organizational entity
directly responsible for supporting resistance activities. Although the current and
previous administrations have published national security strategies that usually include
support for human rights, support to oppressed people, and, in the current strategy, the
specific inclusion of advancing American influence, there is no corresponding entity
within the NSC structure to orchestrate the necessary policy coordination within the
USG to achieve these goals. By contrast, there is a Counterterrorism Directorate that
provides the interagency policy coordination for counterterrorism and that model should
be applied to the case of assessing and supporting resistance movements that are
congruent with US national interests.
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This new entity within the National Security Council could appropriately be called
the Directorate for Assessing and Supporting Resistance Activities or ASRA. Like the
other directorates within the NSC, it could convene subordinate interagency policy
coordination committees (PCCs) to develop policy recommendation for the NSC
deputies and principals committees. In this manner, policy to assess and support
resistance activities worldwide would be more streamlined and effective. Moreover, as
an NSC directorate, this entity could task the intelligence community, State Department,
and Defense Department for assessments and programs to further the recognition,
understanding, and support to appropriate resistance activities, congruent with US
national policy objectives.
This idea is not new. During the Kennedy Administration, when the Soviet Union
had, as a matter of policy, supported communist revolutionary movements in a variety of
locations, including south east Asia, Kennedy found the US military and State
Department to be unable to adapt to this new situation and provide effective
counterinsurgency responses. Kennedy ordered the establishment of a Special Group
for Counterinsurgency, a “high-level interagency committee to monitor and steer the
national security community’s counterinsurgency work, including the formulation of
policy and doctrine.”332 The Special Group was successful in its formative years, but
was killed in 1966, just a few years after Kennedy’s assassination.

Frank L. Jones, “The Guerrilla Warfare Problem: Revolutionary War and the
Kennedy Administration Response, 1961-1963.” U.S. Army War College Guide
to National Security Issues, Vol.2 National Security Strategy and Policy, edited
by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., 402-407. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2012.
http://www.strtegicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1110pdf.
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Underpinning and supporting this new NSC Directorate for ASRA, the
Department of State, CIA, US Special Operations Command, and the private sector
should develop a strategic partnership for planning, coordinating, and executing support
to resistance activities. Although each entity has their unique functions within this
umbrella topic, the synchronization of these entities is not optimized. This may be
partially explained by their different albeit complementary authorities, but a more
complete explanation probably deals with organizational cultures again. Those selfimposed obstacles should be reduced – fully respecting the different authorities – for the
good of the nation.
Procedurally this should include an executive-level interagency cell comprised of
senior officials from each of these entities that meets perhaps quarterly and as needed.
Although this cell would not work directly for the NSC-ASRA, it would certainly be
responsive to NSC tasks and policy guidance. The executive cell would provide
guidance and direction plus set priorities in accordance with NSC-ASRA guidance.
Below this executive cell would be a standing joint planning section staffed with
personnel from each of these entities. This standing planning section would provide
daily interagency (and private sector) coordination and surface unresolved issues to the
executive level, as required. The primary utility of this planning section is to provide
daily and continuous interagency coordination amongst these government entities and
the private sector. Of note, these organizational and process changes would cost
nothing but the will to adapt the existing billet structure and personnel to this priority.
Sufficient force structure and personnel exist within these organizations to enable this
evolution.
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This recommendation is consistent with Dr. Christopher Lamb’s earlier writings
on the need for SOF’s transformation: “The national security bureaucracy in Washington
must adopt a more collaborative decision-making system to produce and choose among
integrated strategic options, monitor progress in their implementation, and adjust and
adjudicate risk rapidly in response to developments.”333
Finally, it is time to change the label of Unconventional Warfare (UW) and MSRA
to Support to Resistance Activities for use within the US interagency. Although this
recommendation may seem trivial to many, it should be adopted for interagency use
because the SRA label immediately establishes a much clearer foundation for
interagency discussions than UW. This does not mean that the military needs to
change its terms or doctrine; rather, this recommendation does argue for establishing
the term “Support to Resistance Activities” into the US interagency lexicon and for the
military to use this terms when discussing UW options in the interagency arena.
The interagency and our foreign partners understand the English phrase of
support to resistance activities. What they do not understand is the military term
unconventional warfare. The messages that this latter term conveys are 1) it must be
akin to asymmetric or hybrid warfare, and 2) it is war. The first message is off-target:
various tactics, techniques, and procedures may be deemed asymmetric or hybrid, but
UW has a precise military doctrinal meaning of activities conducted to enable a
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or
occupying power. While the first message goes off-target with its audience, the second
message (this is war) presents a significant obstacle when coordinating such activities
David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 240.
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within the interagency. When departments or agencies perceives that this is war –
indeed that word is in the title of the concept – it triggers a serious of obstacles,
concerns, and issues in the civilian national security practitioner’s mind that almost
outright stops any consideration of the UW option. To a diplomat, for example, the
“war” option indicates that diplomacy has somehow failed – that the diplomat failed –
and the situation has now turned into a war with the military as the lead US entity. This
is clearly not the intent with the military’s approach with unconventional warfare, but that
is nonetheless the message that is immediately conveyed to a non-military official. It
would be far better to establish a more precise and clear term for discussions and
coordination within the interagency – and with our foreign partners.

Evolving the Interagency Institutional Culture to Support Resistance
Activities
More important than the structural and process changes outlined above, the
interagency culture must be evolved to support resistance activities. Integrated career
paths, with clearly established promotion opportunities, must be designed within the
military, the State Department, and the CIA to build and maintain expertise within this
skill set. That expertise will be enhanced with required rotational assignments of these
individual to the other departments and agencies, similar to how US military officers are
expected to seek and obtain “joint tours” outside of their respective Services to advance
their careers into the senior ranks and become a general or admiral. And similar to the
military example here, it will likely take Congressional action to mandate such promotion
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paths and quotas into law before our current department and agencies adequately
adapt to these new realities.
Tailored career paths with promotions are not enough. The concept of how best
to develop and use SRA as a strategic option for the nation should be further developed
by a national-level institution, research center, or university.334 This might best be
accomplished at universities like Georgetown or Johns Hopkins, or in partnership with
military-related educational institutions like the National Defense University or the Joint
Special Operations University. But it is also clear, from the organizational culture
discussion earlier, that the development of this type of intellectual capital should not be
exclusively resident and confined within the Department of Defense. A partnership with
a DoD university would be advantageous, but the lead and primacy of the effort should
be from a national-level institution, research center, or university that can better develop
the intellectual body of knowledge for MSRA, plus produce civilian and military
graduates who become the next generation of national security practitioners. Curricula
and research areas for this institution would include the following topics (none of which
figure prominently in the current US military war colleges nor the lower-level command
and general staff colleges):335
•

Social movement theory

•

Language proficiency and cultural studies

•

Creation and preparation of an underground

Charles Cleveland T. Cleveland, Lieutenant General, US Army (retired), (three-star
Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012-2015) in an
interview with the author March 27, 2017.
335 Most of the listing depicted above is from Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland,
Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint
Forces Quarterly, 1st Quarter 2016, 101-109.
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•

Cyber UW tools and methods

•

Influence operations

•

Popular mobilization dynamics

•

Subversion and political warfare

•

Social network analysis and sociocultural analysis

•

Revolutionary warfare theory

In addition to research and publishing on the above topics, this institution should
also produce graduates at the undergraduate and masters level. The degrees would be
in National Security Studies with a focus on Resistance Movements. Talented civilian
students at the undergraduate level and graduate level could then compete for positions
within the National Security Council staff, the Department of State, CIA, and the US
military and then embark on their new careers. Select mid-level officers (e.g., majors)
could earn their masters degrees here in lieu of their conventional schooling at their
Service staff college. Senior military officers (e.g., colonels and lieutenant colonels)
could study here for one year fellowships and should receive credit for war college
graduate studies, as already occurs with other universities and think tanks. Likewise,
mid- and senior-level CIA and State Department personnel could earn governmentfunded masters degrees here, too, in combined classes with military counterparts. Of
significance, this yearlong fellowship process of studying with State Department,
military, and CIA professionals would tighten the interagency bonds necessary for
success at the strategic level.
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Chapter Summary
There are five directly derived recommendations from this dissertation and two
strategic level overarching recommendations synthesized from the derived analysis.
The five directly derived recommendations are:
First, the Department of Defense should make organizational and process
changes to ensure the inclusion of UW expertise into the decision-making process.
From a structural-functionalist perspective, DoD should expand the role of the US
Special Operations Command to provide commander’s assessments, estimates, and
courses of actions (options) for any developing situation that may require MSRA/UW
options for the president to consider.
Second, this dissertation exposes the significance of the initial contact with
resistance leaders for the development of MSRA options. Consequently, the
interagency and military – and primarily US Special Operations Command -- should
expend more attention and effort to consider, develop, and execute such activities.
Assessments provided by this contact team would then better enable the development
of MSRA options.
Third, the overly simplistic label of “no boots on the ground” needs to be more
carefully defined and applied so that it does not become a needless and harmful tool
that excludes the use of contact teams and small footprint advice and assistance efforts.
Fourth, the logical extension of the preceding two key points – the significance of
the initial contact and the no BOG mantra – is to focus attention on the real Achilles heel
of the argument for greater MSRA activities. The Achilles heel issue is the political
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consideration of what would happen if extremist non-state forces capture US military
personnel on these small unit missions.
Fifth, the US should expand relationships with foreign partner nation special
operations forces to not only share the burden of such activities, but also in recognition
that from a cultural and linguistic perspective, our regional partners will likely have better
capabilities and strengths than US Special Forces.
In addition to these five directly derived recommendations, there are two
overarching strategic level recommendation that should be implemented. They are:
First, the US should extrapolate these earlier five recommendations to the
national strategic level as well. This includes establishing a new entity within the
National Security Council, the Directorate for Assessing and Supporting Resistance
Activities or ASRA. It also includes the Department of State, CIA, US Special
Operations Command, and the private sector developing a strategic partnership for
planning, coordinating, and executing support to resistance activities. These two
initiatives are connected, with the NSC ASRA entity providing the strategic policy and
guidance necessary for the strategic partners of the State Department, CIA, and US
Special Operations Command to plan and execute.
Second, the interagency culture must be evolved to support resistance activities.
This includes the establishment of interagency career paths and promotions for national
security specialists within the US Special Operations Command, the State Department,
and the CIA. It also requires the establishment of a national-level institution, research
center, or university focused on assessing and supporting resistance activities to build
expertise in resistance activities.
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With the adoption of the above recommendations, we can begin to change
the institutional cultures, the organizational biases, and the old structures to be
able to provide the president a complete, comprehensive, and creative menu of
options when assessing and responding to violent political crises short of
conventional war.
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CONCLUSION
“This is another type of war, new in its intensity,
ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives,
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of
by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression,
seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the
enemy instead of engaging him…. It preys on
economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in
those situations where we must counter it … a
whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind
of force, and therefore a new and wholly different
kind of military training.”
—President John F. Kennedy, June 6, 1962336
“We need strong, numerous boots on the ground,
but we also need the right goal, the right strategy,
and the right tactics. Obviously, Syrian fighters,
and especially Sunni Arab Syrians, and not
Americans, are best placed to confront Sunni Arab
extremists in Syria.”
---Ambassador Robert S. Ford337
Between March 2011 and June 2014 an opportunity existed to disrupt the
strategic partnership of Iran, Syria, and Lebanese Hizballah by supporting a viable and
acceptable resistance movement within Syria that sought to overthrow the Bashar alAssad regime. The resistance formed within the context of the social, economic, and
political upheavals of the Arab Spring in general and the repressive actions of the Assad
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forces in particular. While the US government provided non-lethal aid to elements within
the resistance movement, the US did not provide any military support. Instead, by 2016
a complex civil war unfolded that included military interventions from Russia, Iran, and
Lebanese Hizballah. By 2016 several hundred thousand people had died and ten
million others were refugees or internally displaced.338 By late 2017, Assad was firmly in
control, thanks to Russian, Iranian, and Lebanese Hizballah interventions and the
constrained US response that restricted itself to only fighting ISIS. Could the US have
shaped and influenced this development differently in the earlier years? If so, what
implications should this have for US national security practitioners in future situations?
In this dissertation I posed the research question of why and how the US military
missed the opportunity to provide military support to the moderate Syrian resistance in
the March 2011 to June 2014 period. I argued that the US military’s culture, structure,
and process for providing advice to the president and his national security decisionmaking team are flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare expertise.
This marginalization results in inadequate consideration to applying UW as a strategic
option for the nation. This inadequate planning and decision-making during the Syrian
rebellion in March 2011 through June 2014 resulted in a missed opportunity to disrupt
the strategic partnership of Iran, Syria, and Lebanese Hizballah and support the people
of Syria. Moreover, effective support to the resistance movement arguably could have
mitigated perhaps the extent of the human tragedy inherent in the death or
displacement of more than half of the Syrian population that resulted by 2016. All that
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said, this dissertation was not a case study of the Syrian rebellion; rather, it was a case
study on the US interagency and military decision-making process. The analysis of
what could have happened with proper military support to the resistance will be a topic
for a future researcher.
In this dissertation I showed that a viable and acceptable resistance force existed
in Syria from March 2011 through June 2014 and that the US military conventional
officers failed to recognize this development, adequately analyze its implications, and
craft a strategic UW option for the senior national security decision-makers to consider.
If these cultural, structural, and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, the US is likely to
repeat this strategic error in the future.
In terms of research design and methodology, this dissertation was a disciplined
configurative case study that used established theories to examine a case.339 More
specifically, this was a single case study with macro- and micro-level process-tracing.
Primary source evidence included Congressional testimonies and memoirs from the key
participants in the decision-making, public statements from the White House and State
Department, plus elite interviews with the US Ambassador to Syria and the
Commanding General of the US Army’s Special Operations Command, both serving in
these roles during the 2011-2014 period. Ambassador Ford was a key participant in
these events and retired Lieutenant General Cleveland is an expert in the military’s
structure, process, and culture concerning unconventional warfare. The resulting
process-tracing charts, both macro- and micro-levels, were instrumental in identifying,
placing in context, and then dissecting the decision-making that occurred.
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 74-76.
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Two rival hypotheses were identified during the research design and four
counter-arguments surfaced during the research. The two rival hypotheses postulated
that presidential guidance pre-empted any consideration of MSRA/UW and that DoD
leaders deliberately suppressed such an option and did not present it to the NSC. As
the research and analysis in this dissertation showed, the evidence available today best
supports the original hypothesis and neither of the rival hypotheses.
Arguably more significant than the rival hypotheses were the four counterarguments that emerged during the research and analysis phases of the dissertation.
The first, that MSRA/UW national security options rarely succeed, was shown to be not
quite true. The study cited by the proponents of this counter-argument points to an
important fact that when US advisors are embedded within the resistance forces, the
degree of success was markedly higher. The second counter-argument, that the
president ultimately did decide to support the resistance with an MSRA/UW option, is
shown to be false. The president decided to provide a military “train and equip”
program, but not a UW operation. The third counter-argument, that these paramilitary
activities should be the exclusive domain of the CIA, is shown to be too simplistic. Both
the CIA and the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena.
However, the fourth counter-argument – that the current US military structure can at
times adequately support UW planning and activities – deserves further research to
more precisely determine other factors that stimulate or cause the successful
application of MSRA options. One such factor appears to be the use of small discreet
teams to establish direct contact with resistance elements either early in the crisis or

228

ideally in the pre-crisis phase. This factor figured prominently in distilling the
recommendations of this study for national security decision-makers.
The dissertation research and analysis led to five directly derived
recommendations and two strategic level overarching recommendations synthesized
from the derived analysis.
The five directly derived recommendations are:
First, the Department of Defense should make organizational and process
changes to ensure the inclusion of UW expertise into the decision-making process.
From a structural-functionalist perspective, DoD should expand the role of the US
Special Operations Command to provide commander’s assessments, estimates, and
courses of actions (options) for any developing situation that may require MSRA/UW
options for the president to consider.
Second, this dissertation exposes the significance of the initial contact with
resistance leaders for the development of MSRA options. Consequently, the
interagency and military – and primarily US Special Operations Command -- should
expend more attention and effort to consider, develop, and execute such activities.
Assessments provided by this contact team would then better enable the development
of MSRA options.
Third, the overly simplistic label of “no boots on the ground” needs to be more
carefully defined and applied so that it does not become a needless and harmful tool
that excludes the use of contact teams and small footprint advice and assistance efforts.
Fourth, the logical extension of the preceding two key points – the significance of
the initial contact and the no BOG mantra – is to focus attention on the real Achilles heel
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of the argument for greater MSRA activities. The Achilles heel issue is the political
consideration of what would happen if extremist non-state forces capture US military
personnel on these small unit missions.
Fifth, the US should expand relationships with foreign partner nation special
operations forces to not only share the burden of such activities, but also in recognition
that from a cultural and linguistic perspective, our regional partners will likely have better
capabilities and strengths than US Special Forces.
In addition to these five directly derived recommendations, there are two
overarching strategic level recommendation that should be implemented. They are:
First, the US should extrapolate these earlier five recommendations to the
national strategic level as well. This includes establishing a new entity within the
National Security Council, the Directorate for Assessing and Supporting Resistance
Activities or ASRA. It also includes the Department of State, CIA, US Special
Operations Command, and the private sector developing a strategic partnership for
planning, coordinating, and executing support to resistance activities. These two
initiatives are connected, with the NSC ASRA entity providing the strategic policy and
guidance necessary for the strategic partners of the State Department, CIA, and US
Special Operations Command to plan and execute.
Second, the interagency culture must be evolved to support resistance activities.
This includes the establishment of interagency career paths and promotions for national
security specialists within the US Special Operations Command, the State Department,
and the CIA. It also requires the establishment of a national-level institution, research
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center, or university focused on assessing and supporting resistance activities to build
expertise in resistance activities.
The real crux of the issue uncovered and presented in this dissertation is
the institutional-cultural bias within the conventional military that created an
organizational structure and decision-making process that marginalizes
MSRA/UW expertise to the detriment of national security practitioners and, by
extension, to the nation. The remedy is not merely a list of specific
recommendations; rather, it is a focus on the idea of support to resistance
movements as a national security option with strategic-level interagency
organization and process changes plus a national-level institution from which to
study and build expertise in resistance activities. Only then can we more readily
change the institutional cultures, the organizational biases, and the old structures
to be able to provide the president a complete, comprehensive, and creative
menu of options to consider when assessing and responding to violent political
crises short of conventional war.
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APPENDIX A:
SYRIAN REBELLION MACRO-LEVEL PROCESS-TRACING CHART

This appendix consists of two sections. The first section contains the
macro-level process-tracing charts focused on the rebellion’s beginning in March
2011, through the fall of Mosul in June 2014, and continuing through 2015 for
some additional context that documents the Russian intervention.
Highlighted in red ink are the seven key events that provide critical
insights to the interagency and military decision-making. These events are
further analyzed in the micro-level process-tracing charts in chapter four of this
dissertation.
Highlighted in blue ink within this macro-level process-tracing chart are the
key US policy and strategy announcements from the White House and the State
Department. The full text of these statements can be found in Section Two of
this appendix.
The second section provides amplifying details concerning the US
strategy by providing the actual texts of White House and State Department
statements concerning the Syria situation. These texts clearly show the evolving
nature of the US policy and strategy and provide the detail that could not be
captured in the matrix chart in section one.
The two sections should be read side-by-side.
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Appendix A, Section One
The Chart
Purpose. This section lists more than one hundred major political, economic, and military events, actions, and
activities taken by Syrian actors (the Assad regime and resistance elements), ISIS, other state actors, international
organizations, and the US government on one timeline. This chart is intended to capture and depict the array of various
key events throughout this conflict to allow the reader to refer to a specific event and then to see its temporal relationship
to other events. This array of events is then of utility for researchers to conduct more detailed process-tracing to
determine linkages and causality of key events and variables.
Time Frame. The focus of this dissertation is on the period March 2011 to June 2014. However, to evaluate the
various factors and events that impacted and shaped the decision-making in that precise period, one must also examine
events that occurred both before and after. To that point, the following paragraphs provide background information and
set the listed events into context. Moreover, the event charts themselves extend through December 2015 only to show
the reader the continued evolution of US policy.
Pre-Arab Spring Resistance Activities. In 2010, a year before the Arab Spring uprising began in Tunisia,
Dr. Walid Phares published The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East. In this prescient work, Dr.
Phares predicted the upcoming uprisings and provided a constructivist description of the various social, economic, and
political underpinnings of the upcoming upheavals. Although he described the historical roots of the inevitable revolutions
from the Maghreb, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, his descriptions of Syria are illuminating for this study.
Phares describes the 1982 uprising in Hama that left more than 18,000 dead, relentless regime oppression in the early
1960s, and the brutal actions of Hafez Assad.340 With his death in June 2000, the control of the regime passed to his son
Bashar Assad and his “five security services, all involved in financial and other interests inside Syria and Lebanon.”341
Although the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would complain in 2012 that no one could identify moderate
resistance leaders to him, Phares identified resistance leaders as early as 2010 who were opposing the regime’s
oppression. Resistance leaders like Ammar Abdelhamid, Michel Kilo, Riad Seif, Farid Ghadri, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and
political organizations like the National Council for the Damascus Declaration, the Social Peace Movement Party, Syrian
340

Walid Phares, The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East. (New York: Simon and Schuster,
Inc., 2010), 203-210.
341
Phares, 211.
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Reform Party, would form the cadre and nucleus of much of the initial resistance activities by 2012. Well before that,
however, in 2006 three hundred Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals would sign the Beirut-Damascus Declaration calling for
functional democracies in both countries.342 Phares prophetically wrote in 2010: “When (the Syrian masses mobilize for
change)…democracies around the world must stand by Syria’s civil society, all the way to a democratic revolution. No
doubt about it — it is coming.”343
The Broader Regional Arab Spring Uprising. In addition to placing the Syrian uprising in its historical
context of oppression and resistance since the 1960s, one must also place the Syrian uprising within the context of the
regional Arab Spring uprisings that began December 17, 2010 when “Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on
fire in front of a local municipal office after being harassed by police officers in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid.”344
Given the underlying political, social, and economic grievances against the many corrupt and repressive regimes
throughout the region, this spark ignited the uprisings of the Arab Spring. These revolts spread rapidly to Bahrain, Egypt,
Jordan, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, with protests of various intensities in Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, and the
Gulf States.345 From December 2010 to June 2012 approximately 90,000 people in 16 countries would die, but only the
autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen would fall.346
Methodology
This process trace is in accordance with Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett’s prescription for the detailed
narrative version of process-tracing. In this variant, “a detailed narrative or story (is) presented in the form of a chronicle
that purports to throw light on how an event came about. Such a narrative is highly specific and makes no explicit use of
theory or theory-related variables.”347 This approach is also congruent with Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel’s
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344
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347
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prescription for process-tracing.348 Within the chart, citations for these events are recorded in short form with full citations
in the reference section.
Highlighted in blue within this macro-level process-tracing chart are the key US policy and strategy announcements
from the White House and State Department. The full text of these statements can be found in Section 2 of this appendix.
Within Section 1 of this macro-level process-tracing appendix, there are listings of more than one-hundred events.
Highlighted in red ink are the seven key events that provide critical insights into the interagency and military decisionmaking associated with the Syrian rebellion I the March 2011 to June 2014 period. These seven events are further
analyzed in micro-level process-trace charts in chapter four of this dissertation. These events are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The senior US defense and military leaders assess that “it is not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed
opposition” (February and March 2012).
Interagency senior leaders express frustration at DoD’s thinking (mid-2012).
President Obama rejects National Security Council recommendation for the CIA to arm the rebels (September
2012).
Significant divergence apparent between DoD senior leaders and the US Ambassador in Syria on assessing the
moderate resistance (April 2013).
Two months later President Obama approves plan for CIA to arm the resistance (June 2013).
In the wake of the fall of Mosul, President Obama orders the military to train and equip the moderate resistance in
their fight against ISIS, not the Assad regime (June 2014).
Congress approves the funding for the DoD train and equip operation (December 2014).

Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge, UK: University
Printing House, 2015.)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Syrian security forces shoot and
kill protestors in the southern
city of Deraa who were
demanding release of political
prisoners. This sparks violent
unrest that steadily spreads
nationwide over the following
months. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

Turkey seizes weapons and
ammunition from Iranian
commercial flight en route to
Syria. (Will Fulton, Iranian
Strategy in Syria, 2013, 17)

2011
March

April

Some Iraqi officials, including
Transportation Minister Hadi alAmiri, assessed to be
facilitating Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Force (IRGC) arms
supply flights to Syria. (Fulton,
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 17)

“The first public meeting of
members of the Syrian
opposition is held in Istanbul.”
(Institute for the Study of War,
Syria’s Political Opposition, April
2012, 12)

Iran dispatches Law
Enforcement Force (LEF) (part
of Iran’s interior Ministry)
Deputy Commander BG Ahmad
Reza Radam to Damascus to
provide expertise and aid for
the regime crackdown. (Fulton,
“150 people sign a new national Iranian Strategy, 2013, 13-14)
initiative for democratic change,
creating the Syrian National
Coalition for Change. This is
the first attempt to establish an
organized external leadership
249

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

for the Syrian uprising.”
(Institute for the Study of War,
Syria’s Political Opposition, April
2012, 12)

May

Syrian Army tanks enter Deraa,
Banyas, Homs and suburbs of
Damascus in an effort to crush
anti-regime protests. President
Assad announces amnesty for
political prisoners. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

US and European Union tighten May 19, US condemns Assad
sanctions. (BBC, Syria Profile
regime for its use of deadly force
Timeline, 2015)
against protestors. The US calls
for democratic change. (See
Appendix A, Section 2 for full
text.)
Treasury Department designates
Iranian IRGC-QF Commander
Major General Qassem
Suleimani and Operations and
Training Commander Mohsen
Chizari for their role in “the
violent repression against the
Syrian people.” (Fulton, Iranian
Strategy, 2013, 10)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

June

The Assad government says
that “armed gangs” in the
northwestern town of Jisr alShughour have killed 120
members of the security forces.
Troops besiege the town and
more than 10,000 people flee to
Turkey. President Assad
pledges to start a "national
dialogue" on reform. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

EU sanctions IRGC Intelligence
Organization chief Hojjat alEslam Hossein Taeb for his
involvement in “providing
equipment and support to help
the Syria regime suppress
protests.” (Fulton, Iranian
Strategy, 2013, 14-15)

Treasury Department sanctions
Iran Air and Yas Air (both Iranian
airlines) for transporting military
equipment and personnel to
Syria. The designation described
a series of flights in March 2011
that transported weapons to
Hezbollah and Syria at the
beginning of the conflict. (Fulton,
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 16)

Elements of the Syrian
opposition meet in Antalya,
Turkey and form the Syrian
National Coalition for Change.
The opposition includes liberal,
pro-Western, Muslim
Brotherhood, Assyrian and
Kurdish elements. (Institute for
the Study of War, Syria’s
Political Opposition, April 2012,
12)
July

President Assad sacks the
governor of the northern
province of Hama after mass
demonstrations there. Assad
eventually dispatches in troops
to restore order at the cost of

The US again condemns the
Assad regime for its attacks
against the peaceful protestors.
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for
full text.)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

scores of lives. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

August

The Syrian National Transition
Council (SNTC) forms in
Istanbul with opposition
elements. (Institute for the
Study of War, Syria’s Political
Opposition, April 2012, 12)

September Burhan Ghalioun is named
President of the SNTC. (Institute
for the Study of War, Syria’s
Political Opposition, April 2012,
12)

October

In addition to the Treasury
Department designations
announced in June, Treasury
cites 117 cargo and passenger
planes for transporting arms and
personnel to Syria. (Fulton,
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 16)

“Building on the foundation of
the … (SNTC), a
comprehensive opposition
council is announced. The
Syrian National Council (SNC)
formally declares its
organizational affiliations and
structure to include a General
Assembly, a General Secretariat
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

and an Executive Committee.”
(Institute for the Study of War,
Syria’s Political Opposition, April
2012, 12)
The new SNC says it has forged
a common front of internal and
exiled opposition activists.
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline,
2015)
November

December

Arab League votes to suspend
Syria, accusing it of failing to
implement the Arab peace plan,
and imposes sanctions. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)
Twin suicide bombs outside
security buildings in Damascus
kill 44, the first in a series of
large blasts in the capital that
continue into the following
summer. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

2012
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Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

January

“The SNC General Secretariat
meets in Istanbul to extend
Ghalioun’s presidency.”
(Institute for the Study of War,
Syria’s Political Opposition, April
2012, 12)

IRGC-QF Commander Qassem
Suleimani meets with Assad in
Damascus days prior to the
commencement of the regime’s
assault on Zabadani. (Fulton,
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 12)

Early 2012 - According to thenSecretary of Defense Leon
Panetta, the NSC discusses
options and limits the US
response to non-lethal support.
“We presented a set of options
to the NSC - ranging
from…limited air
strikes…protecting refugee
camps, and supporting regional
allies. It was clear from those
discussions that there was no
strong support among the
president’s top advisors for
direct military action.” (Leon
Panetta, Worthy Fights, 2014,
448)
“There was little coordination
between the opposition groups,
and some had unsavory ties to
terrorist groups….so our initial
support was nonlethal - training,
for the most part, as well as
supplies, but not weapons.”
(Panetta, Worthy Fights, 2014,
449)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

February

Government steps up the
bombardment of Homs and
other cities. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

First meeting of the Group of
Friends (more than 60
countries, UN, Arab League,
EU, and others). The Group
condemns Assad regime and
affirms the goal of reform and
democracy for the Syrian
people. Calls for Assad to
delegate “full authority” to his
deputy.

Event One (first of two parts):
The senior US defense and
military leaders assess that “it is
not clear what constitutes the
Syrian armed opposition”. (See
Chapter 4)

The SNC Executive Committee
meets in Doha, Qatar. (Institute
for the Study of War, Syria’s
Political Opposition, April 2012,
12)

The Group of Friends
recognizes the Syrian National
Council as the legitimate
representative of the Syrian
people. The Group agrees to
increase support to the
opposition.
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for
full texts.)
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In an interview with CNN, the
Chairman of the JCS, General
Martin Dempsey, stated it is
“premature to take a decision to
arm the opposition movement in
Syria, because I would
challenge anyone to clearly
identify for me the opposite
movement in Syria at this point.”
(Interview with CNN’s Fareed
Zakaria, U.S. Military Chief
Dubious About Arming Syrian
Rebels, February 20, 2012)

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
“US Department of Treasury
designates the Iranian Ministry
of intelligence and Security
(MOIS) for providing substantial
assistance to the Syrian General
Intelligence Directorate for the
purpose of assisting the Syrian
regime in its violent crackdown
on protestors.” (Fulton, Iranian
Strategy, 2013, 15)

March

The SNC General Assembly
meets in Istanbul. (Institute for
the Study of War, Syria’s
Political Opposition, April 2012,
12)

UN Security Council endorses
non-binding peace plan drafted
by UN envoy Kofi Annan. China
and Russia agree to support
the plan after an earlier,
tougher draft is modified. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

Then-Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton meets with GCC leaders
in Riyadh to discuss the need to
support the Syrian resistance.
The US was not prepared to arm
the resistance. (Clinton, Hard
Choices, 2014, 453)

Iran provides unmanned aerial
vehicles to Syria to monitor
opposition forces. (Fulton,
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 15)

Event One (second of two
parts): The senior US defense
and military leaders assess that
“it is not clear what constitutes
the Syrian armed opposition.”
(See Chapter 4)
Secretary of Defense Panetta
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Dempsey testify
to the Senate Armed Services
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
Committee. Panetta states, “It is
not clear what constitutes the
Syrian armed opposition. There
has been no single unifying
military alternative that can be
recognized, appointed, or
contacted.” General Dempsey
adds that there are
“…approximately one hundred
groups that we’ve identified as
part of the opposition….(but)
some kind of coherent core…it
doesn’t exist today.” (Senate
Armed Services Committee
Hearings, March 7, 2012)
(Note: In March The Institute for
the Study of War, publishes a
detailed 57-page description and
assessment of the various units,
commanders, locations, and
activities of the moderate
resistance in Syria, including
photos of 39 active
commanders. The Institute
would follow this publication with
a 38-page document in April that
detailed the grass-roots political
opposition that was emerging in
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
Syria.) (Holiday, Syria’s Armed
Opposition, 2012)

May

July

France, UK, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Canada and Australia
expel senior Syrian diplomats in
protest at killing of more than a
hundred civilians in Houla, near
Homs. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)
Free Syria Army (FSA) bomb
kills three security chiefs in
Damascus; FSA seizes Aleppo
in the north. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

Event Two: Interagency senior
leaders express frustration at
DoD’s thinking (See Chapter 4)
CIA Director Petraeus and
Clinton meet to discuss vetting,
training, and equipping
moderate opposition fighters.
“Our military’s top brass was
reluctant to get
involved…consistently offering
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
dire projections….” (Clinton,
Hard Choices, 2014, 462)
“Secretary of Defense Panetta
had become as frustrated as I
was with the lack of options in
Syria; he knew from his own
time leading the CIA what our
intelligence operatives could do.”
(Ibid.)

August

Prime Minister Riad Hijab
defects. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

48 Iranian nationals, including
IRGC unit commanders and
brigadier generals, are
kidnapped near Damascus,
providing a glimpse of the
Iranian advisory and assistance
mission inside Syria. (Fulton,
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 11)
US Secretary of Defense and
C/JCS state that Iran is
developing and training a militia
named Jaysh al-Sha’bi
(People’s Army) within Syria to
fight on behalf of the regime.
(Fulton, Iranian Strategy, 2013,
18)
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President Obama warns that use
of chemical weapons would tilt
the US towards intervention.
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline,
2015)
NSC principals began exploring
options to stand-up a vetted
force of moderate Syrian rebels.
(Clinton, Hard Choices, 2014,
461)

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
Sept 28th Secretary Clinton
announces the US is increasing
its humanitarian assistance by
$30 million to $132 million in
FY12, assisting more than
975,000 people inside Syria and
300,000 who have fled. (See
Appendix A, Section 2 for full
text.)

Sept/Oct

Event Three: President Obama
rejects National Security Council
recommendation for the CIA to
arm the rebels. (See Chapter 4)
Director Petraeus presents the
plan to President Obama who
“worried that arming the rebels
was not likely to be enough to
drive Assad from power….
unintended consequences to
consider.” (Clinton, Hard
Choices, 2014, 463) “…the plan
to arm the rebels dead in the
water….” (Clinton, Hard
Choices, 2014, 464)
Panetta’s account of the
meeting: “I supported the idea,
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
as did David Petraeus and
Hillary Clinton. All of us believed
that withholding weapons was
impeding our ability to develop
sway with those groups and
subjecting them to withering fire
from the regime.” (Panetta,
Worthy Fights, 2014, 449-450)
“President Obama was initially
hesitant….Only after Assad
used chemical weapons in mid2013 did Obama reconsider
supplying those arms, a step he
approved in June (2013).”
(Panetta, Worthy Fights, 2014,
450)

October

Syrian-Turkish tensions rise
when Syrian mortar fire on a
Turkish border town kills five
civilians. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

Turkey intercepts a Syrian
plane allegedly carrying arms
from Russia. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

November

National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces formed in Qatar,
excludes Islamist militias. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

Arab League stops short of full
recognition of newly formed
National Coalition. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

President Obama wins reelection over Republican
candidate Mitt Romney.

December

US, Britain, France, Turkey and
Gulf States formally recognize
opposition National Coalition as
"legitimate representative" of
Syrian people. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)
US Treasury designation cites
Lebanese Hizballah (LH), with
support from the IRGQ-QF,
supplying advisors, trainers,
and direct combat fighters
including snipers to Syria.
(Fulton, Iranian Strategy, 2013,
21-22)

2013
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

January

Syria accuses Israeli jets of
attacking a military research
center near Damascus, but
denies reports that lorries
carrying weapons bound for
Lebanon were hit. Unverified
reports say Israel had targeted
an Iranian commander charged
with moving weapons of mass
destruction to Lebanon. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

February

BG Hassan Shateri, Iranian QF
commander in Syria,
assassinated outside of
Damascus. (Fulton, Iranian
Strategy, 2013, 10)
Israeli airstrike destroys SA-17
anti-aircraft missile convoy in
Syria. (Fulton, Iranian Strategy,
2013, 22)
LH escalates its combat role in
Syria, launching a coordinated
ground offensive against rebel
forces near al-Qusayr. (Fulton,
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 23)

263

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

State Department reiterates its
support to the Syrian Opposition
Coalition as the legitimate
representative of the Syrian
people and announces $54
million in non-lethal aid to the
Syrian opposition to build the
capacity of 1500 grassroots
activists from over 100
opposition councils in 10
different regions of Syria. (See
Appendix A, Section 2 for full
text.)

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

March

Syrian warplanes bomb the
northern city of Raqqa after
rebels seize control. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
US and Britain pledge nonmilitary aid to rebels. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)
The administration notifies
Congress of its intent to provide
food rations and medical
supplies to the National Coalition
of Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces and the Turkey-based
Syrian Military Council (SMC).
(Congressional Research
Service, Armed Conflict in Syria:
Overview and US Response,
October 9, 2015, 22.)

April

IRGQ-QF sponsored Iraqi Shia
militia groups Kata’ib Hezbollah
(KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
(AAH) openly acknowledge
their fighters are in Syria.
There has been unconfirmed
media reporting of their
involvement since 2012.
(Fulton, Iranian Strategy, 2013,
23-24)

Secretary Kerry announces the
US will double its non-lethal
assistance to the opposition to
$123 million. (See Appendix A,
Section 2 for full text.)
Event Four: Significant
divergence apparent between
DoD senior leaders and the US
Ambassador in Syria on
assessing the moderate
resistance. (See Chapter 4)
US Ambassador to Syria
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
Robert Ford testifies April
11th to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that
the State Department is
training and equipping
(non-lethal) over 1,500
local leaders and activists
within Syria. (US Policy
Toward Syria. Hearings
Before the Committee on
Foreign Relations United
States Senate. 113th
Congress, April 11, 2013)
However, in contradictory
testimony six days later,
the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General
Dempsey testifies to the
Senate Armed Services
Committee that he could
not identify the moderate
resistance. “If we could
clearly identify the right
people, I would support
it.” (The Situation in Syria,
Hearings Before the
Committee on Armed
Services, United States
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
Senate, 113th Cong, 1st
Session, April 17, 2013.
Accessed on line at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys,
September 23, 2014)

June

July

Government and allied
Lebanese Hezbollah forces
recapture the strategically
important town of Qusair
between Homs and Lebanese
border. Rebel commanders
complain that arms supplies
taper off over international
concerns about Islamists in the
opposition camp. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

Saudi-backed Ahmed Jarba
becomes leader of opposition
National Coalition, defeating
Qatar-backed rival. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

Event Five: Two months after
event four, President Obama
approves plan for CIA to arm the
resistance. (See Chapter 4)
At an NSC meeting – in the
aftermath of the Syrian regime’s
use of chemical weapons
against their own people – the
president approves the CIA plan
to arm the resistance. (Panetta,
Worthy Fights, 450; see also
Plofchan, Timeline: Syrian Civil
War, June 2013 entry)
(Note Saudi and Qatari
references in adjacent entry.)
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The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General
Dempsey, in a letter to the
Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator
Levin, lists five options that the

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
military could (vice should)
provide in Syria, one of which is
titled, “Train, Advise, and Assist
the Opposition.” (Dempsey,
untitled memorandum, July 19,
2013.)

August

August 21st the White House
strongly condemns the use of
chemical weapons in Damascus
on this day. (See Appendix A,
Section 2 for full text.)

Chemical weapons attack kills
300 in the Ghouta area of
Damascus. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

August 30th the White House
attributes the above chemical
attack to the Assad regime.
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for
full text.)
September

UN weapons inspectors
conclude that chemical
weapons were used in an
attack on the Ghouta area of
Damascus, but do not explicitly
allocate responsibility for the
attack. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)
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Secretary of Defense Hagel
reveals in testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the CIA is
providing weapons to some
Syrian rebels under covert
action authorities. (CRS, Train
and Equip Program for Syria,
June 9, 2015, 2)

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

October

President Assad allows
international inspectors to begin
destroying Syria's chemical
weapons on the basis of a USRussian agreement. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

December

US and Britain suspend "nonlethal" support for rebels in
northern Syria after reports
Islamist rebels seize some
bases of Western-backed Free
Syrian Army. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)

2014
January/
February

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

January 31st, in a text of a
London 11 communiqué
released in Geneva, senior
officials from Egypt, France,
Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE,
the UK, and the USA called for
an immediate political transition
from the Assad regime to a
pluralistic government. The
communiqué expressed
“outrage” at the “starve or
surrender” strategy of the
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

Assad regime. (See Appendix
A, Section 2 for full text.)
UN-brokered peace talks in
Geneva fail, largely because
Syrian authorities refuse to
discuss a transitional
government. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)
March

Syrian Army and Hezbollah
forces recapture Yabroud, the
last rebel stronghold near the
Lebanese border. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

May

Hundreds of rebels are
evacuated from their last
stronghold in the central city of
Homs. The withdrawal marks
the end of three years of
resistance in the city. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

Secretary Kerry meets with
Syrian Opposition Coalition
President Jarba to discuss
“empowering the moderate
political and armed opposition”
while stepping up deliveries of
non-lethal assistance to the
leaders of the Free Syrian Army.
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for
full text.)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

June

ISIS seizes Mosul, Iraq.
(theguardian.com)

UN announces removal of
Syria's chemical weapons
material complete. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

Event Six: In the wake of the fall
of Mosul, President Obama
orders the military to train and
equip the moderate resistance in
their fight against ISIS, not the
Assad regime. (See Chapter 4)
The administration requests
funding from Congress to begin
DoD’s Train and Equip program.
(CRS, Train and Equip Program
for Syria, June 9, 2015, 2.)

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
militants declare "caliphate" in
territory from Aleppo to eastern
Iraqi province of Diyala. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter, in testimony to the
House Armed Services
Committee, describes the best
possible outcome as one in
which Assad is removed from
power, but with functioning state
systems remaining in tact,
allowing moderate Syrian forces
to assume power and then take
the fight against ISIS. (CRS,
Armed Conflict in Syria, October
9, 2015, 15-16.)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

August

Tabqa airbase, near the
northern city of Raqqa, falls to
Islamic State militants, who now
control entire Raqqa province.
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline,
2015)

September

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

United States and five Arab
countries launch air strikes
against Islamic State around
Aleppo and Raqqa. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel testifies to the HASC.
-$500 million is necessary to
fund the training, equipping, and
sustainment for the expected
5,000 moderate Syrian
opposition fighters for the first
year
-The initial assistance will
consist of small arms,
communications equipment,
vehicles, and training
-“A rigorous vetting process will
be critical to the success of this
program.” (US Department of
Defense, Secretary of Defense
Testimony, “Statement on Iraq,
Syria, and ISIL Before the
HASC.” Accessed at
www.defense.gov November 14,
2015)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

December

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
Event Seven: Congress
approves the funding for the
DoD train and equip operation.
(See Chapter 4)
President Obama signs into law
the Congressional authorities to
train and equip vetted Syrian
opposition for the purposes of:
—Defending the Syrian people
from attacks by ISIS and
securing territory controlled by
the Syrian opposition
—Protecting the US, its friends
and allies, and the Syrian people
from the threats posed by
terrorists in Syria
—Promoting the conditions for a
negotiated settlement to end the
conflict in Syria (CRS, Train and
Equip Program for Syria, June 9,
2015, 3.)
Absent from this authority is the
ability to take offensive actions
against the Assad regime. (CRS,
Train and Equip Program for
Syria, June 9, 2015, 7.)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
The act also requires the
administration to submit a
comprehensive interagency
strategy with objectives and
timelines. The strategy must
also address oversight and
vetting procedures on the
opposition. (CRS, Armed
Conflict in Syria, October 9,
2015, 21.)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
Congress defines vetting as
“…assessments of possible
recipients for associations with
terrorist groups including ISIL,
Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al
Sham, other al-Qaeda related
groups, Hezbollah, or Shia
militias supporting the
Governments of Syria or Iran;
and for commitment to the rule
of law and a peaceful and
democratic Syria.” (CRS, Train
and Equip Program for Syria,
June 9, 2015, 33.)

2015
January

March

Kurdish forces push Islamic
State out of Kobane on Turkish
border after four months of
fighting. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)
Opposition offensives push back
government forces. New Jaish
al-Fatah Islamist rebel alliance,
backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia
and Qatar, captures provincial
capital of Idlib. (BBC, Syria
Profile Timeline, 2015)

274

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Southern Front alliance of
secular and Islamist groups take
Jordanian border crossing at
Nassib. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)
May

Islamic State fighters seize the
ancient city of Palmyra in central
Syria, raising concerns that they
might destroy the pre-Islamic
World Heritage site. They also
capture last border crossing to
Iraq. Jaish al-Fatah takes
control of Idlib Province, putting
pressure on government's
coastal stronghold of Latakia.
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline,
2015)

June

Islamic State and Kurdish
fighters intensify fighting
between Raqqa and Turkish
border. Kurds take Ain Issa and
border town of Tal Abyad;
Islamic State attacks Kobane
and seizes part of Hassakeh,
the main city in north-eastern
Syria. (BBC, Syria Profile
Timeline, 2015)
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Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

Date

September

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations
Russia carries out first air
strikes in Syria, saying it targets
the Islamic State group. But
Syrian opposition and US say it
overwhelmingly targets antiAssad rebels instead. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)

October

December

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

Administration announces a shift
in focus from training and
equipping Syrian opposition
members in neighboring
countries to equipping select
vetted fighters already in Syria.
(CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria,
October 9, 2015, 23.)
Britain joins US-led bombing
raids against Islamic State in
wake of Paris suicide bombing
attacks. Syrian Army allows
rebels to evacuate remaining
area of Homs, returning Syria's
third-largest city to government
control after four years. (BBC,
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015)
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FY2016 administration’s request
for Congressional funding
includes:
-$600 million to continue the
Train and Equip program
-$65 million for non-lethal
assistance to vetted members of
the Syrian opposition
-$160 million for non-lethal
assistance to other opposition
groups
-$10 million for justice sector
support in opposition-held areas

Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making
(CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria,
October 9, 2015, 17-18.)
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Date

Events by Syrian Actors
(Assad Regime, Resistance
Elements) and ISIS

Actions by other States
(minus US) and International
Organizations
UN Security Council passes
resolution setting timetable for
peace talks and formation of a
unity government. Key
elements:

Actions by the US
Government to include
Internal Decision-Making

Secretary of Defense Carter
confirms US strategy of:
-Developing “capable,
motivated, and local ground
forces as the only force that can
ensure a lasting victory”
—Calls for ceasefire and formal -Setting the conditions for a
talks on a political transition to
political solution to the Syrian
start in early January
civil war
—Groups seen as “terrorist”,
-Seeking to identify and then
including ISIS and al-Nusra
enable capable, motivated local
Front, are excluded
forces on the ground that can
—“Offensive and defensive
expel ISIS.
actions” against such groups to (Department of Defense,
continue
Statement on the Counter-ISIL
—UN Chief Ban Ki-moon to
Campaign before the Senate
report by January 18th on how Armed Services Committee,
to monitor the ceasefire
December 9, 2015, accessed at
—Credible, inclusive, and non- www.defense.gov December 10,
sectarian governance to be
2015)
established within six months
—Free and fair elections under
UN supervision to be held
within 18 months
—Political transition should be
Syrian-led
(BBC, Syrian War Milestone,
2015)
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Appendix A, Section Two
White House and State Department Press Statements
to Accompany the Chart
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
May 19, 2011
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163825.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
We reject the Syrian government’s justification of its tactics as necessary to maintain
“stability.” The Asad regime remains the source of instability as it foments violence by
meeting peaceful protests with deadly force and mass arrests. Despite the Syrian
government’s violent repression and blatant disregard for the human rights of its
citizens, the Syrian people continue to call for their legitimate demands to be met. The
Syrian people have made clear that the status quo is unacceptable and that the Syrian
government must meet their legitimate aspirations and end the killing, torture, and
arbitrary detentions of protestors and activists.
Executive Orders and Sanctions
Syria has been designated a State Sponsor of Terror since December 1979. An
additional layer of sanctions were added in December of 2003 with the passage of the
Syria Accountability Act, implemented by Executive Order 13338 on May 11, 2004.
Additional sanctions have recently been added to target the human rights abuses being
committed by the Syrian Government against peaceful demonstrators and their own
citizens.
• President Obama signed a new Executive Order targeting the Syrian government’s
continuing escalation of violence against the people of Syria on May 18.
President Asad was designated pursuant to this authority, among other Syrian
regime officials.
• President Obama also signed an Executive Order imposing sanctions on individuals
and entities committing human rights violations in Syria on April 29, including
President Asad’s brother and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-QF).
• We have closely coordinated with our allies in the European Union, who imposed an
arms embargo and their own-targeted sanctions on May 9.
• We are actively considering a range of additional bilateral options for increasing
pressure on the Syrian regime as the situation may require.
• The United States will use the Executive Order to designate additional senior regime
officials for targeted sanctions and will be imposing travel bans on all those who
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commit or contribute to human rights violations. We will hold to account those
responsible for human rights abuses; no one is immune.
Actions at the United Nations
• The United States led the call for a Special Session on Syria at the UN Human Rights
Council in Geneva on April 29, which passed a strong resolution condemning the
Syrian government and calling for an investigation by the office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. As of May 18, Syria has not allowed access to
the High Commissioner’s investigative team.
• We actively lobbied at the United Nations to prevent Syria from being elected to the
UN Human Rights Council later this month. Our lobbying efforts against the
wholly inappropriate Syrian candidacy successfully resulted in Syria withdrawing
its candidacy on May 11. Kuwait will stand for the seat instead.
• The U.S. will call for further action in the Human Rights Council condemning the ongoing violence, torture and arrests of prisoners of conscience, calling for
accountability and lifts of the restrictions on the press.
Civil Society
"Civil Society,” as we know it in many countries in the region, is almost non-existent in
Syria. The Syrian government has traditionally viewed intellectuals, political activists,
NGOs and civic groups with suspicion – and through arrests and other forms of
intimidation has deterred much of Syrian society from participating in “Civil Society.”
Those who have chosen to participate in defiance of the security services have often
paid a terrible price.
• We support the universal human rights of citizens across the region, and have noted
quite regularly our concerns when governments, including the Syrian
government, fail to respect those rights. We stand up for the work of human
rights defenders in all countries around the world.
• The President and the Secretary have both emphasized promoting partnerships with
the Muslim World. Providing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) support
directly to the people of the Middle East and North Africa is one way the United
States can help provide tools to citizens who aspire to deliver positive change in
their countries.
• Through MEPI, we support efforts to expand political participation, strengthen civil
society and the rule of law, empower women and youth, create educational
opportunities, and foster economic reform throughout the region.
• At her first strategic dialogue with civil society, Secretary Clinton emphasized that “the
United States supports democratic change,” and that change is more likely to be
peaceful and permanent when it involves both the government and a broad
cross-section of the population. Civil society holds governments accountable,
keeps them honest, and helps them be more effective. But it plays an even more
fundamental role than that as it helps to strengthen the basic bonds of trust that
are essential to democracy.
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Press Statement
Victoria Nuland
Department Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
July 5, 2011
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167577.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
The United States remains deeply concerned by the ongoing attacks against peaceful
protestors at the hands of the Syrian government. The government of Syria claims it is
interested in a dialogue with the opposition. Yet, its actions in cities like Hama and along
the Turkish border directly undermine the credibility of its words and its initiative. Syrian
security forces have once again stepped up their repression and harassment of
peaceful demonstrators and opposition members. There is no justification, no excuse
for the Syrian security forces to begin yet another crackdown, killing protesters and
arresting people suspected of political opposition. We urge the government of Syria to
immediately halt its intimidation and arrest campaign, pull its security forces back from
Hama and other cities, and allow the Syrian people to express their opinions freely so
that a genuine transition to democracy can take place. The international community will
continue to stand with the people of Syria as they seek their universal human rights.
Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
February 24, 2012
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184642.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
1. The first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People (“the Friends’ Group”),
was held in Tunis on 24 February 2012, with the participation of more than 60 countries
and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European
Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the
Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria.
2. The Friends’ Group reaffirmed its firm commitment to the sovereignty, independence,
national unity and territorial integrity of Syria. It expressed strong condemnation of the
Syrian regime’s ongoing, widespread, and systematic human rights violations, including:
the indiscriminate use of force against civilians; the killing and persecution of peaceful
protestors; and sexual violence and ill-treatment of thousands of detainees, including
children. The Syrian regime’s brutal actions over the past eleven months have led to the
death of thousands of innocent civilians, caused widespread destruction, forced tens of
thousands of Syrians to flee their homes, and created widespread suffering among the
Syrian people. Journalists portraying the truth about what is happening in Syria have
paid with their lives. The Group viewed the regime’s use of heavy artillery and tanks to
attack residential areas of cities and towns as particularly reprehensible. The atrocities
committed, as the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry has said, amount in some
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cases to crimes against humanity.
3. The Friends’ Group affirmed its goal of a political solution to this crisis that meets the
aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom, peace, reform, democracy,
prosperity and stability. The Friends’ Group recognized that this solution should address
the concern of all citizens of Syria, regardless of their religion or ethnicity. It expressed
its strongest possible concern about the situation in Syria and called for the following
steps to be taken as a matter of urgency:
Support for the League of Arab States
4. The Friends’ Group commended the League of Arab States for their leadership on
this issue and welcomed the League’s actions and proposals to achieve a peaceful
resolution of the crisis. It underlined the need for an immediate end to all violence and
for the full implementation of the decisions and resolutions of the League of Arab States
on the situation in Syria, notably resolutions 7444 of 22 January 2012 and 7446 of 12
February 2012, that, inter alia, call for the Syrian government to:
• Cease all violence and protect its population;
• Release all persons arbitrarily detained due to the recent incidents;
• Withdraw all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and towns, and return
them to their original home barracks;
• Guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations; and
• Allow full and unhindered access and movement for all relevant League of Arab
States’ institutions and Arab and international media in all parts of Syria to
determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents
taking place.
The Friends’ Group noted the Arab League’s request to the United Nations Security
Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a
cessation of violence by the regime as outlined above and agreed to continue
discussions on the appropriate conditions for the deployment of such a force.
Political Transition
5. The Friends’ Group called for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in
an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism and aimed at
addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria's people. The Friends’
Group noted that the Syrian government's effort to impose unilaterally a set of political
steps labeled as reforms would not resolve the crisis.
6. In this regard, the Friends’ Group set out its full support for the League of Arab
States’ initiative to facilitate a political transition leading to a democratic, plural political
system in which citizens enjoy equal rights regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities,
beliefs or gender, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between
the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition aimed at:
• Formation of a national unity government;
• Delegation by the President of Syria of his full authority to his First Deputy to
cooperate fully with the national unity government in order to empower it to
perform its duties in the transitional period; and
• Transparent and free elections under Arab and international supervision.
7. In this regard, the Friends’ Group welcomed the appointment of Kofi Annan as the
Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States on the Syria Crisis.
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Accountability for Regime Actions
8. The Friends’ Group expressed disappointment that the United Nations Security
Council had thus far been blocked from responding to the League of Arab States’
repeated appeals for support and for its plan to end the violence in Syria. The Friends’
Group calls on the Security Council to work with the League of Arab States and other
interested parties to take effective action against the Syrian regime’ gross human rights
violations, and to bring about an end to the violence against civilians. The Group
underlined the need to end impunity and to hold those responsible for perpetrating
crimes against the Syrian people to account.
9. The Friends’ Group welcomed the adoption by the UN General Assembly on 16
February of resolution 66/253 which strongly condemned the repression in Syria and
demanded that the Syrian regime implement the Plan of Action of the Arab League of 2
November, and its decisions of 22 January and 12 February without delay. In view of
the significant support for this resolution, the Group called for the United Nations
Security Council to fulfill its responsibilities on Syria by returning to this issue as soon as
possible. The Group also welcomed the continued involvement of the Human Rights
Council and called on the Syrian regime to cooperate fully with the independent
Commission of Inquiry. It welcomed the report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic of 22 February 2012.
10. The Friends’ Group set out its determination to continue to take relevant political,
diplomatic and economic measures to press the Syrian regime to stop all acts of
violence and to prevent the regime from generating further instability in the region. In
this regard, participants committed to take steps to apply and enforce restrictions and
sanctions on the regime and its supporters as a clear message to the Syrian regime that
it cannot attack civilians with impunity. These should include:
• Travel bans on members of the regime;
• Freezing their assets;
• Ceasing the purchase of Syrian hydrocarbon products;
• Ceasing infrastructure investment in, and financial services relating to, Syria;
• To reduce diplomatic ties with the Syrian regime; and
• Preventing the shipment of arms and related materials to the Syrian regime; and
studying means of restricting the Syrian regime's access to fuel and other
supplies used for military purposes.
Support for the Opposition
11. The Friends’ Group commended the courage and determination of Syrians on the
ground, who are the vanguard of the Syrian people seeking freedom and dignity. In this
context, it also praised the work of the Syrian National Council (SNC) to form a broad
and inclusive body and encouraged them to continue these efforts.
12. To this end, the Friends’ Group recognized the Syrian National Council as a
legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. The Group
agreed to increase its engagement with and practical support for the Syrian opposition.
The Friends’ Group encouraged the Syrian National Council to pursue its actions in a
spirit of unity and to support the vision of an inclusive, prosperous and free Syria that
protects its citizens and generates stability in the region, and where all citizens enjoy
equal rights.
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13. The Friends’ Group called on the Arab League to convene a meeting around the
Syrian National Council with a range of opposition groups and individuals, including
those inside Syria, committed to a peaceful political transition, in order for them to agree
on:
• A representative coordination mechanism for working together before, during and
after a transition period;
• A clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria, according to
relevant covenants and resolutions of the United Nations regarding human,
social and political rights, as well as a commitment to a civil, representative future
government that safeguards the rights of minorities.
Humanitarian Assistance
14. The Friends’ Group expressed its strong concern about the humanitarian situation in
Syria, including the lack of access to basic food, medicine and fuel, as well as threats
and acts of violence to medical staff, patients and facilities, in some areas. It reiterated
the need urgently to address humanitarian needs, and to facilitate effective delivery of
assistance and to ensure safe access to medical treatment. The Friends’ Group called
on the Syrian government immediately to cease all violence and to allow free and
unimpeded access by the UN and humanitarian agencies to carry out a full assessment
of needs in Homs and other areas. It demanded that the Syrian regime immediately
permit humanitarian agencies to deliver vital relief goods and services to civilians
affected by the violence, especially in Homs, Deraa, Zabadani and other areas under
siege by the Syrian security forces. The Friends’ Group agreed that, if the Syrian regime
stopped its assault on civilian areas and permitted access, it would deliver humanitarian
supplies immediately. The Friends’ Group also noted the serious and growing burden
carried by Syria’s neighbors in hosting refugees from Syria and committed to provide
appropriate support and assistance in this regard.
15. To this end, the Friends’ Group welcomed the United Nations’ efforts to coordinate
the humanitarian response, including funding, under the leadership of the Emergency
Relief Coordinator. The Group welcomed the Emergency Relief Coordinator's intention
to visit Syria to engage with all parties to allow impartial access for humanitarian
assistance. The Group also supported the establishment by international humanitarian
agencies of Humanitarian Operational Hubs in neighboring countries. It welcomed the
creation of the Syria Humanitarian Forum and pledged support to the body in its role as
a working group to coordinate international assistance. It reinforced the importance of
maintaining a clear distinction between the humanitarian response and the ongoing
political negotiations.
16. The Friends’ Group also declared its firm commitment to contribute substantially to
rebuilding Syria in the process of transition and to support the future economic recovery
of the country. To this end, the Group decided to create a working group on economic
recovery and development.
17. The Friends’ Group expressed their thanks and appreciation to Tunisia for hosting
this international conference. The Group agreed to meet again in Turkey in the near
future. The Group also agreed that the following meeting would be hosted by France.
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Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
September 28, 2012
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198448.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
Today in New York, Secretary Clinton announced the United States is providing nearly
$30 million in additional humanitarian assistance to help those affected by the conflict in
Syria. With this new assistance, the United States is providing more than $132 million in
fiscal year 2012 in humanitarian assistance to help more than 975,000 people inside
Syria and the nearly 300,000 who have fled to the safety of neighboring countries.
This newest funding from the United States will help provide critical aid to besieged
communities inside Syria, and includes funding through nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs); the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA); the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
the World Health Organization (WHO); and the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF).
This latest funding will be used to provide additional medical supplies and emergency
medical care, including mental health care for children who are suffering severely in the
midst of this crisis. This assistance will also help provide displaced children with
continued access to education. The United States will also provide clean water,
materials for shelter, blankets, basic household necessities such as hand soap and pots
and pans, improved sanitation, and materials to help protect against the approaching
winter. In some areas where markets are functioning, we will support a program for
families to make housing repairs and purchase household supplies that will also infuse
cash into the local economy. This funding provides assistance to Palestinian refugees
and internally displaced Syrians impacted by the violence.
With this new assistance, the United States is providing more than $132 million in fiscal
year 2012 for humanitarian activities both inside Syria and in neighboring countries:
• $48.5 million through the World Food Program (WFP);
• $30 million through NGOs;
• Almost $30 million through UNHCR;
• $11 million through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA);
• $8 million through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
• Almost $4 million through the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF);
• $1.3 million through the World Health Organization (WHO);
• $1 million through the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC);
• $0.5 million through the International Organization for Migration (IOM);
• $0.5 million through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs; and
• $0.3 million through the UN Department of Safety and Security for support of
humanitarian operations.1
The United States is aggressively pursuing all feasible options to expand humanitarian
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aid in Syria, utilizing both traditional and non-traditional humanitarian networks. The
United States continues to pursue every available avenue to secure full, safe, and
unfettered access for humanitarian organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
the innocent children, women, and men caught in the middle of the ongoing Syrian
conflict.
We recognize the generosity of the Governments of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq
for receiving those fleeing the violence in Syria and for hosting and providing assistance
to those in need. We commend the efforts of the United Nations and other international
organizations and nongovernmental organizations to ease the trauma that the conflict in
Syria has inflicted on those fleeing the violence.
Patrick Ventrell
Acting Deputy Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
December 24, 2012
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202380.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
The United States condemns in the strongest terms the latest vicious attacks by the
Syrian regime against civilians, most notably the attack on people waiting to buy bread
at a bakery in the town of Helfeya. Brutal attacks such as these show that this regime
has no future in Syria. Those that commit atrocities will be held accountable. The United
States calls on all parties that continue to assist the regime in executing its war against
the Syrian people to end their support.
The visit of Joint Special Representative Brahimi to Damascus and his work offers an
opportunity to move a political transition forward and the United States continues to
support his efforts. We urge the regime to capitalize on the Joint Special
Representative's efforts in order to transition to a new government and end the brutal
repression of the Syrian people.
Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
February 22, 2013
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205092.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
The United States supports the Syrian people’s aspirations for a Syrian-led transition to
a democratic, inclusive, and peaceful Syria. The United Nations estimates that more
than 70,000 Syrians have been killed in the nearly two years since unrest and violence
began. In the last month alone, the number of Syrians seeking refuge in neighboring
countries has risen sharply. More than 870,000 Syrians have registered as refugees
since the crisis began, or are awaiting registration in neighboring countries while, inside
Syria, an additional 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 4 million people
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are in need of assistance. The Syrian regime has sacrificed all legitimacy in a vicious
effort to cling to power. U.S. assistance includes vigorous diplomatic support of the
Syrian Opposition Coalition, nearly $385 million in humanitarian assistance to help
those affected by the conflict, and over $50 million in non-lethal support for local
opposition councils and civil society inside Syria.
Diplomatic Support
The United States continues to support the Syrian people as the Syrian Opposition
Coalition sets a course toward the peaceful, democratic, inclusive future that the people
of Syria deserve. We are working with other nations to further isolate the regime and
support the Syrian people’s calls for President Assad to step down. We and our
international partners actively supported the efforts of the Syrian people to launch the
Syrian Opposition Coalition in Doha in November 2012 and, on December 11, 2012,
President Obama recognized the Coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian
people. The Coalition – which includes opponents of the Assad regime from across the
political and ethno-sectarian spectrum – has made real progress since its founding, and
is stepping up its outreach to women, minorities, religious leaders and civil society. The
Coalition has also begun to develop formal structures and plans for a democratic
political transition that protects the rights, the dignity, and the aspirations of all Syrians.
In Paris on January 28, more than 50 countries supporting the Syrian opposition
gathered to reaffirm their commitment to provide support to the Syrian Opposition
Coalition and agreed on the urgent need to increase and improve the delivery of
humanitarian assistance, including for areas outside of regime control. On February 2,
Vice President Biden met with Syrian Opposition Coalition President al-Khatib in
Munich. The Vice President praised al-Khatib’s personal courage and leadership of the
Coalition and urged al-Khatib to continue his efforts to maintain unity among the SOC
leadership, to isolate extremist elements within the broader opposition, and to reach out
to – and be inclusive of – a broad range of communities inside Syria.
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States, along with the international community, is tirelessly working to
provide humanitarian aid to the innocent civilians affected by the brutal conflict in Syria.
At the Syria Humanitarian Forum in Geneva February 19, the U.S. announced an
additional $19 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria. These new funds augment
the contribution of an additional $155 million announced by President Obama on
January 29.
With this new assistance, U.S. humanitarian assistance totals nearly $385 million to
help millions of people inside Syria and over 870,000 people who have fled to the safety
of neighboring countries. Over $215 million of this total goes to address critical needs
inside Syria. Our assistance is providing emergency medical care and medical supplies,
food aid, and winterization supplies like blankets and heaters for those affected by the
crisis, both inside Syria and those seeking refuge in the region and elsewhere. It also
supports the psycho-social rehabilitation of Syrian refugees who are victims of torture
and war.
U.S. humanitarian aid is being provided throughout all 14 governorates of Syria on the
basis of need. It is not branded in order to ensure the safety of aid recipients and
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humanitarian aid providers as well as to ensure that aid distribution is not thwarted en
route. The United States is committed to using all channels to reach affected Syrians
throughout the country and is working through UN, NGO, and community-based
partners, as well as with the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit.
The United States is also working closely with host governments in the region who have
generously opened their borders. For more details on the United States humanitarian
response to the Syria crisis and what U.S. humanitarian assistance has provided,
please visit www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria.
Transition Support to the Unarmed Opposition
The United States is also providing just over $54 million in non-lethal support to the
unarmed Syrian opposition, including emergent local and national democratic
institutions, and nonsectarian civic groups. This assistance includes training and
equipment to build the capacity of a nation-wide network of ethnically and religiously
diverse civilian activists to link Syrian citizens with nascent governance structures. This
support enhances the information security of Syrian activists, human rights
organizations, and media outlets and empowers women leaders to play a more active
role in transition planning and peace negotiations. Activities sponsored by these funds
enable local councils and grassroots organizations to respond to the needs of their
communities and promotes constructive participation in the country’s political transition.
Over 4,000 major pieces of equipment have been provided, mostly to Damascus,
Aleppo, and other areas with significant opposition presence, including communications
and computer equipment, as well as generators and medical supplies, to support
unarmed Syrian opposition groups strengthen civil society, media, and democratic
transition planning.
Support to civil society groups and local councils includes efforts to train, equip, and
build the capacity of nearly 1,500 grassroots activists, including women and youth, from
over 100 opposition councils and organizations in 10 different regions of Syria; develop
groups’ abilities to mobilize citizens, share information, provide community services, and
undertake civic functions; support interreligious and communal dialogues and
encourage citizen participation in shaping the Syrian transition; and support human
rights documentation and transitional justice workshops while laying the foundation for
future accountability efforts.
Support to independent media projects includes assistance to community radio stations
providing information for refugees about available services; training for networks of
citizen journalists, bloggers, and cyber-activists to support their documentation,
packaging, and dissemination of information on developments in Syria; and technical
assistance and equipment to enhance the information and communications security of
Syrian activists within Syria.
Assistance in support of democratic transition planning includes efforts to link unarmed
opposition elements inside Syria with global supporters; support for the independent
Syria Justice and Accountability Center to document human rights abuses and
coordinate transitional justice and accountability efforts; technical assistance to
emerging political parties; and facilitating non-sectarian Syrian activists’ participation in
political and economic transition planning to promote the business community’s
engagement in transition processes.
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Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
April 20, 2013
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207810.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
Following his meetings with Syrian Coalition President al-Khatib, members of the
Coalition’s leadership, and international partners supporting the Syrian opposition,
Secretary of State John Kerry announced the United States’ intention to double nonlethal assistance to the Syrian opposition, as well as provide additional humanitarian aid
to Syrians in need.
The new non-lethal assistance underscores the United States’ firm support for a political
solution to the crisis in Syria and for the opposition’s advancement of an inclusive,
tolerant vision for a post-Assad Syria. The United States will work with the Syrian
Coalition and other opposition representatives to determine how the new $123 million in
non-lethal assistance can best support their efforts to meet the needs of the Syrian
people and lead the way to a political transition that will bring an end to this conflict, and
build the inclusive, democratic Syria that its people deserve. This new pledge brings our
total non-lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition and civil society groups to $250
million.
The United States will also use a portion of this non-lethal assistance to implement
President Obama’s directive to provide an expanded range of support to the Supreme
Military Council (SMC). We intend to expand this new support beyond military food
rations and medical kits to include other types of non-lethal supplies, which would be
determined in collaboration with SMC leadership.
Secretary Kerry urged international partners gathered in Istanbul, as well as all Friends
of the Syrian People, to make similar pledges of assistance to the Coalition and the
Supreme Military Council with the goal of reaching $1 billion in total international
support for the opposition.
In recognition of the devastating humanitarian situation as a result of the crisis in Syria,
Secretary Kerry also announced nearly $25 million in additional food assistance for the
Syrian people. This aid will provide 25,500 metric tons of wheat – providing four months’
supply of flour to over one million people – as well as food rations for those inside Syria
and refugees in Jordan affected by the violence. The United Nations World Food
Program will begin distributing the wheat to those in need in all 14 Syrian governorates
as quickly as possible. The United States is the largest donor of food assistance both
within Syria and for refugees in the affected neighboring countries and is providing a
total of over $409 million in humanitarian assistance for the Syrian crisis.
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Press Statement
Jen Psaki
Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
July 6, 2013
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211569.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
The United States welcomes the July 6 election of Syrian Coalition President Ahmed
Assi al-Jarba, and looks forward to working with him and with his team. We hope to
make progress together with President Jarba to prevent the total collapse of Syria into
chaos and rebuild its social fabric.
We look to President Jarba and the new leaders to reach out to all Syrian communities
and bring greater unity of purpose and further organization to the Syrian Coalition as the
legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.
A united opposition is essential to achieve a negotiated political solution in which
Bashar al-Assad steps down, and a new transition government leads all Syrians to
dignity, freedom and hope for the future.
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
August 21, 2013
Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest on Allegations of
Chemical Weapons Use in Syria
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/21/statement-principaldeputy-press-secretary-josh-earnest-allegations-chem
accessed March 3, 2017
The United States is deeply concerned by reports that hundreds of Syrian civilians have
been killed in an attack by Syrian government forces, including by the use of chemical
weapons, near Damascus earlier today. We are working urgently to gather additional
information.
The United States strongly condemns any and all use of chemical weapons. Those
responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. Today, we are
formally requesting that the United Nations urgently investigate this new allegation. The
UN investigative team, which is currently in Syria, is prepared to do so, and that is
consistent with its purpose and mandate. For the UN’s efforts to be credible, they must
have immediate access to witnesses and affected individuals, and have the ability to
examine and collect physical evidence without any interference or manipulation from the
Syrian government. If the Syrian government has nothing to hide and is truly committed
to an impartial and credible investigation of chemical weapons use in Syria, it will
facilitate the UN team’s immediate and unfettered access to this site. We have also
called for urgent consultations in the UN Security Council to discuss these allegations
and to call for the Syrian government to provide immediate access to the UN
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investigative team. The United States urges all Syrian parties including the government
and opposition, to provide immediate access to any and all sites of importance to the
investigation and to ensure security for the UN investigative team.
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
August 30, 2013
Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons
on August 21, 2013
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/governmentassessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21
accessed March 3, 2017
The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian
government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August
21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack. These allsource assessments are based on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well
as a significant body of open source reporting. Our classified assessments have been
shared with the U.S. Congress and key international partners. To protect sources and
methods, we cannot publicly release all available intelligence – but what follows is an
unclassified summary of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s analysis of what took place.
Syrian Government Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21
A large body of independent sources indicates that a chemical weapons attack took
place in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. In addition to U.S. intelligence
information, there are accounts from international and Syrian medical personnel; videos;
witness accounts; thousands of social media reports from at least 12 different locations
in the Damascus area; journalist accounts; and reports from highly credible
nongovernmental organizations.
A preliminary U.S. government assessment determined that 1,429 people were killed in
the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426 children, though this assessment
will certainly evolve as we obtain more information.
We assess with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out the chemical
weapons attack against opposition elements in the Damascus suburbs on August 21.
We assess that the scenario in which the opposition executed the attack on August 21
is highly unlikely. The body of information used to make this assessment includes
intelligence pertaining to the regime’s preparations for this attack and its means of
delivery, multiple streams of intelligence about the attack itself and its effect, our postattack observations, and the differences between the capabilities of the regime and the
opposition. Our high confidence assessment is the strongest position that the U.S.
Intelligence Community can take short of confirmation. We will continue to seek
additional information to close gaps in our understanding of what took place.
Background:
The Syrian regime maintains a stockpile of numerous chemical agents, including
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mustard, sarin, and VX and has thousands of munitions that can be used to deliver
chemical warfare agents.
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is the ultimate decision maker for the chemical
weapons program and members of the program are carefully vetted to ensure security
and loyalty. The Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) – which is
subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense – manages Syria’s chemical weapons
program.
We assess with high confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on
a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year, including in the
Damascus suburbs. This assessment is based on multiple streams of information
including reporting of Syrian officials planning and executing chemical weapons attacks
and laboratory analysis of physiological samples obtained from a number of individuals,
which revealed exposure to sarin. We assess that the opposition has not used chemical
weapons.
The Syrian regime has the types of munitions that we assess were used to carry out the
attack on August 21, and has the ability to strike simultaneously in multiple locations.
We have seen no indication that the opposition has carried out a large-scale,
coordinated rocket and artillery attack like the one that occurred on August 21.
We assess that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons over the last year
primarily to gain the upper hand or break a stalemate in areas where it has struggled to
seize and hold strategically valuable territory. In this regard, we continue to judge that
the Syrian regime views chemical weapons as one of many tools in its arsenal,
including air power and ballistic missiles, which they indiscriminately use against the
opposition.
The Syrian regime has initiated an effort to rid the Damascus suburbs of opposition
forces using the area as a base to stage attacks against regime targets in the capital.
The regime has failed to clear dozens of Damascus neighborhoods of opposition
elements, including neighborhoods targeted on August 21, despite employing nearly all
of its conventional weapons systems. We assess that the regime’s frustration with its
inability to secure large portions of Damascus may have contributed to its decision to
use chemical weapons on August 21.
Preparation:
We have intelligence that leads us to assess that Syrian chemical weapons personnel –
including personnel assessed to be associated with the SSRC – were preparing
chemical munitions prior to the attack. In the three days prior to the attack, we collected
streams of human, signals and geospatial intelligence that reveal regime activities that
we assess were associated with preparations for a chemical weapons attack.
Syrian chemical weapons personnel were operating in the Damascus suburb of ‘Adra
from Sunday, August 18 until early in the morning on Wednesday, August 21 near an
area that the regime uses to mix chemical weapons, including sarin. On August 21, a
Syrian regime element prepared for a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus area,
including through the utilization of gas masks. Our intelligence sources in the Damascus
area did not detect any indications in the days prior to the attack that opposition
affiliates were planning to use chemical weapons.
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The Attack:
Multiple streams of intelligence indicate that the regime executed a rocket and artillery
attack against the Damascus suburbs in the early hours of August 21. Satellite
detections corroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck neighborhoods
where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred – including Kafr Batna, Jawbar, ‘Ayn
Tarma, Darayya, and Mu’addamiyah. This includes the detection of rocket launches
from regime controlled territory early in the morning, approximately 90 minutes before
the first report of a chemical attack appeared in social media. The lack of flight activity
or missile launches also leads us to conclude that the regime used rockets in the attack.
Local social media reports of a chemical attack in the Damascus suburbs began at 2:30
a.m. local time on August 21. Within the next four hours there were thousands of social
media reports on this attack from at least 12 different locations in the Damascus area.
Multiple accounts described chemical-filled rockets impacting opposition-controlled
areas.
Three hospitals in the Damascus area received approximately 3,600 patients displaying
symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure in less than three hours on the morning
of August 21, according to a highly credible international humanitarian organization. The
reported symptoms, and the epidemiological pattern of events – characterized by the
massive influx of patients in a short period of time, the origin of the patients, and the
contamination of medical and first aid workers – were consistent with mass exposure to
a nerve agent. We also received reports from international and Syrian medical
personnel on the ground.
We have identified one hundred videos attributed to the attack, many of which show
large numbers of bodies exhibiting physical signs consistent with, but not unique to,
nerve agent exposure. The reported symptoms of victims included unconsciousness,
foaming from the nose and mouth, constricted pupils, rapid heartbeat, and difficulty
breathing. Several of the videos show what appear to be numerous fatalities with no
visible injuries, which is consistent with death from chemical weapons, and inconsistent
with death from small-arms, high-explosive munitions or blister agents. At least 12
locations are portrayed in the publicly available videos, and a sampling of those videos
confirmed that some were shot at the general times and locations described in the
footage.
We assess the Syrian opposition does not have the capability to fabricate all of the
videos, physical symptoms verified by medical personnel and NGOs, and other
information associated with this chemical attack.
We have a body of information, including past Syrian practice, that leads us to conclude
that regime officials were witting of and directed the attack on August 21. We
intercepted communications involving a senior official intimately familiar with the
offensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used by the regime on August 21
and was concerned with the U.N. inspectors obtaining evidence. On the afternoon of
August 21, we have intelligence that Syrian chemical weapons personnel were directed
to cease operations. At the same time, the regime intensified the artillery barrage
targeting many of the neighborhoods where chemical attacks occurred. In the 24 hour
period after the attack, we detected indications of artillery and rocket fire at a rate
approximately four times higher than the ten preceding days. We continued to see
indications of sustained shelling in the neighborhoods up until the morning of August 26.
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To conclude, there is a substantial body of information that implicates the Syrian
government’s responsibility in the chemical weapons attack that took place on August
21. As indicated, there is additional intelligence that remains classified because of
sources and methods concerns that is being provided to Congress and international
partners.
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
September 07, 2013
Weekly Address: Calling for Limited Military Action in Syria
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/07/weekly-addresscalling-limited-military-action-syria
accessed March 3, 2017
In his weekly address, President Obama makes the case for limited and targeted
military action to hold the Assad regime accountable for its violation of international
norms prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The President realizes the American
people are weary after a decade of war, which is why U.S. action would not include U.S.
boots on the ground. Instead, the President has put forward a proposed authorization
that is focused on his clearly stated objectives – preventing and deterring the use and
proliferation of chemical weapons (CW) within, to, or from Syria, degrading
the Assad regime’s capacity to carry out future CW attacks, and deterring this behavior
in others who would otherwise feel emboldened to use such weapons. The President
acknowledged it is not a decision he made lightly, but failing to respond to such actions
poses a serious threat to our national security.
Remarks of President Barack Obama Weekly Address The White
House September 7, 2013
Almost three weeks ago in Syria, more than 1,000 innocent people – including hundreds
of children – were murdered in the worst chemical weapons attack of the 21st
century. And the United States has presented a powerful case to the world that the
Syrian government was responsible for this horrific attack on its own people.
This was not only a direct attack on human dignity; it is a serious threat to our national
security. There’s a reason governments representing 98 percent of the world’s people
have agreed to ban the use of chemical weapons. Not only because they cause death
and destruction in the most indiscriminate and inhumane way possible – but because
they can also fall into the hands of terrorist groups who wish to do us harm.
That’s why, last weekend, I announced that, as Commander in Chief, I decided that the
United States should take military action against the Syrian regime. This is not a
decision I made lightly. Deciding to use military force is the most solemn decision we
can make as a nation.
As the leader of the world’s oldest Constitutional democracy, I also know that our
country will be stronger if we act together, and our actions will be more effective. That’s
why I asked Members of Congress to debate this issue and vote on authorizing the use
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of force.
What we’re talking about is not an open-ended intervention. This would not be another
Iraq or Afghanistan. There would be no American boots on the ground. Any action we
take would be limited, both in time and scope – designed to deter the Syrian
government from gassing its own people again and degrade its ability to do so.
I know that the American people are weary after a decade of war, even as the war in
Iraq has ended, and the war in Afghanistan is winding down. That’s why we’re not
putting our troops in the middle of somebody else’s war.
But we are the United States of America. We cannot turn a blind eye to images like the
ones we’ve seen out of Syria. Failing to respond to this outrageous attack would
increase the risk that chemical weapons could be used again; that they would fall into
the hands of terrorists who might use them against us, and it would send a horrible
signal to other nations that there would be no consequences for their use of these
weapons. All of which would pose a serious threat to our national security.
That’s why we can’t ignore chemical weapons attacks like this one – even if they
happen halfway around the world. And that’s why I call on Members of Congress, from
both parties, to come together and stand up for the kind of world we want to live in; the
kind of world we want to leave our children and future generations.
Thank you.
Taken Question
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
Taken Question at the December 11, 2013 Daily Press Briefing
December 12, 2013
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218654.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
Question: How much nonlethal assistance has the United States given to the Syrian
opposition?
Answer: The Department of State is providing nearly $260 million in nonlethal support
to the Syrian opposition and the Supreme Military Council (SMC).
Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
January 17, 2014
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/220029.htm
There is an updated version of this fact sheet located here //20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/223955.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
The United States supports the Syrian people’s aspirations for a democratic, inclusive,
and unified Syria. President Bashar al-Asad has proven through his brutal and
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repressive tactics that he cannot lead Syria’s transition. His continued tenure only
inflames tensions throughout the region and fuels extremism on both sides of the
conflict.
The United Nations estimates that more than 130,000 people have been killed since the
unrest and violence began over two years ago. The number of civilians fleeing Syria
and seeking refuge in neighboring countries has increased sharply as violence has
escalated. More than 2.2 million people affected by the conflict are now refugees in
neighboring countries while, inside Syria, an additional 6.5 million people are displaced
and 9.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN Security Council
has condemned the Asad regime’s denial of humanitarian relief access to these civilians
in need and urged immediate steps to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief
operations throughout the country.
At the Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria in Kuwait January 15, U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United States would contribute an
additional $380 million to Syrian humanitarian relief efforts – bringing the total U.S.
humanitarian commitment to more than $1.7 billion, the largest of any nation. These
resources support international and non-governmental organizations assisting those
affected by the conflict both inside Syria and across the region.
The United States is also providing nearly $260 million in direct non-lethal support to the
moderate Syrian opposition. This assistance is helping the Syrian Opposition Coalition,
local opposition councils and civil society groups provide essential services to their
communities, extend the rule of law, and enhance stability inside liberated areas of
Syria. These funds are also being used to provide non-lethal assistance to moderate
factions of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of the Free Syrian Army, which is
contesting extremist groups for leadership of the struggle against the Asad regime.
Diplomatic Support to End the Conflict
Efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Syria crisis are based on the Final
Communiqué of the 30 June 2012 Action Group meeting in Geneva. The process set
forth by the Communiqué is supported by the United States and the broad partnership
of nations known as the “London 11” that are pressing for a negotiated political solution
to the Syria conflict. The U.S. has been working vigorously to advance Syria’s transition
through the “Geneva II” international conference based on the Communique: the
establishment of a transitional governing body formed by mutual consent, exercising full
executive powers over all government institutions. The transitional governing body will
also be charged with establishing a national dialogue, reviewing the constitutional order
and legal system, and preparing for and conducting free and fair elections.
Simultaneous U.S. diplomatic efforts are helping coordinate the provision of assistance
with other partners and allies in support of the Syrian opposition. Diplomatic efforts also
seek to further isolate the regime, both politically and through comprehensive sanctions;
to support the Syrian people’s calls for an end of Asad’s rule; and to reinforce the Syrian
opposition’s vision of a democratic post-Asad Syria.
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States and the international community are working tirelessly to provide
humanitarian assistance to those affected by the brutal conflict in Syria. At the
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Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria in Kuwait on January 15, U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry announced that the United States would continue to increase its
humanitarian contributions for those affected by the ongoing conflict in Syria. About half
of the more than $1.7 billion in U.S. humanitarian assistance is being distributed to
organizations working inside Syria, with the balance going to assist those affected by
the conflict who have fled to other countries, and to the communities that host them.
The United States is providing emergency medical care and supplies, shelter, food,
clean water, relief supplies, access to education and protection – including activities to
prevent and respond to gender-based violence – to those affected by the crisis inside
Syria and in neighboring countries. U.S. assistance supports the activities of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP),
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other international and
nongovernmental organizations, both within Syria and within the regional refugee
response in Lebanon (more than $76 million), Jordan (more than $61 million), Iraq
(nearly $20 million), Turkey (nearly $31 million) and Egypt (more than $12 million).
In response to growing incidents of gender-based violence during the conflict, the U.S.
is also providing psychosocial support for women and children from Syria through
women’s health centers, mobile clinics and outreach workers. In September 2013,
Secretary Kerry launched an initiative to help humanitarian agencies hire staff and
develop programs to protect women and girls in global emergencies, including Syria.
The U.S. is also building awareness and support for survivors of gender based violence
into its broader assistance programming for those affected by the conflict.
Within Syria, U.S. humanitarian assistance is reaching more than 4.2 million people
across all 14 of the country’s governorates through the United Nations, international and
non-governmental organizations, and local Syrian organizations, as well as in
coordination with the Syrian Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU). To ensure
the safety of recipients and humanitarian workers and to guard against assistance being
blocked while en route to beneficiaries, U.S. humanitarian assistance is often not
branded or marked. The U.S. supports approximately 260 field hospitals and makeshift
clinics across Syria. These facilities have treated nearly one million patients and
performed more than 190,000 surgeries. To meet the need for more medical staff
capable of saving lives, the U.S. trained more than 1,500 volunteers inside Syria to
provide emergency first aid care.
The United States continues to work closely with governments in the region hosting
refugees fleeing Syria. For more details on the U.S. humanitarian response to the Syria
crisis and what U.S. humanitarian assistance is being provided, visit
www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria.
Non-lethal Transition Assistance to the Syrian Opposition
The United States is working in partnership with the international community to assist
the Syrian opposition to meet daily needs, provide essential services, and support a
transition and is providing nearly $260 million in non-lethal transition assistance to the
moderate opposition. These funds include a $15 million contribution to the multi-donor
Syria Recovery Trust Fund. The purpose of this fund is unite and coordinate
international donors to help with Syria’s current reconstruction and economic needs in
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liberated areas and after the formation of a Transitional Governing Body.
Assistance is being provided to a range of civilian opposition activists, including local
councils, civil society organizations and the Syrian Coalition (SOC) to bolster their
institutional capacity, create linkages to among opposition groups inside and outside
Syria, and help counter extremism. These efforts enable the Coalition to deliver basic
goods and essential services to liberated communities. For example, in close
collaboration with the Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), U.S. assistance is
being used to procure equipment and critical supplies for prompt disbursement to
communities inside Syria. This equipment includes generators to power water pumps
and bakeries; ambulances to reinstate emergency medical services; crane, dump, and
fire trucks for urban sanitation and civil defense; and water storage units to provide
access to potable water. Other critical supplies provided through this assistance include
educational kits for teachers, students and school administrators, winterization materials
including blankets and heaters and commodity baskets for needy families. These efforts
help the national-level opposition groups provide for the needs of local communities.
Through a series of small cash and in-kind grants, the U.S. is helping to strengthen
grassroots organizations and local administrative bodies– a foundation of democratic
governance – as they step in to fill the void left by the regime and provide basic
services, including emergency power, sanitation, water, and educational services to
their communities. Some of this assistance is being directed to maintain public safety,
extend the rule of law, and enhance the provision of justice to improve local stability and
prevent sectarian violence.
U.S. non-lethal assistance includes training and equipment to build the capacity of a
network of over 2,000 grassroots activists, including women and youth, from more than
100 opposition councils and organizations from around the country to link Syrian
citizens with the Syrian opposition and local councils. This support enhances the
linkages between Syrian activists, human rights organizations, and independent media
outlets and empowers women leaders to play a more active role in transition planning.
Support to independent media includes assistance to community radio stations
providing news, including information for refugees about available services; training for
networks of citizen journalists, bloggers, and cyber-activists to support their
documentation and dissemination of information on developments in Syria; and
technical assistance and equipment to enhance the information and communications
security of Syrian activists within Syria. U.S. technical and financial assistance to the
ACU’s Media Unit is supporting the Coalition’s outreach to Syrians through the internet;
local, independent radio stations; and satellite television.
The United States continues to assist in laying the groundwork for accountability by
supporting the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center’s efforts to document violations
and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international
humanitarian law committed by all sides of the conflict, and by bolstering the capacity of
civil society organizations to build the foundations for lasting peace. The United States
also works at the grassroots levels with groups and individuals across a broad spectrum
of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic communities to empower women, religious
leaders, youth, and civil society to advocate for their communities, build trust, tolerance,
and mitigate conflict.
In addition to this transition assistance, the U.S. has been increasing direct non-lethal
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assistance to the SMC since the spring of 2013 along supply lines periodically
contested by the regime or extremist fighters. To date, this includes over 408,000 halal
food rations, vehicles and over three tons of medical supplies as well as planned
deliveries of satellite access equipment, laptops, radio communication equipment, and
medical kits to moderate SMC elements.
Assistance to the International Effort to Eliminate Syria’s Chemical Weapons
The United States remains firmly committed to the elimination of Syria’s chemical
weapons arsenal, as outlined in the U.S.-Russia Framework and United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2118. The process of removing chemical weapons from
Syria for destruction as begun. To this end, the United States has contributed tens of
millions of dollars in assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW)–UN Joint Mission to safely package and remove chemical weapons
materials from Syria for elimination by the international community. U.S. assistance
includes outfitting a U.S. ship with proven hydrolysis technology to neutralize safely at
sea the most dangerous of Syria’s chemical agents and precursors. For more
information please click here: //2009-2017.state.gov/t/217199.htm
Additional Support for the Syrian People
To help Syrians begin to rebuild, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Statement of Licensing Policy inviting U.S. persons to
apply for specific licenses to participate in certain economic activities in Syria. The
OFAC Statement focused on applications to engage in oil-related transactions that
benefit the Syrian Coalition, or its supporters, and transactions involving Syria’s
agricultural and telecommunications sectors. OFAC also amended Syria General
License 11 to authorize the exportation of services and funds transfers in support of notfor-profit activities to preserve and protect cultural heritage sites in Syria.
A new limited waiver of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration
Act of 2003 authorizes the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and
Security to process license applications for the export and re-export of certain
commodities, software, and technology for the benefit of the Syrian people, including
but not limited to: water supply and sanitation; agricultural production and food
processing; power generation; oil and gas production; construction and engineering;
transportation; and educational infrastructure.
The United States continues to engage Syrians directly, offering academic advising to
young people hoping to study in the United States and opportunities to participate in
State Department exchanges and other outreach programs. The State Department is
also working with a range of Syrian, American, and international partners to protect
Syria’s rich cultural heritage – including archaeological sites, historic buildings,
monuments, and collections of objects – and to halt the trade of looted Syrian cultural
property in international antiquities markets. See http://icom.museum/resources/redlists-database/red-list/syria/ for more information. The State Department maintains an
active dialogue to coordinate policy and assistance for Syria with a broad cross-section
of Syrian opposition groups, including with the Syrian Coalition offices in Turkey and the
United States. The American people, including Syrian-Americans, have contributed
generously and have organized to provide assistance to Syrians in need.
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Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
January 31, 2014
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/221088.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
Below is the text of a London 11 communique, released today in Geneva, Switzerland.
BEGIN TEXT:
On January 31, Senior Officials from Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United
States, after having met in Geneva with the Syrian opposition delegation led by the
Syrian National Coalition, the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, adopted
the following Core Group communiqué:
1. We appreciate the efforts of the Joint Special Representative Brahimi and his team to
lay the foundations of negotiations between the Syrian regime and the Syrian opposition
delegations. The UNSG has convened the parties to the Geneva II Conference with the
aim of achieving a political transition on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué which will
preserve the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. As
reiterated by the UNSG at the Montreux Conference, the transition should begin with
the formation, by mutual consent, of a transitional governing body with full executive
powers, including control over security, intelligence and military apparatuses. The
negotiations are to form without delay a transitional governing body with full executive
powers in full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué.
2. We welcome the courageous decision taken by the Syrian National Coalition to come
to Geneva, and the constructive approach the opposition delegation has adopted
throughout the first round of negotiations. We encourage the Coalition to pursue its
efforts in this direction and to keep broadening the basis of the opposition delegation as
well as to continue actively reaching out to all Syrians. We are fully committed to
support this process.
3. The regime must adopt a clear position by endorsing the Geneva Communiqué and
commit to the objective of the Conference as stated in the invitation letter of the UN
Secretary General and as requested by the countries present in Montreux. The regime
is responsible for the lack of real progress in the first round of negotiations. It must not
further obstruct substantial negotiations and it must engage constructively in the second
round of negotiations. We ask all those who have influence on it to engage to create the
conditions for the process to succeed.
4. We express outrage at the maintaining, by the regime, of its “starve or surrender”
strategy which in particular deprives hundreds of thousands of people in the suburbs of
Damascus, in the old city of Homs and elsewhere, from receiving food and medicine,
and at the arbitrary detention of tens of thousands of civilians. It is all the more
important that the Geneva II process lead to tangible and immediate benefits to the
Syrian people. We call on the international community to use all its influence to secure
full humanitarian access throughout Syria without delay. The regime must let UN
convoys have access to the old city of Homs, as proposed by the UN and accepted by
the opposition.
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5. We condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of “barrel bombs”, ballistic
missiles and heavy artillery by the regime against the Syrian people, in full contradiction
with the Geneva process as well as basic human rights principles.
6. We reiterate the right of the Syrian people to defend itself. In this vein, we commit to
support the opposition groups respecting democratic and pluralistic values, as stated in
the national covenant adopted by the opposition in July 2012, recognizing the political
authority of the Syrian National Coalition and accepting the prospect of a democratic
transition. We fully back the opposition groups in their action against Al-Qaeda affiliated
groups. We condemn the presence of foreign fighters in Syria, both those fighting with
the regime such as Hezbollah and other Iranian backed forces, and those fighting within
other extremist groups. We call on the international community to do their part to ensure
that the extremists don’t deny the Syrian people the opportunity to realize their
democratic aspirations.
7. The Geneva II Conference aims to allow the Syrian people to control its future
through a genuine political transition. It is of utmost importance that these goals should
be reached.

Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
May 8, 2014
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225807.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
Secretary Kerry met today with Syrian Opposition Coalition President Jarba at the
Department of State. He and President Jarba had a productive discussion on the full
range of our shared concerns in Syria, including empowering the moderate political and
armed opposition, curbing the rise of extremism, completing the work of removing
chemical weapons, and easing humanitarian suffering.
As part of our continued efforts to bolster the moderate Syrian opposition and help the
Coalition serve the interests of all Syrians, the Secretary also discussed with President
Jarba some additional measures we are taking to support the Coalition, local
communities inside Syria, and members of the moderate, armed opposition. These
steps include our announcement that the Coalition’s representative offices in the United
States are now foreign missions; working with Congress to provide more than $27
million in new non-lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition; stepping up deliveries of
non-lethal assistance to commanders in the Free Syrian Army to enhance their logistical
capabilities; and, as announced earlier today by the Department of the Treasury,
imposing new sanctions and restrictions against members of the regime and its
supporters who have suppressed the Syrian people.
Additionally, the Secretary reaffirmed to President Jarba that the United States remains
committed to working towards a negotiated political solution that puts an end to the
violence and ultimately leads to a representative government that is responsive to the
needs of the Syrian people. The United States has led the international community’s
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efforts to advance a political transition, and the Secretary commended the Coalition’s
commitment to that goal.
Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
May 15, 2014
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226110.htm
accessed March 3, 2017
Following is the text of the communique agreed upon by the Ministers of the London 11
countries at a meeting held in London on May 15, 2014.
Begin text:
We the countries of the ‘London 11’ Core Group of the Friends of Syria denounce the
Assad regime’s unilateral plan to hold illegitimate presidential elections on 3 June. This
mocks the innocent lives lost in the conflict, utterly contradicts the Geneva communiqué
and is a parody of democracy. Under rules set by the regime, such elections will be
devoid of political participation of millions of Syrians. We call on the entire international
community to reject these illegitimate elections, as the Arab League, United Nations,
United States of America, Turkey and the European Union have already done.
We have agreed unanimously to take further steps together, through a coordinated
strategy, to: increase our support for the moderate opposition National Coalition, its
Supreme Military Council and associated moderate armed groups; hold the Assad
regime accountable for the terror it is perpetrating against its own people and spreading
across the region, including through Security Council referral to the International
Criminal Court; counter the rising forces of extremism; complete the removal of Syria’s
chemical weapons; and step up efforts to deliver humanitarian aid across borders and
across lines irrespective of the consent of the regime. We have directed our officials to
implement a Core Group action plan.
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APPENDIX B:
IRB APPROVAL AND EMAIL TEXT TO INTERVIEWEES

2/7/2017
Konrad Trautman School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies
RE: Expedited Approval for Initial Review
IRB#: Pro00029448
Title: Strategic Negligence: Why the United States Failed to Provide
Military Support to the Syrian Resistance from 2011-2014
Study Approval Period: 2/7/2017 to 2/7/2018
Dear Mr. Trautman:
On 2/7/2017, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and
APPROVED the above application and all documents contained
within, including those outlined below.
Approved Item(s): Protocol Document(s): dis irb protocol version
1 .docx
Consent/Assent Document(s)*: dis irb informed consentv1
Feb1.docx.pdf
*Please use only the official IRB stamped informed consent/assent
document(s) found under the "Attachments" tab. Please note, these
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consent/assent documents are valid until the consent document is
amended and approved.
It was the determination of the IRB that your study qualified for
expedited review which includes activities that (1) present no more than
minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) involve only procedures listed
in one or more of the categories outlined below. The IRB may review
research through the expedited review procedure authorized by
45CFR46.110 and 21 CFR 56.110. The research proposed in this study
is categorized under the following expedited review category:
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior
(including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition,
motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or
practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview,
oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation,
or quality assurance methodologies.
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to
conduct this study in accordance with IRB policies and procedures and
as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the approved research must be
submitted to the IRB for review and approval via an amendment.
Additionally, all unanticipated problems must be reported to the USF
IRB within five (5) calendar days.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject
research at the University of South Florida and your continued
commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions
regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson USF Institutional Review Board
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Email text to:
Ambassador (retired) Robert Ford and
Lieutenant General (LTG) (retired) Charles Cleveland
For the Dissertation
Konrad Trautman
#Pro00029448
January 31, 2017
Email From: Konrad Trautman, trautman2@mail.usf.edu
Email To: Ambassador (retired) Robert Ford and
Lieutenant General (LTG) (retired) Charles Cleveland

Subject: Request to Interview You for a Dissertation Concerning the Syrian Rebellion
Gentlemen,
I am Konrad Trautman, a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida (USF). My
dissertation concerns the early years of the Syrian rebellion and I would like to interview
each of you to solicit your insights into the dissertation’s research question and key
supporting questions. I am asking for your participation because you were key
participants or observers to major elements of the research question and the supporting
subordinate questions.
This is a voluntary study.
My research question is: Why and how did the US military miss the opportunity to
provide military support to the moderate Syrian resistance in the March 2011 – June
2014 period?
My hypothesis is: The US military structure and process for providing advice to the
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the
marginalization of unconventional warfare (support to resistance movements) expertise.
This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying US unconventional
warfare as a strategic option for the nation.
The three subordinate questions are:
(1) Did a moderate resistance force exist in Syria during this time?
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(2) If so, why and how did the US military miss this?
(3) What are the implications for national security practitioners?
The specific questions I would like to ask you are listed below, but your responses may
likely lead to follow-on questions. I would like to ask each of you the first three
questions, with the remaining two only addressed to Lieutenant General (retired)
Cleveland.
Question 1: During this March 2011 – June 2014 period in, in your judgment did
the military see and understand the resistance activities and potential in Syria? If not,
why not?
Question 2: During this period, did the military develop military options to support
to the Syrian resistance? If not, why not?
Question 3: Did you see or hear of any indication that the president proactively or
pre-emptively provided guidance to his national security team to not even consider any
option to support the resistance movement? (This evidence would support the rival
hypothesis.)
Question 4: Are there any bureaucratic-cultural reasons why the conventional
military would not fully understand the strategic option of support to resistance
movements?
Question 5: Are there any structural-functionalism reasons why the military
decision-making process would marginalize unconventional warfare expertise?
Attached is a USF Informed Consent to Participate in Research Involving Minimal Risk.
Please read this form, sign it if you agree to participate, and scan/email it back to me.
Please also advise me on which dates and times would be best for you to conduct the
interview. I intend to ask you for a phone call or a Skype interview, at your
convenience.
I want to also disclose to you that in addition to being a USF doctoral candidate – the
role in which I am contacting you and conducting this interview – that I am also a
serving official with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The views, opinions,
conclusions, and recommendations that will develop in this dissertation are solely my
own and do not represent the views of the Defense Department, DIA, the United States
Special Operations Command, or any other element of the Federal Government.
If you desire to contact the USF, the identification number for this study is
Pro#00029448. My contact information is trautman2@mail.usf.edu and 813-XXXXXXX.
Sincerely,
Konrad Trautman
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Email text to:
Senator John McCain
Major General (MG) (retired) William Rapp
Dr. Christopher J. Lamb
For the Dissertation
Konrad Trautman
#Pro00029448
October 22, 2017
Email From:
Konrad Trautman, trautman2@mail.usf.edu
Email To:
Senator John McCain
Major General (MG) (retired) William Rapp
Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

Subject: Request to Interview You for a Dissertation Concerning the Syrian Rebellion
Gentlemen,
I am Konrad Trautman, a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida (USF). My
dissertation concerns the early years of the Syrian rebellion and I would like to interview
each of you to solicit your insights into the dissertation’s research question and key
supporting questions. I am asking for your participation because you were key
participants or observers to major elements of the research question and the supporting
subordinate questions.
This is a voluntary study.
My research question is: Why and how did the US military miss the opportunity to
provide military support to the moderate Syrian resistance in the March 2011 – June
2014 period?
My hypothesis is: The US military structure and process for providing advice to the
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the
marginalization of unconventional warfare support to resistance movements) expertise.
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This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying US unconventional
warfare as a strategic option for the nation.
The three subordinate questions are:
(1) Did a moderate resistance force exist in Syria during this time?
(2) If so, why and how did the US military miss this?
(3) What are the implications for national security practitioners?
The specific questions I have asked all previous participants are listed below. Based
upon your familiarity with either the events in Syria during this time or the institutional
cultural divides within the conventional and unconventional military elements, we will
tailor the questioning accordingly.
Question 1: During this March 2011 – June 2014 period in, in your judgment did
the military see and understand the resistance activities and potential in Syria? If not,
why not?
Question 2: During this period, did the military develop military options to support
to the Syrian resistance? If not, why not?
Question 3: Did you see or hear of any indication that the president proactively or
pre-emptively provided guidance to his national security team to not even consider any
option to support the resistance movement? (This evidence would support the rival
hypothesis.)
Question 4: Are there any bureaucratic-cultural reasons why the conventional
military would not fully understand the strategic option of support to resistance
movements?
Question 5: Are there any structural-functionalism reasons why the military
decision-making process would marginalize unconventional warfare expertise?
Attached is a USF Informed Consent to Participate in Research Involving Minimal Risk.
Please read this form, sign it if you agree to participate, and scan/email it back to me.
Please also advise me on which dates and times would be best for you to conduct the
interview. We may conduct the interview by phone, Skype, or in person, at your
convenience.
I want to also disclose to you that in addition to being a USF doctoral candidate – the
role in which I am contacting you and conducting this interview – that I am also a
serving official with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The views, opinions,
conclusions, and recommendations that will develop in this dissertation are solely my
own and do not represent the views of the Defense Department, DIA, the United States
Special Operations Command, or any other element of the Federal Government.
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If you desire to contact the USF, the identification number for this study is
Pro#00029448. My contact information is trautman2@mail.usf.edu and 813-XXXXXXX.
Sincerely,
Konrad Trautman
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APPENDIX C:
COPYRIGHT PERMISSION FROM
THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

See following two pages.
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APPENDIX D
GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS349

Combatant Command — A unified or specified command with a broad
continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by
the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called CCMD.
J-2 – Within a combatant command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Staff, the staff sections are assigned “J-codes” to designate their functional
staff specialty. The J-2 staff section is responsible for intelligence.
J-3 – Within a combatant command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Staff, the staff sections are assigned “J-codes” to designate their functional
staff specialty. The J-3 staff section is responsible for operations and short range
or crisis planning.
J-5 – Within a combatant command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Staff, the staff sections are assigned “J-codes” to designate their functional
staff specialty. The J-5 staff section is responsible for long range or deliberate
planning.

US Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, March 2017), accessed April 1, 2017 at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf
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Special Forces — United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped
to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare
capabilities. Also called SF.
Special Operations — Operations requiring unique modes of employment,
tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the
following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through
indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.
Special Operations Forces — Those Active and Reserve Component forces of
the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized,
trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called
SOF.
Terrorism — The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated
by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce
governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.
Theater Special Operations Command — A subordinate unified command
established by a combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and
support joint special operations. Also called TSOC.
Unconventional Warfare — Activities conducted to enable a resistance
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and
guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW.
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Unified Command Plan — The document, approved by the President, that sets
forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their
missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general
geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and
specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also
called UCP. See also combatant command; combatant commander.
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